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Abstract 
 
Decentralisation to a variety of spatial scales is a prominent global trend in government and 
governance. Uneven decentralisation of powers, responsibilities and resources has placed a 
greater focus on local actors and the governance of cities and city-regions to coordinate local 
institutions and capacity.  
 
This thesis examines the changing role and structure of the local state in the evolving sub-
national frameworks of government and governance for economic development and how this 
has been unfolded by national and local actors across different scales. The empirical study 
focuses upon the cases of Greater Manchester and the North East in England. 
 
The English case presents an advanced example of local state restructuring within a highly 
centralised governance system marked by continuous reorganisation of sub-national 
governance arrangements in the post-war period, including the abolition of the regional tier by 
the Coalition government in 2010. 
 
Critically engaging with the literature on the autonomy and agency of the local state, and local 
institutions and economic development, a framework is proposed to understand and explain 
the implications for local government within a shifting landscape of decentralisation and 
austerity. The framework is used to examine and explain how sub-national government and 
governance has changed in the North East and Greater Manchester. 
 
The research demonstrates that amidst a reconfiguration of responsibilities involving 
(re)centralisation and decentralisation, and unprecedented reductions and incremental moves 
towards the localisation of funding and financing; local government remains pivotal in the sub 
national governance of economic development but in new and reworked approaches and 
institutional forms. 
 
This research contributes empirically towards questions on the role and contribution of local 
institutions in economic development by examining what these changes mean for the elected 
and unelected local state in the development of localities. Emerging from this are contributions 
to theorising the local state and its role in economic development in terms of institutional 
permanence and inter-generational outcomes and on adapting accountability and scrutiny in 
shifting institutional forms. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Towards decentralisation and localism in a centralised state?  
Decentralisation to a variety of spatial scales is a prominent global trend in government and 
governance. However, the type and nature of decentralisation and localism made available to 
sub-national tiers is highly uneven and variegated (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010; 
CURDS and LSE, 2011). While the principle of subsidiarity and transferring decision making 
to the lowest possible level is generally accepted as necessary for effective and efficient sub-
national economic development (Tiebout, 1956), the interpretation and implementation of 
decentralisation and localism in practice, by central governments, presents an uneven picture. 
In the UK economy, which is embedded in a highly centralised state, the uneven (and partial) 
implementation of decentralisation is even more pronounced. 
Alongside this trend, the growing importance of cities and city-regions as a critical scale in 
decentralisation and localism has brought greater attention to the capacity and capability of 
the local state (see for example Harding, 2007; Jonas and Ward, 2007). A particular concern 
is how local state actors adapt and reconfigure in new frameworks of government and 
governance at the city-region scale, to enable and facilitate an economic development and 
growth agenda. A pivotal actor in the local state is local government with a unique set of 
objectives and responsibilities. However, in this latest episode of decentralisation, the role 
and contribution of local government in the local state has been reshaped and challenged in 
the broader context of restructuring, crisis and austerity within the distinctive political-
economy and institutions of a highly centralised state. 
The roles of local government in the local state in shifting cycles of decentralisation and 
localism have continued to be questioned over time (Cockburn, 1977; Cochrane, 1993; Ward 
et al., 2015). More recently, contributions on networks and governance theory have 
overlooked the role and contribution of the local government in these institutional 
arrangements, perhaps reflecting a decline in the theoretical interest in local government as 
well as its power base (Ward et al., 2015).  
This research aims to understand and explain the changing role and structure of the local state 
in new frameworks of government and governance for economic development and how this 
has unfolded unevenly across scales, places and actors. In doing so the research examines the 
extent to which local government remains a pivotal actor in the governance of economic 
development in increasingly multi-level and multi-actor configurations of the local state. The 
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motivation for this study was twofold. First, to critically examine and explain this episode of 
decentralisation and localism and make explicit the underpinning assumptions and arguments 
of the local and central actors involved. Second, to explore the unique role of local 
government in the context of the governance of uneven development and across relational 
spaces. Chapter 2 explores these questions and contributions in more detail. This next section 
explains how these terms are defined in the research and why this focus was selected. 
 
1.2 Revisiting conceptualisations of the local state 
This research examines the changing role and structure of the local state in economic 
development. The focus on local government in the local state is to address a gap in the 
literature in understanding the role of political institutions in economic development and how 
their qualities and capacities shape the activity of other actors and economic outcomes 
(Helpman, 2004; Tomaney, 2013).  
The definition of the local state used in this research draws on the distinction between local 
administration (local governance) and local democratic representation (local government) 
(Williams, 1998) to describe the local state in terms of the different local governance actors 
for economic development working alongside local government – as one element in the local 
state (Cochrane, 1993). Developing this further, this research argues that local government is 
not just one actor in the state but the pivotal actor, shaping the coordination and capacity of 
other actors, and this has become even more important with decentralisation and austerity. 
The distinction between local government and the local state is addressed in this research by 
examining frameworks of both government and governance simultaneously and recognising 
the role that local government plays within a broader multi-scalar and multi-agent context. 
In the context of a Schumpeterian workfare state (SWS), focused on the promotion of 
innovation and competitiveness (Goodwin et al., 1993; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), local 
government’s transition towards an enabler, facilitator and commissioner of services in a 
market-oriented, neoliberal governance system has placed local government in a complex 
web of agents involved in the development of local economies (Bennett, 1997). A renewed 
territorial policy and decentralisation focus on cities and metropolitan governance has also 
turned attention to the local state. In particular, in the context of declining state capacity, 
relational interpretations of place, and a broadening field of economic development under 
decentralisation encompassing a greater number of interests and policy domains. This 
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research develops the argument that these changes have also increased local government’s 
relevance in the local state.  
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive discussion of the themes and transformations of local 
government and the local state. This builds on a critique of the local state’s linear depiction in 
earlier conceptualisations and questions on its conceptual relevance in a fragmented context. 
The review of the literature identified four perspectives in understanding and conceptualising 
the local state relevant to this study. First, how the relationship between local government 
and the local state is defined in new approaches to economic development and growth 
(Section 2.2.1). Second, examining the autonomy and agency of the local state in relation to 
frameworks of government and territorial development (Section 2.2.2). Third, examining 
both territorial and relational perspectives on the local state to understand how new localities 
are formed (Section 2.2.3). Fourth, exploring the politics of the local state to examine the 
interrelations between different sets of actors operating in and across the local state (Section 
2.2.4). Examining these perspectives alongside a better understanding of the way local 
economies are governed for economic development (2.3) and of how processes of 
decentralisation and rescaling have unfolded at the local level (2.4) allow for a multi-scalar 
and multi-actor analysis of the local state.  
The review of the literature on local institutions, the local state and economic development 
(Chapter 2) identified further questions or ‘gaps’ to be explored through the empirical 
research and these informed the research questions for this study: 
 
1. What is the local state’s role in economic development and how is it shaped by new 
and dominant approaches to local and regional development? 
2. What characterizes the government’s programme of changes to the sub-national 
governance of economic development? 
3. How and why have changes to powers unfolded unevenly across scales, actors and 
places? 
4. What do these changes mean for centre-local relations in the sub-national governance 
of economic development? 
 
1.3 The framework for research: a comparative case study approach 
This was an in-depth and qualitative study to be able to uncover and explain the complexities 
of local institutions in frameworks of government and governance for economic 
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development. The research drew on the analysis of interviews and secondary data to 
construct case studies to explain how the role of local government has unfolded in a city-
region context. 
To address the aim of the research and examine how decentralisation changes have unfolded 
across and between different spatial scales, geographic contexts, and actors; the research was 
comparative and looked beyond the core case study to other city-region examples to develop 
a rich and nuanced understanding of the governance changes as well as a finer grained 
analysis of the core case study itself. The focus of the comparison was on how 
decentralisation changes for the government and governance of economic development have 
unfolded across economically similar cases within a single national context but with different 
governance and economic development outcomes.  
The UK was selected as the focus of the empirical research to understand processes of 
decentralisation within a highly centralised state. There have been studies that have addressed 
local state reform in more decentralised countries, for example in Western Europe (Tselios et 
al., 2012) and across OECD countries (Charbit, 2011). Despite experimenting with 
decentralisation to the sub-national level in various spatial imaginaries (regions, city-regions, 
pan-regions), successive governments have failed to redress the balance of fiscal 
decentralisation and local autonomy (CURDS and LSE, 2011; CLG Committee, 2014; 
London Finance Commission, 2013: Pike et al., 2015). The 2010 Coalition government 
identified decentralisation, rebalancing and localism as a priority. This study examined 
decentralisation changes for the sub-national government and governance of economic 
development over the five year parliamentary term and continuing into the Conservative’s 
administration. This was to understand the particular type and nature of decentralisation and 
how it has unfolded, shaped by the distinctive political-economy and institutions of the local 
and central state. 
The North East (NE) and Greater Manchester (GM) were selected as the case studies using 
Flyvbjerg’s information-oriented strategy and an ‘extreme/deviant’ case selection approach to 
obtain information on unusual cases that can be especially problematic or especially good 
(Flyvbjerg 2006: 229-30). Both case studies are in the North of England and have an 
industrial past and post-industrial legacy, with sector strengths in innovation but also with 
some of the of the most deprived wards in England. Both case studies were former 
metropolitan councils in the early 1980s, and city region development pilots in the 2000s 
(albeit the NE had a different city-region geography) and have Core Cities, Manchester and 
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Newcastle, in their city-regions. Greater Manchester was the first to establish a Combined 
Authority in 2011 based on an already-functioning city-region geography, were in the first 
wave of Local Enterprise Partnerships in 2011, secured the first devolution deal in 2014, in 
addition to subsequent deals and became the Coalition’s trailblazer for devolution and model 
of governance for others to look to (Blond and Morrin, 2014). The North East established a 
new city-region governance scale in 2010, formed a Local Enterprise Partnership also in the 
first wave in 2011, and a Combined Authority at a later stage in 2014. To date, the NE has 
been unable to agree a devolution deal between local partners and with central government 
with prospective deals being abandoned through local and central negotiations. In contrast to 
the coherent local state collaboration over decades in GM, the NE’s history of collaboration 
is one of churn and fragmentation between local actors. 
This study draws upon academic work that has examined the political economy and social, 
and cultural evolution of the Greater Manchester and North East local economies and in 
relation to urban governance. In the North East, the earlier work on the politics of local state 
(Shaw, 1990a; Shaw, 1990b; Shaw, 1993), on post-industrial Tyneside (Byrne, 1989) and on 
moving forward from the 2004 referendum on an Elected Regional Assembly for the North 
East (Shaw and Robinson, 2007) and emergence of city-regions (OECD, 2006). From 2010, 
analyses of the changes to the sub national level and implications for the local level (Shaw 
and Greenhalgh, 2010; Shaw and Robinson, 2012; Shaw, 2012) and promoting local growth 
(OECD, 2012; OECD, 2015). In Greater Manchester, the seminal work of Tickell and Peck 
(1996) on who governs Manchester has informed a body of critical work examining the urban 
transformation and restructuring of Manchester and Greater Manchester (e.g. Peck and Ward, 
2002). More recent work has examined the role of Manchester and progress under the 
Coalition government’s programme of devolution (Ward et al., 2015; Haughton et al. (2016) 
as well as the evolution of the city-region (Deas et al., 2014; OECD, 2015). 
In total, 50 in-depth interviews were undertaken with local economic actors in GM and the 
NE, in addition to a small number of interviews in central government and cities networks. 
The framework of analysis was developed through a series of research propositions that 
emerged from a review of the literature and guided analysis of the empirical material. 
A relational comparative approach (Ward, 2010) encouraged cross-case examination critical 
insight and reflection on the core case study and comparator case study. This helped to draw 
out and reflect upon the similarities and differences between the cases and how the broader 
processes of change were mediated and attenuated in different institutional, spatial and 
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temporal settings. The outcome of the comparative research was a more detailed 
understanding of the diversity of cities in relation to theories rather than identifying ideal 
types of governance (Robinson, 2002; Ward, 2010). 
The study commenced in September 2011 and the fieldwork was conducted between June 
2015 and February 2016. There were a number of reasons for this. First, arriving at this stage 
in the research following a period of maternity leave. Second, waiting until after the May 
2015 General Election so all interviews could be conducted in the same political context and 
reflect back on the 2010-2015 Coalition government term. Third, delaying approaching 
potential interviewees in the North East due to the sensitive devolution discussions underway 
at that time. 
 
The outcome of the General Election saw political control shift from the Conservative-
Liberal Democrats Coalition government to overall Conservative control. The Rt Hon George 
Osborne remained as Chancellor for the new political term and continued to prioritise 
reducing the deficit and cuts to local government funding in order to balance the budget by 
2020, thus presiding over the ongoing challenging circumstances for local government that 
began under the Coalition government. The research sought to understand and explain the 
different implications for local government from policy and funding changes introduced over 
the period 2010-15, which was the term of the Coalition government. As the study period as 
well as the fieldwork and analysis came before the 23 June 2016 Referendum to Leave the 
European Union, this has not been reflected upon. The study was written up over the course 
of 2016-17.  
 
1.4 Conceptual and theoretical contributions 
The aim of the study was to understand and explain how new frameworks of government and 
governance for economic development have unfolded across scales, places and actors. The 
purpose was to examine the extent to which local government remained a pivotal actor in 
economic development in increasingly multi-level and multi-actor contexts and in a climate 
of reduced public resources. A review of the literature on local institutions, the local state and 
economic development provided an understanding of existing conceptual frameworks to 
examine the local state in economic development in addition to highlighting gaps and 
opportunities to build new insight in a number of areas relating to the autonomy and agency, 
type and nature of decentralisation, horizontal coordination, and centre local relations. 
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The analysis showed that this was an expanding area of both academic and policy interest and 
particularly in the context of addressing uneven development. However, within debates on 
approaches to sub national growth (OECD, 2012; Glaeser, 2012, Pike et al., 2017), there are 
diverging perspectives on both where development and growth activity should be spatially 
concentrated in a national context, on the capacity and capability of city-region actors to 
mobilise in response to opportunities and through new forms of urban governance (Nelles, 
2012; Ahrend et al., 2014), and on role of state institutions in facilitating and enabling 
development and growth (Tomaney, 2013). In increasingly multi-level and multi-actor 
configurations of government and governance for economic development and with Urban 
Economics as a dominant paradigm of growth shaping where growth happens as well as who 
is involved in shaping it; the role and contribution of local government to new forms of urban 
governance has been overlooked. 
The research offers distinctive contribution to these academic and policy debates by 
providing a finer grained understanding and appreciation of: first, why institutions matter and 
how they influence the governance of economic development (Rafiqui, 2009; Farole et al., 
2011; Pike et al., 2015); second, of local government in the local state in order to understand 
its unique role as a political institution and the political factors that “shape incentives for 
economic action” (Tomaney 2013: 6); third, to understand how new frameworks of 
government and governance have unfolded differently for city-regions in England to 
understand and explain the variation in governance and decentralisation outcomes (Gertler, 
2010); fourth, through a relational comparative approach, reveal the uneven ways in which 
the broader processes are mediated in particular city and city-regional contexts, drawing out 
similarities and differences. Also to provide a critical and in-depth analysis of the Greater 
Manchester model of governance that has been the template and shaped the Coalition 
government’s approach to decentralisation and devolution to cities, to sit alongside the many 
normative accounts of its success (cf. Emmerich et al., 2013; Holden and Harding, 2015; 
OECD, 2015), alongside a less successful and less well interrogated example from the North 
East. Finally, to provide lessons on collaboration across the local state as well as the role of 
the centre for future local governance experiments. 
The first contribution from the research demonstrates that local government remains a pivotal 
actor in the local state in the governance of economic development but in new and changed 
forms.  The review of the literature showed that analyses of urban governance can overlook 
the role and contribution of local government as an economic actor in local state 
configurations. This contribution builds on existing work examining the shift back from 
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governance to government (Koch, 2013) and the contribution of a qualitative state (Pike and 
Tomaney, 2009) by exploring the unique role of local government in a multi-level and multi-
actor context of the local state. The empirical analysis showed how local government remains 
a pivotal in the local state for economic development with new enhanced responsibilities at a 
sub-national level, working in new institutional forms of groups of local authorities, and in 
both a reduced climate of resources and shift towards an increased reliance on growth 
incentivised funding. The fundamental characteristics of local government – of democratic 
representation and delivering a unique set of public missions such as justice and equality – 
are critical roles and responsibilities that are being implemented and challenged in new ways. 
This includes acting as representative governance at new city-region scales and having 
economic and social levers at their disposal in a broadening field of economic development. 
Analysis of the two cases showed the territorial challenges of relational ways of working and 
how dominant political actors and interests can lead to ‘political lock-in’ of established 
approaches. 
The second contribution demonstrates the need for a greater consideration of multi-actor and 
multi-level arrangements in the local state, in which local government and centre-local 
relations are critical. This argues for not only examining horizontal governance and the 
interests of different actors in the local state, but also understanding this in relation to 
frameworks of government. This is to understand and explain how the autonomy and agency 
of the local state is contingent upon local and central government. This is important to 
understanding explaining the autonomy and agency of the local state particularly in the 
context of a broadening field of economic development powers and responsibilities. 
This includes how the role and responsibilities of the central state are often largely undefined 
and unaccounted for in supporting sub-national economic development, despite this being 
critical to the agency and autonomy of the local state. This research has found that by leaving 
opaque the contingencies of the local state on the central state this can undermine its agency 
and autonomy as well as prevent local actors holding central government to account for 
commitments to resources and implementation, to also reduce uncertainty. Second, with more 
integrated approaches to economic development across different policy areas and 
geographies (see below) and more open and ‘bottom up’ approaches to collaboration and 
governance giving a greater number of local actors a stake in determining priorities and 
investment, the governance mechanisms required to negotiate a more diverse range of 
interests and how this will be coordinated and by whom, link back to representative 
democracy becomes a challenge in multi-level and multi-actor governance systems.  
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The third contribution of the thesis demonstrates that a ‘centrally-prescribed’ version of 
localism has shaped the agency of the local state to implement new forms of governance and 
economic development. This refers to the type and nature of decentralisation and localism 
implemented by the Coalition government and explains how and why it has unfolded 
differently across scales, places and actors. The literature shows that different forms of 
variegation of decentralisation and localism are not sufficiently examined and this can 
explain the uneven outcomes of localities. The research showed that local states were not 
only shaped by the type of decentralisation and localism on offer, but also how changes were 
implemented. In this latest episode of decentralisation in England, the Coalition government 
pursued a process and form of politics which resulted in deep and fast reductions to local 
government funding, and rescaling of the financial crisis to the local and urban scale. These 
insights build on the work of Peck (2012) and Meegan et al. (2014) looking at austerity 
urbanism and urban politics, and Wills (2016) on localism. 
The empirical analysis showed how an overriding focus on reducing the deficit and austerity 
underpinned all decentralisation and localism activity. These objectives were not always 
explicit, nor was their consideration of the impact of cumulative changes to local government 
and the local state. A clear example of centrally-prescribed localism was the Coalition’s 
focus on decentralisation of economic development powers and responsibilities to, arbitrarily 
defined, functional economic areas as the preferred scale. Also the specific governance 
requirement to have a directly-elected metro mayor to acquire substantive powers and local 
flexibility. Some interviewees perceived this to be backdoor restructuring and rationalising of 
local government, particularly given the scale of austerity borne by the local level through 
cuts and expectation to absorb further savings as reduced pots of funding were decentralised. 
The Chancellor’s advocacy of the GM model of governance and devolution for other places 
to follow, also provided a challenge for local areas configured differently. 
The fourth contribution is that economic development has become further integrated with 
social policy through a focus on economic growth, austerity and changes to local government 
finance. This emerging contribution finds that a more explicit link between economic and 
social policy at the sub-national level has emerged under decentralisation. Social policy is 
now more geared and linked to economic policy and its focus upon economic 
competitiveness and growth at the sub-national and city-regional scale. 
The empirical analysis showed that greater integration of economic development and social 
policy was developed through an economic discourse and narrative on how spending in social 
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policy made economic sense to reducing the deficit. Also through the shifting nature of local 
government finance, away from grant funding to growth-incentivised funding sources, such 
as business rates and council tax, creating a dependency for local authorities to fulfil their 
statutory duties through economic development and growth. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides a critical review and analysis of the underpinning literature on local 
institutions, the local state and economic development. This grounds the study, frames the 
empirical research and sets out its contemporary relevance. The chapter is organised into four 
sections to examine: the contemporary relevance and focus of examining local institutions in 
economic (2.1); critically examining definitions and conceptualisations of the local state 
(2.2); critically reflecting on the general changes that have shaped, and are continuing to 
shape, the way local economies are governed for economic development (2.3); and how 
processes of decentralisation and rescaling have unfolded at the local level (2.4).  
Breaking this down, in Section 2.1, an institutionalist perspective is developed that recognises 
the politics of governance and complex political-economy of the local and central state, to 
examine and interpret decentralisation changes and how they have unfolded across scales, 
places and actors. Section 2.1.1. examines how institutions are defined in order to understand 
the different manifestations and configurations that emerge and highlighting the interaction 
between formal and informal institutions as important to understanding the institutional 
framework. Section 2.1.2 identifies political institutions as a critical institution in economic 
development. Examining how politics interacts with institutions in the local state for 
economic development is a central aim of this study and this section discusses the importance 
and focus of addressing this. In Section 2.1.3 the role and functions of institutions in 
economic development are explored to understand the variety of demands and relationships 
involved in the governance of economic development and examining not just what they do 
but the processes that enable or constrain them.  
Section 2.2 introduces the local state in economic development and explores different 
frameworks of analysis to develop an understanding of urban governance within multi-level 
and multi-actor settings and to identify gaps to address through empirical research. Section 
2.2.1 explores definitions and conceptualisations of the local state to understand and explain 
the distinctive role of local government in the local state and to identify the limitations of 
existing interpretations. Section 2.2.2 explores the agency and autonomy of the local state 
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and in particular the exogenous and endogenous sources that generate institutional change 
and how these are mediated and negotiated locally. In Section 2.2.3, the geographies of the 
local state are examined to understand the territorial and relational perspectives and tensions 
that manifest in governing across new economic geographies and in multi-scalar frameworks 
of governance. Following on from this discussion, Section 2.2.4 explores what these multi-
level and multi-actor relationships means for negotiating the politics of the local state across 
political and administrative boundaries and with the central state. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 
examine the general changes and transformations in the local state.  
Chapter 3 introduces the methodological approach in the study to address the aim and 
research questions, explores important considerations in undertaking comparative research 
and in economic geography, and provides the justification and context for the study focus and 
case studies. 
Chapters 4-7 introduce and discuss the empirical analysis. The chapters begin with examining 
the national context and the distinctive political economy and institutions of the central state 
that interacted with the local state to shape governance outcomes. The experiences of the two 
case studies are then examined and discussed to explain how and why changes have unfolded 
unevenly across places, scales and actors. 
Chapter 8 draws together the study conclusions, addresses the research questions, and offers 
theoretical and conceptual contributions in addition to reflections on future research.  
 
1.6 Research aim and questions 
The overall aim of the research was to examine the changing role and structure of the local 
state in new frameworks of government and governance for economic development and how 
this has unfolded differently across scales, places and actors. The main argument of the 
research – and its contemporary theoretical and policy relevance – is that local government 
remains a pivotal actor in the governance of economic development. In the context of what 
appears to be constant restructure and upheaval of the local state; local government, as 
suggested by Barnett (2013), maintains a degree of permanence despite constant talk of its 
demise. This research demonstrates how local government has become more important in the 
context of decentralisation and austerity, but in new and changed forms. The research 
therefore sought to: first, critically review the emergent concepts and theories on the local 
state in the context of new approaches to local and regional development and policy. Second, 
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identify the new and emergent forms of institutions, governance arrangements and policy for 
local and regional development in an international context. Third, examine the actors and 
explain the structures, roles and relationships involved in economic development for the case 
studies. Fourth, develop an analytical framework to interpret and assess the sub-national 
changes. The research questions are set out below: 
 
1. What is the local state’s role in economic development and how is it shaped by new 
and dominant approaches to local and regional development? 
2. What characterises the government’s programme of changes to the sub-national 
governance of economic development? 
3. How and why have changes to powers unfolded unevenly across scales, actors and 
places? 
4. What do these changes mean for centre-local relations in the sub-national governance 
of economic development? 
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Chapter 2. Local institutions, the local state and economic development 
 
2.1 Local institutions and economic development: contemporary relevance and 
developing a critical approach   
This chapter examines and grounds the study in the literature on local institutions, the local 
state and economic development to frame the research in wider theoretical debates as well as 
to highlight gaps in the literature that the research will seek to address. The chapter explores 
this in two parts. First, the role and contribution of local institutions in economic 
development is examined. Crucial to this is defining institutions and then examining those 
institutions that are critical to economic development and their role and functions. This 
analysis argues that the role of local government as a political institution in the local state is 
critical to the overall functioning of economic development activities. Second, the chapter 
examines in depth the role and contribution of local government to economic development in 
the local state to understand and explain how governance processes and relationships unfold. 
 
The local level and city-region scale is a relevant geographic scale to examine how 
institutions seek to structure and shape the agency and relationships of economic actors, to 
examine the role of extra-local relations and processes in establishing and conditioning how 
institutions operate, and to explore how institutions adapt and cope with change, disruption 
and uncertainty (Pike et al., 2015). Furthermore, the scale of city region and metropolitan 
areas plays an important role in the governance of economic development (Wills, 2016).  
 
The role and contribution of institutions in economic development as a source of inquiry in 
economic geography research, continues to generate both interest and scrutiny as scholars 
and practitioners explore ways to explain the geographically differentiated growth of cities 
and localities. The global trend of political and administrative decentralisation to a variety of 
spatial scales (Tomaney, 2013; Faguet, 2013) has opened up regions and localities to the 
opportunities and challenges of territorial competition and sparked a search for ‘multi-scalar 
fixes’ (Brenner, 2009; Pike and Tomaney, 2009; Pike et al., 2015). However these 
institutions and local actors are embedded in multilevel hierarchies that define to a large 
extent their scope and action and how they interact with existing forms and structures (Pierre, 
2011), and in an increasingly contested space of scale and urban politics. Furthermore, the 
recent economic downturn and austerity state has cast a more critical lens on public 
institutions in a context of declining state capacity (Streeck and Mertens, 2013), declining 
democratic capacity and electoral disengagement (Crouch, 2011). 
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Recent academic contributions (Gertler, 2010; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013; Tomaney, 2013; Pike 
et al., 2015), building on a longstanding institutionalist strand of literature (cf. North, 1990; 
Rodrik, 2003; Faguet, 2013) have sought to re-examine the relationship between institutions 
and economic development and to provide a “richer account” (Rodrik 2003: 12) and more 
“finely grained appreciation of the geography of institutional variation” (Gertler 2010: 5). 
These studies contribute towards a better understanding of the origins of institutions, 
relationship between scales, and their ability to effect evolutionary change over time. 
 
2.1.1 Defining institutions in relation to growth and development  
To examine and explain the “distinctive institutional manifestations and configurations” 
(Pike et al. 2015: 188) that emerge in different geographical contexts, at different scales and 
at different speeds, institutions must first be defined. The most commonly cited definition is 
that by North who describes institutions as “the rules of the game in a society; (and) more 
formally, (as) the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990: 
477). According to Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, most of the literature tends to agree with a 
“two-tier division” (2006: 10): ‘formal’ or ‘hard’ institutions or ‘society’, and, ‘informal’, 
‘tacit’, ‘soft’ institutions, ‘community’ or social capital (Amin, 1999; Pike et al., 2015). 
Expanding on North’s definition, Fukuyama describes how ‘formal’ institutions (also known 
as ‘hard’ institutions or ‘society’) can be regarded as universal and transferable rules and 
generally include constitutions, laws, charters, bylaws and regulations, as well as elements 
such as the rule of law and property rights and contract and competition monitoring systems 
(Fukuyama 2000: 6). In contrast ‘informal’ institutions (also known as ‘soft’ institutions, 
‘community’ or social capital) include a series of features of group life “such as norms, 
traditions and social conventions, interpersonal contacts, relationships, and informal 
networks” which Fukuyama describes as essential for generating trust (2000: 3). 
 
An important distinction to draw upon in North’s work, is to separate institutions, “rules of 
the game”, from organisations, “players of the game” to understand and analyse the evolution 
of economic systems (Rafiqui 2009: 335-336). A distinction also made by Storper (1997) 
who describes institutions (underlying rules of practice and conventions between individuals 
and organisations) and organisations (specific administrative and political forms). North 
emphasises the constant interaction between the institutions and organisations, “what 
organizations come into existence and how they evolve is influenced by the institutional 
framework. In turn they influence how the institutional framework evolves” (1990: 5). This 
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interaction can also be examined using Martin’s description of the ‘institutional environment’ 
and ‘institutional arrangements’ (2000: 79),  
“The ‘institutional environment’ [that] refers to both the systems of informal 
conventions, customs, norms, and social routines… and the formal… structures of 
rules, regulations… which constrain and control socioeconomic behaviour… [and 
the] ‘institutional arrangements’ … used to denote the particular organisational 
forms… which arise as a consequence of, and whose constitution and operation are 
governed by, the institutional environment.” 
 
From this analysis, Pike et al. (2015) recommend further examination the interaction between 
the institutional environment and arrangements and how this shapes economic behaviours 
and outcomes across and between different spatial levels and in particular geographical 
contexts through the “institutional regime”, as an important issue that requires further 
examination (Pike et al. 2015: 5). Further to this, and in order to better understand the 
approaches and methods used to shape economic behaviours and why some approaches are 
more effective than others, a finer grain analysis of the interrelations between formal and 
informal institutions (Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 2006) within the institutional environment 
could reveal more about these processes. The OECD (2012: 25) underscores the important 
interplay between formal and informal institutions that creates opportunities for negotiation 
and dialogue among key actors that mobilises and integrates them into the development 
process, the focus being on enhancing policy continuity, creating a cohesive voice external to 
the locality and region and fostering linkages between private and public sectors. Nelles 
(2012) research on intermunicipal cooperation stresses the importance of flexible 
arrangements, partnerships and collaboration, alongside structures, in tackling metropolitan 
issues. Also, the relationship between institutional quality and economic performance is 
widely recognised – better, stable institutions contribute to better economic performance 
however it is more difficult to demonstrate this (OECD Regional Outlook, 2014). 
 
Notwithstanding a growing policy salience of the role of institutions in local and regional 
development, there remain limitations in the theory and understanding of institutions and the 
difference they make (Tomaney, 2013) and particularly at the local level (Pike et al., 2015). It 
is argued that institutions remain “poorly understood and under-appreciated in specific 
disciplinary domains relevant to economic development at specific spatial levels and in 
particular geographical contexts” (Pike et al. 2015: 3). Empirical studies point to the 
difficulty of determining the impact of effective (and ineffective) institutions on economic 
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development prospects (e.g. OECD, 2012; Rodriguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2013), pointing to 
the importance of qualitative case study research to address this. A qualitative research 
approach can help to explain “which institutions, when they matter, and precisely how they 
shape growth” (Farole et al. 2011: 59, emphasis in original). However, the challenge for 
comparative research is to move beyond the idea that institutions matter and differ between 
places to “pin point exactly how they influence economic development” (Rafiqui 2009: 339) 
and to examine interactions between institutions and economic development at different 
geographic scales (Gertler 2010: 5-6). The imperative for this being the growing evidence 
that local solutions may not have sufficient scale to address economic development issues 
that span political and administrative boundaries, requiring increasingly “interlocal and 
interorganizational” forms of governance (Peck and Tickell 2002: 393). For urban or 
metropolitan areas within regions, the evidence points to coordinated intervention across 
functional economic areas to capitalise on economic flows (Katz and Bradley, 2013). Also 
forms of intermunicipal cooperation and collaboration, both formally binding and informal, 
are becoming more prevalent (Nelles, 2012; OECD, 2012). 
 
How we come to understand the role and contribution of institutions and the local state is also 
shaped by different approaches to local and regional development and growth. The dominant 
approaches to growth advanced in the 2000s include New Economic Geography and Urban 
Economics and the work of Glaeser (2012; see Tomaney, 2013 for a critique). These 
perspectives advocating concentrating growth in larger cities and connecting smaller places 
through supply side measures to benefit from external spillovers from agglomeration 
economies. A counter-perspective to this is ‘place based’ policies for development – which 
point to sources of growth being diverse as well as locations (OECD, 2012) and is providing 
a counterweight to these hegemonic ideas (cf. Barca et al., 2012; OECD, 2012). This 
approach highlights the instrumental role of institutions in supporting growth but equally 
where institutions are ineffective this can have a negative impact. 
 
2.1.2 Political institutions critical in the local state 
Recognising the role of informal and soft institutions alongside the more traditional and hard 
institutions assigns an important role for political institutions in the governance of economic 
development. Political institutions at the local and city-region level refer to local government 
or groups of individual local authorities and their associated structures. However, in 
recognising that institutions cannot be reduced to specific organisations using the 
‘informal/formal institutions’ definition (Storper 1997: 268; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013), political 
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institutions can therefore be expressed as, an important actor within the system of economic 
development government and governance at the city-region level (formal institution) and also 
part of the traditions of cooperative working between public, private and civic institutions 
(informal institution) (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). 
 
In the human geography literature on institutions and development, Tomaney (2014) 
highlights a gap in understanding how politics interacts with institutions in shaping 
development policies and outcomes and why there are differences in subnational economic 
performance (Dellephiane-Avellaneda, 2009). North (2005: 57) ascribes this to the “primacy 
of politics”, in that “it is the polity that defines and enforces the economic rules of the game 
and therefore is the primary source of economic performance”. This includes affecting the 
ability to innovate and to implement new technologies through political institutions framing 
the struggle between proponents of change and their opponents (Helpman 2004: 315).  In 
evolutionary economic geography, this is also described as “political lock-in” (Hassink 2007: 
1147), which can occur when institutions aimed at preserving existing traditional structures 
slow down industrial restructuring, thereby obstructing the development of indigenous 
potential and creativity. In contrast to economic decisions, political decisions are of a 
different nature, reflecting “complex, moral, ethical and ‘non-rational’ reasoning – or diverse 
rationalities (DiMaggio, 1998), and “create the conditions in which markets and economies 
evolve” (Tomaney, 2014: 135-136). Tomaney argues that a better understanding of the 
qualities and capacities of local political institutions would lead to a better understanding of 
how political factors shape incentives for economic action (2014).  
 
Around the world, the political system at the local level varies from, the small, fragmented 
and powerless American municipalities to the politically and financially strong local 
authorities of Scandinavian countries (Pierre, 2011). Notwithstanding this, in the United 
States of America there have been recent examples of local and metropolitan scale 
governance innovation not least in response to a post-recession federal state hiatus (Katz and 
Bradley, 2013) and reported downscaling of austerity impacts (Peck, 2012). The process for 
how economic development takes place and who is involved is the topic of contemporary 
academic and policy discussions. This is particularly the case for political institutions that 
seek to make sense of a context defined by austere growth and fiscal constraints, shifting 
scales and economic territories, electoral disengagement, and a lack of trust in political 
parties within modern democracies. Also, the suitability of politicians, to set tough, 
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discriminating objectives in economic development cannot be assumed (Hanssen et al. 2011: 
48). 
 
2.1.3 The roles and functions of institutions in economic development 
There are many ways of defining local economic development including whether 
development is seen as being a ‘top-down’ versus a ‘bottom-up’ intervention. The following 
definition is employed here to highlight the collective nature of the process of economic 
development and one that is focused on outcomes,  
“the purpose of local economic development is to build up the economic capacity of a 
local area to improve its economic future and the quality of life for all. It is a process 
by which public, business and non-governmental sector partners work collectively to 
create better conditions for economic growth and employment generation” (Swinburn 
et al. 2006: 1).   
The collaborative focus described above has implications for the role and focus of 
institutions. The role and functions performed by institutions in economic development at the 
local level depends upon the nation state context and both the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
institution characteristics, introduced in the previous section (Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 
2006). However there are some more general themes that can be extracted from the literature 
in the context of political institutions. Governance frameworks for economic development are 
increasingly multi scalar and multi agent, this places demands on new and existing 
institutions to negotiate vertically (with supranational, national and regional structures) and 
horizontally (in coordinating and mobilising other actors in the public, private and civic 
sectors) - across scales and agents - to achieve development outcomes. An important role for 
institutions in these frameworks is therefore,   
“…reducing uncertainty for local actors, for example, institutions undertake important 
work in diagnosing local economic development circumstances and issues, leading 
actors in deliberation and selection of priorities, formulating development strategies 
appropriate to local contexts and situations, and pooling and aligning resources and 
investments” (Pike et al. 2015a: 11). 
 
In addition to the range of role and functions of institutions in local economic development, 
Pike et al. (2015a), attention should also be given to not just what institutions do in terms of 
responsibilities, but how those responsibilities are implemented in practice and the 
democratically accountable and politically autonomous arrangements in place, in addition to 
the extent to which they further these goals. Analysing the role of functions of local 
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institutions in economic development in isolation is not sufficient to determine the 
contribution. For political institutions, such as local government, the ability of these 
institutions to exercise their role and function in economic development as with other policy 
areas is also determined by autonomy and resources. Using Pierre’s (2014) distinction of two 
types of autonomy: ‘vertical autonomy’ referring to constitutional arrangements and 
‘horizontal autonomy’ referring to the relationship between the local authority and other 
actors on the local level, Pierre stresses that formal, vertical autonomy both facilitates and 
constrains political action (2014: 880-881), a reminder that the relationship between central 
and local government is an important dimension to examine. 
 
In summary, this introduction to institutions and economic development has examined the 
main concepts and theories to understand the role and contribution of institutions in the 
context of uneven development. This has shown a recognition that institutions can shape 
economic development but that a more finely grained analysis of exactly how is currently 
lacking to understand and explain the distinctive institutional manifestations and 
configurations. In particular there is limited knowledge relating to the interrelations between 
formal and informal institutions and on the qualities and capacities of political institutions in 
shaping incentives for economic action which will be examined in this study. The next 
section will focus on examining the political institution of local government in the local state 
in the context of economic development, by exploring transformations in the state. 
 
2.2 Local government and economic development in the local state 
A growing research interest in the role and contribution of local institutions in economic 
development has prompted questions concerning the role and structure of local government 
and whether this is being redefined (cf. Peters et al., 2011; Peck, 2013; Barnett, 2011; Ward 
et al., 2015). Local government is an important political institution among a plethora of local 
economic actors that make up the local state. This section is structured in three parts: first, it 
will explore different conceptualisations and themes of the local state to emerge from a 
review of the literature; second, it will examine general changes restructuring and impacting 
on the local state; and finally examine transformations in the local state to draw out historical 
and contemporary insights. The synthesis and analysis of the literature will inform the 
theoretical and analytical framework (see Section 2.5 at the end of the chapter) that underpins 
this research and guides the empirical analysis. 
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Western states, typically, have longstanding structures for local government and have 
undergone processes of reform and restructuring following an uneven transition towards a 
post-Keynesian welfare state and post-industrial economy (Peck and Tickell, 2002). This has 
had implications for the role and structure of the local state for economic development, 
particularly in the context of uneven development and territorial competition, responding to 
new approaches to local and regional development, and more recently with the global 
financial crisis and austerity state (Schäfer and Streeck 2013: 9). Increased inter-locality 
competition, reinforces the importance of the local level as a source of political activity and 
territorial competition (Bennett, 1997). The city has long been seen as a relevant unit for 
understanding how wealth is created (Jacobs, 1984) and is therefore also a significant level of 
geography at which to examine the economic, political and social implications of austerity 
(Donald et al., 2014; also Peck, 2013).  
 
 
2.2.1 Defining, conceptualising and theorising local government and the local state 
This section examines conceptualisations of the local state to understand and explain the role 
of local government in the local state and to identify the limitations of existing 
interpretations.  
“the fragmentation of local government has led to a proliferation of different agencies 
which need to be considered as part of the local state, both in the fields of welfare and 
economic development […] local government can only be understood as one element 
alongside others within the welfare state” (Cochrane 1993: 5-6) 
Local government, whilst rooted in the historical foundations and jurisdictions of national 
contexts, generally comprises a “governing institution which has authority over a subnational 
territorially defined area: in federal systems a sub state territorially defined area” (Bradbury 
2013). The fiscal, legislative and executive authority therefore extends over the smallest 
geographical areas distinguished for administrative and political purposes (OECD 2001: 6). 
Some form of local government is found in virtually all developed polities as a complement 
to central government and is generally seen as a sign of healthy democracy (Kingdom 2003: 
593). Local government can therefore be said to “maintain some degree of permanence” 
(Barnett 2013: 9), however increasingly this must be seen within sub-national systems of 
multi-level governance as states adapt towards increased multi-scalar and multi-agent 
relations. 
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Why do we need a better understanding of local government and the local state? First, the 
economic geography of places extends beyond political and administrative boundaries with a 
focus on functional economic areas and city-region/metropolitan areas as the context for wider 
growth processes. This in turn is challenging the “material and imagined coherence” of 
localities (Jones and Woods 2013: 39; see also Nelles, 2012). Second, economic development 
does not take place in a vacuum, the processes of globalisation, urbanisation and 
decentralisation have promoted and undermined capacity building and the empowerment of 
local actors leading to greater emphasis on the participation of stakeholders (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Palavicini-Corona 2013). This process draws in stakeholders from the private and third 
sectors, alongside the public sector, in formulating economic development visions and 
strategies for localities, in addition to developing new funding and delivery models. However, 
following the financial crisis, and in an austerity context, there is arguably a greater imperative 
for local government to work with stakeholders to develop new funding and delivery models. 
Third, following a trend of decentralisation that has spanned several decades - but that has 
manifested itself differently in different places - there is a growing body of literature that 
support “place-based” and more “bottom-up” approaches to growth (Barca., 2009; Barca et al., 
2012; OECD, 2012) and localism (e.g. Featherstone et al., 2012). This, in turn, places demands 
on the capacity of local areas to build evidence, assessing and appraising the locality for 
investment, bidding for resources, negotiating with central government and across localities. 
Finally, the role of institutions in helping to facilitate growth is receiving research attention 
(Tomaney, 2013; Pike et al., 2015a) and this has implications for local states and the way they 
are manifested and configured to address, among other things, issues of legitimacy and 
accountability, the relationship with the centre and also the inter-relations with local 
government. These factors demonstrate what makes local government in the local state an 
important actor and focus in the governance of local economic development. 
 
The following contextual points are worth highlighting here in order to explain how and why 
the interpretation of local government and the local state has evolved. Local governments in 
the post-industrial economies of the US and Western Europe, have a long and varied history of 
involvement in economic development, since the post-war period. This is usefully understood 
as part of the transition from a centrally driven Keynesian welfare state (KWS) ensuring a 
strong social safety net and, which saw local governments seeking to influence the location of 
companies (Jessop, 1994), to a Schumpeterian workfare state (SWS), focused on the promotion 
of innovation and competitiveness (Goodwin et al., 1993; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Brenner, 
2004; Harvey, 2005; Lobao and Adua, 2011). In a market-oriented, neoliberal governance 
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system, the shift towards an ‘enabler’, ‘facilitator’ and ‘commissioner’ of services, has placed 
local government in a “complex web of agents involved in the development of local 
economies” (Bennett, 1997: 333; Sullivan, 2011). 
 
As local governments became responsible for a widening range of functions and had greater 
local discretion, moving away from a universal state and collective consumption, this led to 
fragmentation of the local state and this was particularly pronounced in the United States and 
Great Britain (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1998). This resulted in a plethora of agencies 
responsible for aspects of the economy and neighbourhoods and with weak coordination 
overall coordination (ibid). Despite this, it is argued that fragmentation mobilised innovatory 
forms of ‘socialisation’ as agencies involved in the wider governance of local economic 
initiatives were freer from public scrutiny, expectations and accountability (Eisenschitz and 
Gough, 1998). The role of the local state in innovatory approaches became increasingly more 
important as time went on. In the US, this approach translated into the idea of “laboratories of 
democracy”, coined by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932 (Brandeis, 1932). 
Within a federal framework, states and local government could act as “laboratories” and try 
novel and social experiments without risk to the rest of the country.  
 
There are a number of defining aspects of local government while different across and within 
national contexts. These include: the rules of government and/or constitution; historical 
foundations; the nature of central-local relations; organisational and financial structure; and 
policy administration versus policy discretion (Bradbury, 2013). It is this final point, also 
referred to as local administration alongside the role of local democratic representation 
(Williams, 1998), that is pivotal to examining the relationship between local government and 
the local state and provides a useful distinction in highlighting the sometimes conflicting 
democratic (local) versus administrative (national) objectives of local government. Other 
definitions of the local state, however, argue that given the involvement of other actors in the 
process of local development - with potentially shared objectives and responsibilities - the 
focus of the local state should be wider than the narrow concentration on the institutions and 
organisations of local government (Duncan and Goodwin 1988: 32). Examining frameworks 
of both government and governance therefore takes into account the role that local government 
plays within a broader multi scalar and multi agent context.  
 
The earlier literature on the local state raised critical questions on, the contractual and 
conflicting relationship between central and local (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Rhodes, 
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1997), on the fragmentation of local politics (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1998; Cochrane, 1993),  
uneven development (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988) and on the perceived and actual 
democracy and legitimacy of local institutions (Crouch, 2004). Prominent perspectives on the 
local state focused on conceptualising it, initially in terms of centre-local relations (e.g. 
Rhodes, 1997) and in terms of resistance and struggle, conflicts and accommodations (e.g. 
Cockburn 1977; Barnett, 2013), by examining the local state as a part of the capitalist state. 
This perspective, however, does not account for sufficient agency for change, variations or 
degrees of autonomy. 
 
Of all the stakeholders that make up the local state and are responsible for the governance of 
economic development, local government has distinctive and unique characteristics in 
fulfilling this role. Transformations in the state over a number of decades have shaped and 
moulded local government in a fragmented governance context that has seen the rise of regional 
and metropolitan structures. More recently, in the wake of the financial crisis, some are starting 
to question whether we are seeing a return to government from governance (Koch, 2013) as 
national governments seek to consolidate governance structures and recentralise functions to 
establish greater control of finances. The extent of this depends on the system of local 
government and the national and local politics of different countries. Significantly, local 
government can be said to have more permanence than other actors (Barnett, 2013) and what 
makes local government distinctive in relation to other actors in the system is the fundamental 
institution of representative democracy in the electoral system (Kateb 1981: 357).  
 
Expanding on the distinctive role of local government, in contrast to private sector management 
it is accountable for “a unique set of public missions and norms such as representations, 
equality, impartiality, integrity, justice and citizenship”, alongside the economic efficiency, 
economy and competition criteria (Haque 2000: 610). Also distinctive to local government is 
that, to varying degrees, it is able to generate its own income, by taxing businesses and people 
within its territories (Musson 2010: 80). Following the Great Financial Crisis which saw 
reductions in public finances rescaled to the local level in the US and Great Britain (Peck, 
2012), Sullivan argues that local government “still matters” as it has to ‘govern the mix’ of 
actors and interests at the local level, offering expertise in coordination and decision making 
with a logic of care (2011: 81-82). Sullivan describes local government occupying a symbolic 
role in articulating and representing a local government and local democracy “to come” (2011: 
81-82), a nod towards inter-generational outcomes. With this in mind, rather than seeing a 
scaling back of local government as austerity and financial cuts continue to take hold, it may 
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increasingly fall to local government to fill the gaps left by higher levels of government in 
order to preserve the social safety net (Lobao and Adua, 2011). Institutional capacity for local 
government to perform this role will be a critical issue, as will the capacity to undertake local 
economic development as priorities become reconfigured in an austerity context. 
 
Given the increasing propensity for the creation of cross-sector partnerships in local economic 
governance (Cochrane, 1993; Peck and Tickell, 1996), how does one formulate a view of local 
government that captures these dynamics within a multi-level governance context, and what is 
the merit and purpose of theorising local government? For some, the local state is implicated 
in the need to manage uneven development (Goodwin et al., 1993), for others it is theorised in 
terms of the working connections between central government and local government and the 
world of government and business (Rhodes, 1997), for still others it is understood in terms of 
discourses of resistance or opposition (Cockburn, 1977: 41; Barnett, 2013), It has also centred 
on dealing with the constraints imposed on cities by the national and international political 
economy (Leitner, 1990). Certainly, with contemporary pressures and constraints that bring to 
bear questions about the viability and sustainability of local government provision, there is a 
pressing need to understand this variability in governance capacity. Moreover, as Leitner 
(1990) states; “we need an analysis that sets local government in the context of the real 
economic situation of the period in which we live and asks: what is its job?” (1990; see also 
O’Neill, 2004). One aspect we can draw on from Leitner’s work on cities and the local state in 
the US, and local growth and urban politics, in the 1980s and 1990s, is the need to analyse how 
economic and political processes operating at different spatial scales interact to determine local 
policy formation and outcomes (1990: 150), and the way institutional and governance 
mechanisms shape these. In summary, the purpose of this section has been to explore different 
conceptualisations of the local state and role of local government and to ground this study in a 
contemporary understanding of what local government is for in order to provide insight on 
changes under the Coalition.  This next section will explore the autonomy and agency of the 
local state. 
 
2.2.2 The autonomy and agency of the local state 
An analysis of the local state that recognises the contingency of local government and the 
local state, and is sensitive to issues of agency could also help to show how local governance, 
might challenge, negotiate and soften the impact of dominant and prevailing forces in the 
development of localities (Newman, 2008). Identified as a feature of local economic 
development, autonomy - referring to “self-government….and the ability to act according to 
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a group or institution’s own direction” (Bradbury, 2013), is seen to contribute to better local 
development outcomes alongside other factors, such as capacity building and participation 
mechanisms (Rodríguez-Pose and Palavicini-Corona 2013: 2). The argument supporting 
greater autonomy for local economic development policy is reflective of a broader shift, 
driven by processes of globalisation, urbanisation and centralisation, from traditional top-
down to bottom up, or territorial, approaches to development (ibid.) It is argued that these 
approaches are more likely to succeed provided there is a certain level of local autonomy 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Palavicini-Corona, 2013; see also OECD, 2012).  
 
Central to examining the role and structure of the local state in economic development are 
discussions of autonomy and agency and how these processes interact to explain the 
relationship between central and local government, and local-local relationships in 
frameworks of growth and development. This draws on discussions of structure and agency, 
that is “‘structure’ - the social context that defines the range of potential actions - and 
‘agency’ – the intentional agent” (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999: 36; see also Giddens, 1984). 
However, this relationship is recursive - structures are mutually constitutive of agents, 
shaping and in turn being shaped by their agency (Storper, 1997). Institutions shape and 
regulate and, in turn, are shaped and regulated by the agency of economic actors (Farole et 
al., 2011; Pike et al., 2015a; Goodwin, 1999). This is important for explaining changes to the 
local state in multi-scalar and multi-actor governance as well as understanding what the 
sources that generate institutional change and lead to differentiated social and economic 
outcomes (Gertler, 2010). 
 
As discussed in Section 2.1, there is growing evidence that effective institutions shape the 
performance of places in the global economy (see Peck and Tickell, 1994; Brenner, 2004; 
Pike and Tomaney, 2009). For post-industrial economies in mostly Western states, 
neoliberalism opened up localities to internationalisation and globalisation of trade, whilst 
concurrently exposing localities to territorial competition. The neoliberal constitution of 
competitive relations between localities and regions placed real limits on the practical 
potential of localised or bottom-up political action (Amin, 1999). Also, the asymmetrical 
scale politics of neoliberalism led to local institutions and actors were being given 
responsibility without power (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Competition between places 
intensified and the economic importance attributed to place became pivotal for localities in 
developing competitive advantage (Gordon and Cheshire 2001: 137). While some places 
were able to capitalise on this based on exploiting favourable factor endowments, for many 
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localities, this simultaneously reduced their bargaining power and resulted in a “scramble of 
localities” (Peck and Tickell 1994: 281). Peck and Tickell’s analysis underlines the transitory 
nature of success under this ‘global regulatory order’ in that success for localities was 
achieved at the expense of failure elsewhere and “the more vigorously localities compete 
with each other, the more pronounced their subordination to supra-local forces becomes” 
(1994: 302). For Newman (2014), both central and local government have some autonomy, 
although the state in a capitalist society is certainly under pressure to comply with business 
interests and market forces and this is a limitation on local government in a capitalist society 
(Newman, 2014: 55). According to Newman, the extent to which a local authority can modify 
the dominance of market interests will depend on its history and on the values of its 
councillors and residents and their ability to build coalitions to resist market-driven policies 
(ibid.). Therefore, alongside examining the effects of neoliberalism and territorial 
competition which can lead to the long-term decline of local government autonomy 
(Cochrane, 1993), it becomes important to also examine localism and local actors and what 
can be influenced through local intervention (Peck and Tickell, 1994). Uneven and 
contingent outcomes can be shaped by “economic, social, cultural and political context, 
legacies and aspirations and the agency of institutional actors” (Pike and Tomaney 2009: 24). 
 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the scope and limits of the agency of local institutions is shaped 
by approaches to growth as well as the governance of uneven development. The examination 
of external or global forces in shaping the autonomy and agency of national and local 
government therefore should not detract from the role of the nation state in shaping the 
agency of local institutions, particularly through growth policy and the governance of uneven 
development. This process is described by Pike and Tomaney (2009: 29) as, local institutions 
and the nation state as being “integrally inter-twined […] the nation state whose agency 
shapes the ‘variegation’ of particular processes and outcomes of governance and uneven 
development across and between spatial scales”. 
 
To examine how local states articulate their interests relative to the centre as well as working 
with other localities, adjacent and further afield, in pursuit of local goals, this study will draw 
on MacKinnon and Shaw’s interpretation of Brenner’s ‘New state spaces’ (NSS) and the 
ancillary notions of ‘regional armatures’- “spatialised social relationships that shape the 
evolution of state spaces” - and ‘the politics of scale’ – the links between actors and groups 
operating in and across different spatial scales” (2010: 1232). MacKinnon and Shaw contend 
that this new synthesis of state spatialities “incorporates a greater sensitivity to agency and 
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politics, particularly in terms of the social relations and struggles that ‘form’ and ‘mould’ 
particular spaces” (2010: 1232). It is worth highlighting here two aspects that have influenced 
MacKinnon and Shaw’s synthesis of New State Spaces which, independently deserve further 
consideration for their contribution to untangle the role and shape of the local state, 
particularly at the margins: the process of ‘institutional layering’, often associated with 
excessive rounds of reform (Brenner, 2004). Also and the notion of the ‘qualitative state’ 
(O’Neill, 1997) which emphasises the diversity and multiplicity of state structures and 
practices (MacKinnon and Shaw 2010: 1246). In summary, examining issues of autonomy 
and agency uncovers factors of institutional change in the local state. However, greater 
autonomy does not necessarily result in greater agency, as explained in the next two sections. 
 
 
2.2.3 Geographies of the local state  
Discussions on geographies of the local state connect with theoretical debates on territorial 
and relational approaches to governing economic development. The different perspectives are 
summarised by Pike and Tomaney as “…a territorial vein that seeks to interpret ‘rescaling’ 
and the emergence of ‘new state spatialities’ and relational approaches whose concern is the 
‘unbounding’ of spatial assemblages of nodes and networks of governance” (2009: 14). As 
articulated by Cochrane, 
“Critical to understanding conceptualisations of the local state and contemporary local 
government is developing an understanding of the local as a contested political and 
geographical category” (Cochrane 2016: 907).  
 
In contrast to territorial accounts (e.g. Brenner, 2003; Jones et al., 2005) which depict the 
state as “integrally spatial” (Pike and Tomaney 2009: 15), under relational interpretations, the 
continued relevance of the term ‘geography’ and ‘scale’ in accounting for the new 
arrangements of state powers, is questioned (Allen and Cochrane 2010: 1087). Here it is 
argued, that the proliferation of networks (e.g. Rhodes, 1997; Martin and Guaranos-Meza, 
2013) has led us to a “flat ontology” (Marston et al., 2005). Critique of relational accounts 
point to them providing only a partial explanation that can underplay or disregard the 
continued importance of the territorialities of institutions and boundaries in governing 
economic development (Pike and Tomaney 2009: 29; McCann and Ward, 2010).  
 
Case studies on emerging metropolitan governance show the difficulty in ignoring issues of 
scale and territory in cross-border collaboration. Katz and Bradley’s (2013) case study of 
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Denver’s approach to annexation and disunity highlights the role of state laws as being an aid 
or obstacle to collaboration across administrative borders. The notion of networks being 
unable to escape the existing territorial mosaic of politico-administrative units is indicative of 
how relational accounts have been challenged by those that contend that regions are the 
product of a struggle and tension between territorialising and de-territorialising processes 
(Hudson, 2007; Harrison, 2012). An approach to the analysis of localities should take both 
approaches into account (Pike and Tomaney, 2009; MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010) in order to 
understand localities as “multifaceted, dynamic and contingent entities” (Jones and Woods 
2013: 39). Key to this, the authors argue, are “… using the vehicles of imagined coherence 
and their material coherence, which collectively make a locality meaningful” (ibid: 39; see 
also Nelles, 2012). Research on localities should therefore be “spatially focused, but not 
spatially constrained” in order to understand the range of forces and actors engaged in the 
governance of a locality (Jones and Woods 2013: 39). 
 
The sub national tier of government and governance has been a site of experimentation and 
adaptation particularly in more centralised economies without clear sub national 
constitutional settlements and political units, such as federal states and regions. This has led 
to a churn in the geographies of the local state as units of government are consolidated and 
divided, powers centralised and decentralised and governance mechanisms expanded and 
contracted. Reforms can be triggered by a mix of economic rationales, political ideals and 
international governance trends and are increasingly driven by new understandings of 
economic geographies that transcend political and administrative boundaries in order to 
capitalise on the economic flows of places (e.g. Bennett, 1997; Brenner, 2004). Despite an 
expansion of local governance and local state arrangements across administrative boundaries, 
and the transfer or extension of accountability arrangements to new scales, local government 
remains a core part of the local state, as discussed in Section 2.2.1. 
 
The interrelation between administrative systems and economic spaces - that is the 
relationship between state apparatus and economic change (Bennett, 1997; O’Neill, 1997) – 
is central to discussions on institutions and economic development (OECD, 2012; Tomaney, 
2013; Pike et al., 2015a). An important aspect to aligning economic and social change with 
more adaptable and flexible systems of administration (Bennett, 1997) is multi-level 
governance capacity and developing soft infrastructures that are organised in relation to 
functional economic areas rather than administrative boundaries (OECD, 2012; Tomaney, 
2013). The long term changing nature of the economy has given rise to new spatial 
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imaginaries in economic geography (see Brenner, 2004), in particular the role of ‘city-
regions’ and cities and metropolitan areas (Rodríguez-Pose, 2008; Katz and Bradley, 2013). 
This has emphasised the need for greater coordination and improved governance under a city-
region framework (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Frisken and Norris, 2001) in addition to 
underlining the importance of action at the local scale as a platform for competitive 
advantage (Jones and Woods, 2013). ‘Multi-level’ refers to “the increased interdependence of 
government operating at different territorial levels, whilst ‘governance’ signalled the growing 
interdependence between governments and non-governmental actors at various territorial 
levels” (Büchs 2009: 40; see also Bache and Flinders, 2004; and Jessop, 2008). Examining 
changes to the geography of the local state as part of a framework of multi-level government 
and governance reveals both the vertical and horizontal dimensions and relationships (Büchs, 
2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2003). 
 
2.2.4 Politics of the local state  
There have been significant changes in the political economies of North America (Leitner, 
1990; Peck, 2013) and Western Europe (Brenner, 2004; Peck, 1995) which have seen a shift 
in how cities are governed, coupled with the growing intensity and unevenness of inter-
locality competition (Peck and Tickell, 1994; Pike and Tomaney, 2009; Brenner and 
Wachsmuth, 2012). This has sparked interest in the politics of local and regional 
development and urban politics. While the politics of the local state is not a new debate 
(Shaw, 1990), recent developments including the interest and development of functional 
economic geographies that transcend political and administrative boundaries and reductions 
in public finances through austerity (see Section 2.2.4) present new complexities and 
challenges for local actors in negotiating ‘politics of scale’ (Cox, 1998) in multi-level and 
multi-actor forms of governance.  
 
Across nation states, local government’s role in the politics of local and regional 
development varies. For example, compared to local government in Europe, local 
governments in the United States (US) are extremely active agents in the politics of local and 
regional development, with stakes in the growth of economies and aligned with strong and 
active local business interests (Cox, 2011). This is in part because in the post-war period of 
economic restructuring, US local and state governments adopted a more proactive role in 
seeking to protect and enhance the development of local and regional economies (Phelps and 
Wood, 2011). From this restructuring emerged a few select concepts - ‘urban 
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entrepreneurialism’ (see Section 2.3.2), ‘growth machine’ and the ‘urban regime’ – which 
Phelps and Wood (2011) argues grapple with the politics of local and regional development, 
and have sought to revitalise the study of the politics of local and regional development, 
however they are specific to the US context.    
 
The idea of politics, according to Weber (1948: 78) is “striving to share power or striving to 
influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state”. An 
example of the politics of territorial competition being the potential influence over important 
location factors (Gordon and Cheshire, 2001), another being negotiating with the central state 
for public resource. Cox’s “politics of scale” (1998: 1) provides a conceptual lens to examine 
the interrelations between different sets of actors operating in and across different spatial 
scales (see also MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; MacKinnon, 2011). According to this notion, 
local and regional actors construct ‘spaces of engagement’ that link them to regional, national 
or even supra-national institutions in order to secure their local ‘spaces of dependence’ 
(MacKinnon 2011) — areas in which their prosperity, power or legitimacy relies on the 
reproduction of certain social relations (Cox and Mair 1988; MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010). 
At the same time, drawing on Jones’ (1997) notion of ‘spatial selectivity’ shows how from 
the top down, the central state can privilege certain places through accumulation strategies, 
state projects, and hegemonic projects. 
 
The politics of scale can therefore be said to play out through multi-level governance 
arrangements. As Faguet (2013: 9) proposes in relation to decentralisation reform, “the 
question of multi-level governance can be an endogenous outcome of struggles among the 
powerful for advantage”. This, he argues, can help explain the variation observed across 
countries in the scale of “local” or “regional” government, the authority and discretion 
devolved to them, and the resources they control” (ibid.). A challenge for local governments 
is managing these dynamics whereby, it is argued, effective local politics must operate in 
multiple spaces, including supra-local ones - “a politics of place beyond place” (Clarke and 
Cochrane, 2013: 22). This is particularly so in the context of the economic powers of 
globalisation and economic restructuring (Pierre, 2011). 
 
As part of a multi-level approach to economic development, the participation of stakeholders 
is seen as a key element in order to make local economic development sustainable 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Palavicini-Corona, 2013). However, these mixed forms of governance, 
of scales and actors - from public agents to employers, community and voluntary 
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organisations, universities, and development agencies - Crouch argues, threaten to dilute the 
role of democratic institutions within governance systems (2011). The differences between 
business and government are highlighted by Bogdanor (2005: 8), “businesses, after all, had 
concrete and enforceable obligations to their customers. Governments, on the other hand, had 
to respond to a diverse range of constituents whose claims were less concrete, though in 
many ways far more formidable”. These competing, and potentially conflicting, interests 
have also been described as a tension in the economic development agenda between 
competitiveness and cohesion objectives (Meegan et al., 2014). These new forms of local 
state governance, Pike and Tomaney (2009) argue, are often given normative and neutral 
claims with the aim that they will redress a perceived and argued political or administrative 
imbalance and which rarely follows a considerate, objective appraisal or intention to build on 
existing arrangements. These perspectives on the local state offer a conceptual framework 
that is sensitive to the multi-level and multi-actor framework of analysis for this study. The 
next section explores transformation in the local state. 
 
2.3  General changes impacting on the local state 
The preceding sections in this chapter have critically reflected on how to better understand 
the role of local government and the local state in local economic development, negotiating 
multi-scale and multi-agency frameworks of government and governance. In so doing, the 
analysis has identified and examined the enduring features of the local state to establish the 
big themes and principles that frame discussions of local government today. Four themes 
emerge: i) defining the relationship between local government and the local state in a new 
context of economic development; ii) understanding how the local state exercises agency and 
autonomy in relation to the central state within a framework of growth and competition; iii) 
to understand the territorial and relational geographies of the local state and dynamism of 
localities; and finally iv) the politics of the local state in negotiating multi-level and multi-
actor forms of governance. Exploration of these themes is important in determining the 
changing role and shape of the local state.  
 
In this section, these themes are applied to the general changes impacting on the state in the 
field of economic development to examine the characteristics and fundamental nature of local 
government. In so doing, the general changes that have shaped, and are continuing to shape, 
the way local economies are governed for economic development are examined. These 
transformations are organised into two categories in order to examine the local state 
implications for governance: the general changes impacting on central states and applicable 
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at the local level; and, how the processes of rescaling unfold at the local level. This connects 
with the overall aim of the thesis, which is to understand the role of local government in a 
changed context of multi-scale and multi-agent frameworks of government and governance, 
and to understand how these processes have unfolded at different levels and in different 
places. It is precisely understanding and explaining these variations in governance that this 
study is concerned with. 
 
To analyse and interpret these general changes to the local state, they must be examined in 
the context of a broader state transition in the global North over the last half century, while 
remaining cognisant of different interpretations and approaches within individual countries 
(Lobao and Adua, 2011). The transition from an industrial to post-industrial economy, and 
from a Keynesian welfare state focused on the collective consumption of services, to a 
neoliberal economic system, resulted in a shift whereby the needs of capital increasingly took 
precedence over the wellbeing and provision of services for local inhabitants (Purcell 2013: 
312; MacLeod, 2002; Jessop, 1993; Tickell and Peck, 1992). These political and economic 
changes, endogenous and exogenous to localities, have profoundly influenced local 
government and the local state’s role in economic development from a post-war role largely 
confined to promoting local economic activity by influencing the location of companies, to 
intervening in the production process itself (Geddes and Newman, 1999). From a governance 
perspective, this can be said to illustrate a shift from welfare and state control towards the 
state as an “‘enabler’, ‘facilitator’ and ‘commissioner’ of services, in a complex web of 
agents involved in the development of local economies” (Bennett 1997: 333; Sullivan, 2011).  
 
New state forms and relationships for economic development increasingly transcend political 
and administrative boundaries, particularly in a context where the focus of growth has shifted 
towards city-regions and functional economic areas (see inter alia World Bank, 2009; 
Glaeser, 2012; Rodriguez-Pose, 2008; Harrison, 2007) as engines of growth and crucial 
policy spaces. However, the manifestations of this wider process have been uneven and 
complex at the local and urban level, and compounded by increased inter-local competition 
for economic investment so that local authorities feel they have no choice but to create a 
“business friendly” climate (Purcell 2013: 312; Brenner and Wachsmuth, 2012; Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992). 
 
The following transformations of the state represent longstanding debates on the fundamental 
nature of government and, in turn, have implications for the local state. In a neoliberal 
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context, these transformations have unfolded unevenly over time and space, leading to 
variable outcomes in places. They are not mutually exclusive and the attributes overlap into 
each other. The purpose here is to examine and explain how these broader trends have 
impacted on, and continue to impact, the local state. 
 
2.3.1 ‘Hollowing out’ the state 
Discussions on the ‘hollowing out’ of the state, refer to the rescaling of the nation’s powers 
and responsibilities vertically, upwards and downwards, to supra-national institutions and 
local administrations respectively, as well as horizontally, to non-state actors (Jessop, 1993; 
Jessop, 1997). For these reasons, the notion of ‘hollowing out’ is reflective of a number of 
multi-level governance changes taking place. Claimed to provide a response to the 
“overloaded and bureaucratic state” of the 1960/70s (Skelcher 2000: 3), questions on the 
extent to which a ‘hollowing out’ out of the state (central and local) is occurring, are ongoing 
today.  
 
Contemporary analyses contrast with original interpretations which were fixated on a transfer 
from national to subnational. Later interpretations focus on capturing the complexity of state 
activity and relations, as articulated by Brenner’s ‘New State Spaces’ (2004; see also 
Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2009) which explores the dynamics of ‘hollowing out’ 
alongside ‘filling in’ which addresses the reconfiguration and emergence of new 
arrangements and relationships in place of shifting state powers (Shaw and MacKinnon, 
2011). As defined by Jones et al. (2005: 357) 
“while hollowing out refers to the transfer of certain national state functions to other 
scales of governance, filling in is concerned with ‘the sedimentation of new 
organisations, the configuration of pre-existing organisations, the evolution of new 
working relationships between different organisations and the development of new 
working cultures’ at these other scales.” 
 
The focus, therefore, is analysing a readjustment between different levels of government, 
rather than a scaling back or weakening of, particularly, the nation state’s powers (Shaw and 
MacKinnon 2011: 28; Jessop, 2002; Goodwin et al., 2005; Jessop, 2000). As part of these 
governance changes, self-organising networks were seen as a way of reintegrating the 
‘hollowed out’ state (Martin and Guarneros-Meza 2013: 586; see also Rhodes, 1994). 
However, this revealed a conflict between the general tendencies towards decentralisation 
and the centralising consequences of meta-governance (Peters, 2011). An example of ‘filling 
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in’ is what has come to be known as ‘meta-governance’, which refers to the way of 
enhancing coordinated governance by politicians in a fragmented political system, based 
upon a high degree of autonomy for a plurality of self-governing networks and institutions 
(Sørensen, 2006). The development of multilevel governance in the 1990s offered a 
framework to explain these changing roles and structures (Hooghe and Marks, 2001) and 
showed how local government interacts with different levels of government as well as other 
local state actors. 
 
A central concern of ‘hollowing out’ has been its “spatial myopia”, ignoring the 
reconfiguration of state capacities at scales beyond the national (Jones et al. 2005: 338). It’s 
argued that ‘filling in’ focuses on the reorganisation of governance within particular 
territories, involving the establishment of new organisational forms or the configuration of 
old ones, for example, the emergence of a regional level in Europe (Jones et al., 2005; 
Mackinnon and Shaw, 2010). Goodwin et al. (2005: 338) argue that it is only by examining 
the notion of filling in that the spatially contingent evolution of governance within particular 
territories or regions can be appreciated (Goodwin et al. 2005: 338). 
 
To address a more multi-scalar and complex governance environment, Shaw and MacKinnon 
(2011) redefine hollowing out in scale-neutral terms as “involving processes of institutional 
reconfiguration that diminish the capacities of, or functions exercised by, state and quasi-state 
agencies.” However, as shown above, processes of hollowing out and filling in occur 
simultaneously. To understand better how ‘filling in’ shapes devolution and state 
restructuring, Shaw and MacKinnon (2011: 23) distinguish between “structural and relational 
forms of filling in, ensuring a clear analytical separation between structure and agency”. 
Also, with structural filling in’ referring to the establishment of new, and reconfiguration of 
existing, organisational forms, and ‘relational filling in’ involving how these organisations 
operate in terms of using their powers and developing links with other organisations and 
actors” (Clifford and Morphet 2014: 1). This allows for analysis of recalibration between 
local, regional, national and supranational levels – including changes to new and existing 
organisational forms (Storper, 1997) - and in so doing, acknowledges the linkages and 
relations between scales.  
 
2.3.2 Urban entrepreneurialism, entrepreneurial government and New Public 
Management (NPM)  
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The transition towards entrepreneurial government practices captured the shift from the 
bureaucratic managerial practices of earlier decades - whereby local states operated mainly as 
sites of welfare service provision and collective consumption (Brenner, 2004) - towards a 
more entrepreneurial stance. Faced with fiscal pressures, local leaders were encouraged by 
central states to embrace new partnerships and develop alternative ways to deliver services 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992: 17). Against this backdrop, New Public Management emerged, 
referring principally to reforms aimed at introducing private sector techniques and market 
orientations into the public sector with the purpose of improving the efficiency of service 
provision (Tomaney, 2007).   
 
These changes also stemmed from a realisation that solutions to country wide problems were 
not just coming from the central state, but also the local level (Osborne, 1993; Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002). Around the same time, the role that urban areas play in the radical 
restructuring of places and economic activity was receiving increased attention (Harvey, 
1989; Leitner, 1990). This was driven by a shift in the economic base, experienced in the US 
and Western Europe during the 1970 and 1980s, that resulted in de-industrialisation, 
transforming city and urban landscapes (MacLeod, 2002). A neoliberal agenda prevailed and 
local growth came to dominate urban politics and planning, leading cities to increasingly 
adopt entrepreneurial strategies (MacLeod, 2002; Leitner, 1990; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
Under this framework, urban governance was seen as playing an important role in fostering 
and encouraging local development and employment (Harvey, 1989).  
 
A focus on territorial competitiveness, New Public Management techniques, and cities as 
arenas for policy experimentation and institutional restructuring were all seen as promoting 
and facilitating the neoliberal cause (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). This transformation had 
far reaching implications for local states, including changing intergovernmental relations 
(Leitner, 1990; Sbragia, 1988) and also the potential to influence macro-economic dynamics 
(Harvey, 1989). However, competition with other cities assumed primacy over distributional 
issues in urban policy-making and became the new basis for growth (Harvey, 1989; see 
Macleod (2002) for a detailed discussion of the drivers. This left European cities confronting 
sharpening inequalities and entrenched social exclusion (MacLeod, 2002). NPM arguably 
compounded these disparities by not accounting for equity of provision, complicating the 
joining up of institutions at the local and regional level, and raising questions of legitimacy 
and democratic accountability by removing decision making from political structures 
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(Tomaney 2007 – see article for an in depth review of NPM). A critical perspective on urban 
entrepreneurialism indicates,  
“not only its negative impacts but its potentiality for transformation into a progressive 
urban corporatism, armed with a keen geopolitical sense of how to build alliances and 
linkages across space in such a way as to mitigate if not challenge the hegemonic 
dynamic of capitalist accumulation to dominate the historical geography of social 
life…”(Brenner and Wachsmuth 2012: 201). 
 
In the recent context of the financial crisis, it is argued that the profound failures of the 
market have tended to undermine any confidence in ideas such as those of NPM, which 
depend on the market, but as yet there seems to be no clear alternative (Peters et al., 2011). 
Alongside NPM, a move to entrepreneurial government practices has had a profound effect 
on the role and shape of local government today. A key defining feature of NPM and 
entrepreneurial government approaches were that they triggered a reconfiguration of 
intergovernmental relations as forms and functions were redefined, set in the context of ‘a 
revival of the local’ (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 341). Brenner (2004), suggested that the 
changes occurred in three basic forms. Firstly, in the face of increasing budgetary constraints, 
local states privatised or contracted out; second, local states sought subsidies to promote 
economic regeneration through nationals and/or European industrial and sectoral 
programmes; third, local states often in conjunction with regional state governments in 
federal governments, introduced a range of new policies to promote local economic growth 
(Brenner, 2004; Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993). 
 
An entrepreneurial government - that is one that, among other things, generates self-finance, 
embraces participatory management and catalyses all sectors into action (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992) – is still an aspiration today, albeit in a changed context with new pressures 
and challenges.  As mainstream policy discourse accentuates ‘entrepreneurial’ paradigms and 
the importance of exploiting the competitive edge of the city-regional scale in economic 
development strategies (OECD, 2006; 2007), there is pressure on local authorities to ‘cope 
and compete’ (Nelles, 2012; (Hulst and van Montfort, 2007; Brenner and Wachsmuth, 2012). 
In the same thrust as Peck and Tickell’s search for a new institutional fix and Harvey’s call to 
address uneven development (1989); Brenner and Wachsmuth (2012: 201) ask whether 
localities can escape from the competitiveness trap to which they apparently have been 
consigned over three decades of worldwide geoeconomic and geopolitical restructuring. 
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This raises questions on the ability of localities to influence macro-economic dynamics 
(Harvey, 1989) that impact on local outcomes. For the competition of localities, “the more 
vigorously localities compete with each other, the more pronounced their subordination to 
supralocal forces becomes” (Peck and Tickell 2008: 304). Local government today is one 
actor amongst several, both state and non-state, competing for resources for developing local 
economies, at multiple scales i.e. within a functional economic area, neighbouring region, 
nationally, supranationally. As the system of neoliberalism is deemed unsustainable as a 
mode of regulation (Kiel, 2009), what becomes of the market driven approaches and practices 
that drive the governance of local economic development, particularly in the context of 
uneven development. 
 
2.3.3 From government to governance  
Examining whether there has been a shift in neoliberal societies from government to 
governance, through public sector reforms, can also be viewed as a subset of discussions on 
the ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Rhodes, 1997; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Jessop, 2004). The 
‘government to governance’ debate moved thinking on from the mainly efficiency-led 
proposals of New Public Management (NPM) during the 1970s and 80s (Tomaney, 2007), to 
a set of ideas which stressed the importance of involving a range of social actors in the 
process of governing (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Peters, 2011). The objective being to enhance 
democratic participation in making and implementing decisions, alongside promoting 
efficiency (Peters 2011: 6; also Kjær, 2004). However, despite the proliferation of local 
governance arrangements in local economic development and the premise of a more efficient 
and consultative approach to governance, the impact of the emergence of local governance is 
unclear, with no necessary association between the emergence of local governance and any 
increase in local autonomy (Lowndes, 2009).  
 
In the field of public administration and public policy, governance can be said to refer to 
“self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterised by interdependence, resource-
exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state” (Rhodes 1997: 15). 
This contrasts with local government which is a formal system of government that takes 
place within administrative and political boundaries and involves statutory relationships 
between politicians, professionals and the public (Guarneros-Meza and Geddes, 2010). In 
Western democracies, the governance changes advanced under neoliberalism have given rise 
to more pluralistic forms of governance, based on the interactions of a range of political 
actors, aside from the state (Kooiman; Bennett et al., 2005). The term ‘governance’ is used to 
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describe the "broader coalition of forces" in economic development (Harvey 1989: 8), which 
represents the state and non-state actors that make up the local state.  Whilst local governance 
can be said to represent a looser process of steering localities in contrast to the more formal 
system of local government, these networks can become formalised into structural 
arrangements, for example, partnerships (Guarneros-Meza and Geddes, 2010). 
 
The debate on the extent to which we have witnessed a shift from government to governance 
requires consideration of a number of aspects. Often examined as opposing arguments 
(Rhodes, 1997; Koch, 2013), examining the relationship between the two provides useful 
insights on the role that government can/does play in governance arrangements, explicitly 
and implicitly, and in a supportive and constraining sense. The two approaches are defined as 
traditional modes of government and new forms of network-based interactive governance 
(Klijn 2008) and between type I and type II governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). 
Implicitly or indirectly, the influence of government can extend through the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’, in the external and self-steering of networks can be explained through the term 
‘meta-governance’ (Jessop, 2004). This refers to different forms of coordination and self-
organisation and the way in which “governments (and other organisations) may seek to 
initiate, facilitate or constrain network processes” (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012; see also 
Jessop, 2004). Here, the state is no longer sovereign authority, it becomes just one participant 
among a pluralistic guidance system (Jessop 2004: 71; Fenwick et al., 2012). More explicit 
involvement by government can be seen as instrumental in establishing and mobilising 
partnerships through an ‘external’ or ‘soft’ steering role (Martin and Guarneros-Meza, 2013: 
585), which also extends the capacity and realms of government (Fenwick et al., 2012: 417). 
 
In considering the role of local government in new governance structures, drawing on 
research by Aars and Fimreite (2005), the interplay with emerging network structures can 
raise questions on the democratic quality of network governance if network decisions are not 
open to public scrutiny. They also highlight that in moving towards local governance 
arrangements, democratic control is difficult to achieve even if local councillors are 
represented as local councillors may deliberately deprive themselves of influence over 
important policy fields or because networks develop decision-making styles that shield them 
from external political control (ibid.). 
 
The involvement of government in governance arrangements leads some to suggest that 
rather than a shift to governance, we are witnessing a “path to government” (Koch, 2013) but 
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through multiple scales and agents. The aftermath of the financial crisis reveals constraints 
for both state and non-state actors in governance arrangements, however, Pike et al (2010) 
suggest that the crisis is pushing the state back into the centre stage in economic 
development.  
 
2.3.4 Austerity  
The general changes outlined above show how aspects of neoliberalism – in particular the 
reorganisation of state responsibilities and scale and promoting the territorial competitiveness 
of places - have profoundly influenced the role and shape of local government and the 
economic development governance of localities, in multi-agent and multi-scalar ways.  
The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and ensuing recession experienced by a number of 
countries in Europe, resulted in a substantial deterioration of public finances and restricted 
the ability of governments to generate revenues at a time when spending needed to increase; a 
concoction referred to as “permanent austerity” (Schäfer and Streeck 2013: 1). The marked a 
shift away from the tax and debt Keynesian economy to an austerity state (Blyth, 2011). The 
austerity approach involves cutting the state budget to promote growth, a logic underpinned 
by the belief that cutting the state’s budget, debts, and deficits, would restore competitiveness 
and inspire business confidence (Blyth 2013: 2). For an in-depth review of austerity see Blyth 
(2013) and Schäfer and Streeck (2013).  
 
Despite the common characteristics of austerity as a policy approach, individual countries 
have developed their own interpretations and priorities. The most draconian measures to 
address the public deficit have been witnessed in Western Europe through public sector 
reforms, in Greece, Spain and Portugal and in England with the removal of the regional tier 
and rescaling of funding cuts to the local level.  
 
Austerity policies have had a direct impact on the role and shape of local government. In 
England, the pressure on public spending and push to reduce the deficit whilst still pursuing 
growth has led to a scaling back of public expenditure as well as simultaneous 
decentralisation and centralising of functions and responsibilities. However, this is not simply 
about reductions in public expenditure, but “profoundly political choices about the future 
character of the state, with uneven implications for cities and regions” (McCarthy et al. 2012: 
127). Whilst there is sporadic evidence of discussions of these choices taking place, they 
don’t mirror the scale and pace of cuts to expenditure. 
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Where does this leave local government? Some see an enhanced role for local government in 
its unique position of preserving the social safety net. Rather than a rolling back of the state, 
Lobao and Adua (2011) prescribe a recalibration of state levels whereby local government 
may be required to fill the gaps left by higher levels of government. Similarly, Sullivan 
(2011) argues that local government’s “logic of care” is important and relevant to “governing 
the mix” of actors and interests at the local level, as well as having a symbolic role in 
articulating and representing a democratic and local government of the future (Sullivan 2011: 
81-82), and focused on intergenerational outcomes. 
 
In the harsh light of austerity, the nature of intergovernmental relations and politics of 
austerity are revealed. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the capacity and capability of 
local government alongside discussions of governance is a critical issue. While it is suggested 
that the financial crisis has only exacerbated the long-term shrinking of the room that 
governments have to manoeuvre (Schäfer and Streeck 2013: 2); austerity can be argued to 
have reduced the agency and autonomy of local governments through a nationally determined 
and executed approach that manifests in spatial, scalar and temporal ways (Meegan et al., 
2014).  
 
Instead of sparking an alternative economic model to challenge the uneven effects of 
neoliberal policies, the crisis is seen to reinforce and even accelerate a tranche of market-
oriented policies which position cities on the frontline (Peck, 2012; Warner and Clifton, 
2014).  The city is therefore a significant level of geography at which to examine the 
economic, political and social implications of austerity (Donald, 2014; also Peck, 2013). 
Approaches to austerity are seen to reinforce neoliberal tendencies of helping the strongest 
first (The Economist 201: 1). This can be seen in the uneven spatial impact of the distribution 
of cuts, the reconfiguring of intergovernmental relations and the pace at which cities are able 
to bounce back and return to growth and employment. In the US, Peck describes the 
“renarration of the financial crisis” (2014: 20) in the form of local state failure, where the 
costs and responsibility for the crisis are redistributed to the lowest tiers of government. 
There is growing evidence of the effects of austerity in the US and in the UK as illustrate in 
this quote,  
“The devolution of austerity is driving a deep wedge between those cities that can 
feasibly go it alone and those that, by virtue of local economic frailty or high poverty 
rates, have no real option but to downsize municipal government and retrench public 
services” (Peck 2012: 633). 
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As noted by Meegan et al. (2014), those with more buoyant and resilient local economies will 
reinforce their position at the expense of those in which economic restructuring is a long term 
challenge. For local governments and local state actors carrying out economic development, 
there is arguably a greater imperative for local government to work with stakeholders to 
develop new funding and delivery models and respond to further government downsizing and 
privatisation. This presents a conflict in the shape of reductions in local government spending 
and the desire to promote local economic development, especially in large cities (ibid.). 
Furthermore, the extent to which economic development represents a statutory obligation 
rather than a discretionary service will determine the approach taken. In summary, this 
section has show the different ways that local government is important in the local state in the 
context of restructuring and transitions. 
 
2.4 Decentralisation and rescaling the state 
The preceding section has shown how, in a global neoliberal framework of growth (Brenner 
and Theodore 2002: 14; also Leitner et al., 2007), general changes to the state have shaped 
and, in some instances, are continuing to shape the characteristics and nature of local 
government. These general changes – affecting mostly Western states and post-industrial 
economies – can be described as promoting neoliberal objectives. Economic development is a 
relevant area to examine these state transformations over time given the enhanced post war 
role of the local and sub national level. The state transformations are explained by broader 
theoretical debates on the role of the state in the economy and encompass diverging 
perspectives and interpretations. Following the global financial crisis, national and local 
states continue to make budget cuts in austere times, contributing to a number of common 
themes emerge from the transformations of the state, relating to the relationship between 
central and local government, the relationship with other non-state actors in the field of 
economic development, and restructuring of the state. The extent and impact of these general 
changes is very difficult to assess as power shifts are multi-directional – there may be a 
simultaneous withdrawal and extension of the state by new forms and means - and have 
unfolded differently in different places. One way of analysing this further is to look at the 
processes of state rescaling and decentralisation to understand how and why these changes 
take place, as institutions and governance are increasingly recognised as mechanisms to 
achieve policy objectives (Barca, 2009; OECD, 2012). 
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This section explores the processes of decentralisation and state rescaling as an outcome of 
these state transformations, and also as a result of the interplay between state actors at 
different scales. They are the levers that enable the restructuring and adjustment within the 
general changes to take place. There is broad accordance in the literature of a general trend 
towards decentralisation and the rescaling of the state (see inter alia Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 
2005; Pike and Tomaney, 2009; Peck, 2012), influenced by international trends towards more 
powerful cities and regions within nation states, and advocacy for these ideas from 
international organisations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. 
However, individual nation states construct their own interpretation based on a mix of 
political ideals, constitutional frameworks and the extent of the political support for 
transformation. Furthermore, the true extent and impact of the processes, in addition to 
spatial variations, sparks much debate, particularly on its uneven nature within a framework 
of territorial competition (Pike and Tomaney, 2009). As with the state transformations, the 
approach and pace of change for rescaling processes may differ between countries, but also 
importantly within countries. The competitive environment for local economic development 
see localities negotiating and drawing up contracts with the central state for increased 
freedoms and flexibilities, for example ‘City Deals’ in England (Ward, 2017) and proposals 
for Collaborative Federalism in the US (Katz and Bradley, 2013). The changing shape and 
role of the local state and its contribution to economic development is therefore best viewed 
through a lens which examines the broader political and economic processes of 
decentralisation and state rescaling. 
 
In setting out to examine state rescaling and decentralisation, there are methodological 
challenges to consider, not least the relationship between the two (Büchs, 2009; CJES). 
Vertical rescaling can be examined as decentralisation and Lobao et al. (2009: 7) in their 
article discuss the idea that state rescaling itself can be interpreted as ‘cyclical variations in 
decentralization’. In this chapter they are examined separately to explore the issues at the 
local level and then in a multi scalar context to look at how they unfold across different 
places. In analysing changing institutional landscapes in contemporary capitalism the 
literature on decentralisation and rescaling is fraught with “many open theoretical, 
interpretive, methodological and empirical questions” (Brenner, 2009). This requires 
interpretation to take into account contextually specific circumstances as well as a sensitivity 
for how place is interpreted, in territorial and relational ways.  
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2.4.1 State rescaling 
The rescaling of state power refers to the transfer of certain functions and responsibilities 
between the different territorial levels of state organisation (MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010). 
Rescaling can occur horizontally – across non-state actors (Büchs, 2009) – as well as 
vertically, through a more traditional command and control structure. Whilst individual 
nations determine their state rescaling approach, neoliberal globalisation and world market 
integration are seen as having a huge influence on global dynamics and the rescaling of 
economic and political relations (Jessop, 2009; 2001; 2001).  
 
An influential contribution to the state rescaling literature, Brenner’s ‘New State Spaces’ – 
from a strand of literature on the importance of emerging scale in the global economy (e.g.  
Cox and Mair, 1991; Harrison, 2007) - shows how under contemporary capitalism the state 
has reconfigured its spatial and organisation structures to maintain control over urban and 
regional development (Brenner, 2004; Harrison, 2014). This demonstrated that rescaling of 
the state signalled a shift from questions of socio-spatial to the promotion of local and 
regional development (Cox, 2009) and challenged earlier accounts of the demise of the nation 
state (Jessop, 2002). Whereas the notion of hollowing out explored the erosion of the 
sovereignty of the nation state, it is argued that the notion of rescaling can be used to extend 
the insights on hierarchically structured institutional arrangements and provide a counter-
narrative to the arguments of state decline or erosion during the 1980s and 90s (Brenner, 
2009). Reflecting on his contribution, Brenner (2009) cautioned against overstretching  the 
notion of rescaling to encompass state space as a whole and highlighted state rescaling as 
“one of the most prominent examples of rescaling - the others being the rescaling of capital 
accumulation, the rescaling or urbanization processes and the rescaling of contentious 
politics” (ibid: 125). 
 
There are a number of defining aspects that shape state rescaling and have implications for 
the local level, notably, determining scale itself, territorial and relational approaches to 
rescaling, and economic and political rationales for rescaling. Viewing localities as dynamic 
entities in order to reflect and capture new geographies beyond territorial boundaries, 
reinvigorates questions of how to study scale itself and determining the right scale for 
intervention in development (Lobao et al., 2009; Marston et al., 2005; Moore, 2008). A 
dynamic view of localities, as “multifaceted and contingent entities” (Woods and Jones, 
2013) challenges conventional notions of scale (inter alia Marston, 2008; Allen and 
Cochrane) as well as the underpinning assumptions and objectives of decentralisation and 
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rescaling.  To address this, Cox (2009), Keating et al. (2009) and Pike and Tomaney (2009) 
argue for a greater need to integrate the material or territorial approach with more relational 
accounts that take into consideration the fluidity of scale and its cultural construction by state 
actors (Lobao et al., 2009). 
 
The literature on state rescaling has mostly been presented in a context of territorial 
approaches to local and regional development (Pike and Tomaney, 2009, Brenner, 2004). 
Because of this, some writers contest the relevance of this approach in a multi-level 
governance context (inter alia Barnett, 2013; Allen and Cochrane, 2007; Painter, 2006). An 
example of applying an integrated or ‘qualitative state’ approach (Pike and Tomaney, 2009) - 
rather than viewing this in the confines of either territorial or relational approaches - would 
see the process of “deterritorialization” of geographically bounded entities (scales) resulting 
in the state losing the power of structuring political action, then allowing new modes of 
governing to emerge that “reterritorialize” around functional economic spaces (Koch 2013: 
400; see also Cox, 2009; Leitner, 2004; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). This shows that 
networks help construct and contest scales and (re)configure scalar relations and in turn, 
scalar structures construct and contest networks. Interurban networks may help strengthen the 
power of the local (urban and regional) scale vis a vis the national and supranational scales, 
thereby contributing to a reconfiguring of scalar relations” (Leitner 2004: 250).  
 
However, an examination of scale on its own may not be enough to explain rescaling 
outcomes (Jessop, 2009; Jessop, 2004) that are also determined by political struggles, actors 
and interests (Le Galès 2006: 719;). Le Galès argues that the rescaling paradigm is based on 
strong economic determinism which leaves hardly any room for political agency, choice and 
struggles (ibid.). From the perspective of cities and rescaling, Harrison (2015) stresses the 
need to deepen our understanding of both the economic and political processes underpinning 
the contemporary urban condition. In the context of the rescaling of capital accumulation he 
cites the following political factors – centrally orchestrated state strategies to promote 
transnational investment in major urban regions, governmentalised mapping of state spaces, 
the political-construction of a hierarchy of cities and urbanised regions within national and 
international circuits of capital. The result of this is a mismatch of functional and political 
territories that forms an obstacle for metropolitan governance (Koch, 2013). Political conflict 
therefore shapes outcomes so that they may become contested and contingent on a number of 
political interest. When interpreting the politics of governance, in contrast to a functional 
perspective where governance changes appear as uncontested political decisions, an 
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institutional perspective considers the complex political dynamics (Nicholls, 2005; Koch, 
2013) and illustrated in Figure 2.1 below.  
 
Figure 2.4. Theoretical perspectives on Governance Change 
 
 
Source: Koch, 2013, adaptation based on Hay (2006), Mahoney (2000), and Schmidt (2010). 
 
According to Bevir (2004) governance reforms are shaped by the way political institutions 
interpret exogenous developments in terms of political dilemmas and how they relate them to 
their institutional context (i.e. traditions) and their beliefs. The relationship between forms of 
state governance and patterns of uneven development is described as “contentious” (Pike and 
Tomaney, 2009). However, despite this, there is a growing body of evidence that points to 
strong institutions at the relevant scale as best placed to address interregional disparities and 
uneven development (OECD, 2012; Tomaney, 2013). In the wake of the Great Financial 
Crisis and response by some national governments to implement programmes of austerity 
there is greater attention devoted to examining the socioeconomic implications of territorial 
rescaling and state restructuring (Sullivan, 2011; Donald et al., 2014; Peck, 2012). 
 
As mentioned above, state rescaling is influenced by globally specific conditions – a 
neoliberal framework of growth - as well as national level factors which include political 
interpretations and constitutional frameworks, but also local factors such as capacity and 
political will for transformation. Therefore, despite broad trends, there are spatial and scalar 
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variations in state rescaling across countries and localities. What role does state rescaling 
play in uneven development? In his critical focus on the state rescaling literature, Cox argues 
that unlike in the US which is radically more decentralised, the significance of state rescaling 
in Western Europe has been exaggerated and  geographically uneven (2009). Rather than 
rescaling of the state as a response to globalisation and geographically uneven development, 
Cox sees a role for a politics and representation that is sensitive to questions of scale in the 
context of local and regional development. At the urban scale and concerning rescaling of the 
city, Harrison (2015) draws attention to growth divergence among cities within national 
urban systems, and the role of states in reconfiguring their institutional form in the face of 
these global and national challenges that shape these ‘new territorial dynamics and politics’. 
In the context of geographically uneven development, just as Cox asserts the need to engage 
in the politics of scale; the politics of austerity also need to be negotiated. Austerity is seen as 
paving the way for new rounds of fiscal discipline, local-government downsizing and 
privatisation – factors some attribute to ‘devolved neoliberalism’. The explicitly spatial 
rescaling involved in many cities’ pursuit of austerity measures raises important questions of 
place, space and the politics of contraction (Donald et al., 2014). 
 
Lobao and Adua (2011) argue that, based on their empirical research on local government in 
the US, the austerity impact on the state is that state functions tend to be rescaled territorially 
with subnational governments “assuming greater roles in economic growth and 
redistributions”, which chimes with Sullivan’s (2011) idea of local government continuing to 
‘govern the mix’. However, closer examination of the effect on cities suggests that “the 
forces of globalisation and subsequent state rescaling have left many municipal authorities 
with increasing responsibilities but without fiscal capacity to deliver essential public 
services” (Donald et al., 2014). To tackle local variation in responses to austerity, empirical 
research in different types of cities suggests that stronger institutional infrastructure, 
governance coalitions and community solidarity can position municipal governments to cope 
better during challenging economic and fiscal times (ibid.). 
 
If we also recognise that contemporary processes of state restructuring were crisis-induced 
and that the state is therefore a key architect of the process of geoeconomic integration 
(Harrison, 2015); in order for the state to design effective governance, there is a requirement 
to “reflect on the nature and multiplicity of relations that compose contemporary political 
economies and their potential relationship to state rescaling processes” (MacLeavy and 
Harrison, 2010). 
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Where does this leave local states and localities in determining and shaping the outcomes of 
state rescaling? From theoretical and empirical analyses, the process of state rescaling is 
predominantly centrally determined and instigated (aside from state rescaling motivated by 
cultural or identify factors i.e. Northern Italy) but can also be influenced and shaped from the 
bottom up and arise through moments of conflict or crisis. As shown in Brenner’s New State 
Spaces, there is continued significance of the central branches of the state in the politics of 
geographically uneven development (Cox, 2009) through strategies such as metagovernance 
and external steering. 
 
Despite extensive research in this area, there remain methodological limitations (Lobao et al., 
2009; Brenner, 2009; Cox, 2009; Pike and Tomaney, 2009), perhaps most notably, while the 
study of state rescaling must be guided by theory, overall it remains a highly empirical 
question - the meaning and significance of state-rescaling processes are highly contextually 
dependent, particularly across nations. Understanding the fluidity of state rescaling processes 
is a key methodological challenge (Pike and Tomaney, 2009). Furthermore, understanding 
local context and agency is important in order to account for local adaptations and variations 
within an overarching neoliberal framework (Brenner, 2002; Lobao and Adua, 2011; Leitner, 
1990). 
 
2.4.2 Decentralisation and the local state 
Political and administrative decentralisation to a variety of spatial scales, is one of the most 
important global trends in government and governance (Tomaney, 2013: 1; Faguet, 2013; see 
also Rodriguez-Pose; Cox, 2009). Over the last few decades, there has been a transfer of 
powers and resources from superior to lower tiers of government (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 
2005; Schneider, 2003; Peck, 2012), which is changing systems of governance that also seek 
to establish political legitimacy and accountability at the relevant scale.  
 
Using Faguet’s definition, “decentralization [is] the devolution by central (i.e. national) 
government of specific functions, with all of the administrative, political, and economic 
attributes that these entail, to regional and local (i.e. state/provincial and municipal) 
governments that are independent of the centre within given geographic and functional 
domains” (2013: 2). Whilst this is a comprehensive account, it represents an absolute 
scenario where in fact the reality tends to be more nuanced, contested and contingent.  
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In contrast to ‘top down’ approaches to decentralisation which mostly advance efficiency 
arguments, ‘bottom up’ motivations for decentralisation are varied and can include the search 
for self-sustaining systems of improvement based on increased choice for individual service 
users and increased voice for neighbourhoods and local communities (Bennigton, 2006: 8; 
Newman, 2014). A view criticised as utopian by Harvey (2000). More recently, governance 
discussions point to an enhanced role for the citizen, thereby requiring new models of 
governance. In relation to democracy, decentralisation is usually promoted in order to foster 
more active citizenship, improve the accountability and responsiveness of the ward councillor 
(Lowndes 1992: 60) and provide new pathways for participation and partnership (Sullivan 
and Howard, 2005; Newman, 2014) 
 
Decentralisation comes in many forms, has a wide diversity of meanings (see CURDS and 
LSE, 2011 for an in depth review and analysis). Worth noting here is: that this process is not 
one-directional and can represent a centralisation of powers and responsibilities as well as 
decentralization; the three main types of decentralisation are fiscal, administrative and 
political (Treisman, 2007); and the transfer of responsibility is not always matched with the 
overall policy responsibility and financial resources (Bennett, 1997). Furthermore, the 
empirical analysis does not “unambiguously” corroborate the claims of a positive effect of 
decentralisation on economic performance (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). For these 
reasons, there is little agreement about what constitutes an example of decentralisation, what 
causes decentralisation, or what effects it is likely to have (Schneider 2003: 32-33; CURDS 
and LSE, 2011).  
 
Decentralisation directly links state action with spatial scale through the transfer of state 
activities that contribute to the growth and redistribution functions of the nation state (Lobao, 
2009). Questions about decentralisation are therefore situated into broader debates about the 
relative decline of the nation state, the rise of neoliberal governance, uneven development 
and variations in the welfare state. Since growth and redistribution are core functions of the 
nation state, attention also is given to theorising how economic development (Pike and 
Tomaney, 2009) and social welfare activities (Scarpa, 2009) are reallocated to subnational 
states (Lobao, 2009). A focus on decentralisation frames central political economic and 
governance questions in light of spatial scale (ibid). 
 
Despite the shift of powers and responsibilities from the central to local state and in some 
instances to new scales at the regional or metropolitan level; it is suggested that claims are 
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exaggerated and evidence is thin (Cox, 2009). As with processes of rescaling, 
decentralisation is context specific and varies across nations but and also within nations. The 
decision to decentralise is not a uniform process and, as shown in the previous section, it can 
also mask aspects of centralising, therefore it can be described as “both a resource and a 
threat for local government and for the economic performance of the system as a whole” 
(CURDS and LSE 2011: 25; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). Particular states may, for 
example, give differing weight to specific forms of decentralisation, administrative or 
political, and design them in particular ways with mechanisms that can encourage or inhibit 
the capacities of institutional actors (Pike and Tomaney, 2009). 
 
It is suggested that, for the majority of countries, the question is not whether to “decentralise 
or not”, or even opt for a specific decentralisation model, but to look at ways to improve 
capacity and coordination among public stakeholders at different levels of government to 
increase efficiency, equity and sustainability of public spending (Charbit, 2011). This 
question of “multi-level governance”, it is argued, is therefore applicable whatever the 
constitutional framework of countries, for example federal or unitary (Charbit, 2011). 
However, there are significant variations in the interpretation (form) and process adopted by 
national contexts and role of different spatial scales (CURDS and LSE, 2011). 
 
For local states, the degree of decentralisation is dependent upon a range of factors, some 
which need to be externally demonstrated, such as structures for accountability and 
legitimacy, but also internal factors such as determining capacity and capability, negotiating 
institutional politics, and building partnership capital. This is particularly so for the more 
significant fiscal and political types of decentralisation. From the centre, there is greater 
importance placed on (top down) governance mechanisms and structures of accountability 
than on (bottom up) issues of capacity and capability, and trust and institutional stability, as 
witnessed in the variation of institutional and local responses. In an austerity context, Peck 
(2012) highlights “competitive decentralization and continued institutional attrition at the 
local scale” as some of the key challenges for the most heavily impacted locations. 
Furthermore, Peck argues that there is a central state lack of understanding of the impact of 
decentralised austerity on the functioning and provision of state services overall.  
 
2.4.3 The state at different scales  
The preceding sections on rescaling and decentralisation have shown how, despite a strong 
rhetoric on devolving powers and responsibilities to lower levels as a means to improve local 
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growth outcomes, outcomes are uneven and unclear. As part of a variegated picture of the 
development of regions and localities, places adopt different approaches to decentralisation 
and rescaling between nation states and well as within nation states. Furthermore, approaches 
to decentralisation and rescaling often do not represent a one way shift but instead conceal a 
reconfiguring that can mean greater centralisation and disempowered local level. In a 
framework of territorial competition, local states that are able to exercise autonomy and 
agency may have greater success in influencing outcomes at the expense of other areas. This 
section examines those important relationships between state actors at different scales and 
how these relationships can be used to influence decentralisation and rescaling 
outcomes/capabilities deployed.  
 
Notwithstanding the hegemony of market fundamentalism and neoliberalism (Leitner, 2007), 
rather than a rolling back of the state, the state – at central and local level - is continuing to 
exercise control through new governing and governance approaches. The preceding sections 
have shown that the state at the central and local level continue to have an active and 
important role in local economic development but through different governance forms and 
approaches. Examining the processes of rescaling and decentralisation of state powers and 
responsibilities across nations reveals an uneven picture of multi-level and multi-agent 
arrangements. In the context of territorial approaches to growth and development there are a 
number of important scalar relationships that the local state navigates by requirement and 
selectivity. Examining these relationships can build a better understanding of how rescaling 
and decentralisation are taking place and what the local response is. These are:  
• centre-local – the relationship between the central and local government 
• local-local – the relationship between different local governments and local actors 
that share contiguous political and administrative boundaries 
• trans-local – the relationship between local governments and local actors that 
transcend political and administrative boundaries within (and across) countries, for 
example, for economic or cultural benefits  
 
On reflection, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate out the actions of state actors in 
increasingly multi-agency and multi-scale frameworks of government and governance. 
Unelected and technocratic organisations set the agenda as well in terms of the nature of 
these relationships, and include hard and soft institutions. A critical axis for local economic 
development is the relationship between the local state and the nation or federal state. The 
central state is responsible for setting the policy and funding framework within which the 
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local state operates and in order to achieve both local and national growth outcomes. Of 
particular interest here is how well the local state articulates and mobilises its interests 
relative to the centre to pursue local growth outcomes. Noting also a tendency to assume that 
the local scale is preferable to other scales – the ‘local trap’ (Purcell, 2006). Receiving less 
attention is how to best to analyse interrelations and the contracts between different levels 
(Mitchell-Weaver, 2000).  
 
Local-local relationships refer to the increasing interactions and collaborations across 
political and administrative boundaries, mostly driven by urban and metropolitan areas. Of 
interest here is how well does the local state work with adjacent (contiguous) and sub 
national scales horizontally. Trans-local relationships refer to the ties that bind local areas at a 
sub national level and explores how the local state works beyond boundaries and horizontally 
across the sub national scale. This can include international and cross border collaboration. 
Examples of ties here include networks of cities and/or policy learning, industry/specialism 
groupings.When examining collaboration across boundaries it is important to consider the 
different types and nature of relationships within frameworks of government and governance.  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to ground the study in the literature and explore existing 
conceptualisations and their limitations in order to develop a theoretical framework for the 
research. First the chapter explored the contemporary relevance of examining the role and 
contribution of local institutions in economic development, citing the different growth 
paradigms that shape theories on the contribution of local institutions to economic 
development and particularly in the context of addressing uneven development (2.1.1). 
Within this body of literature there is a gap in understanding – which this study seeks to 
contribute to – on the qualities and capacities of political institutions in economic 
development (2.1.2) and understanding the different roles and functions that political 
institutions perform (2.1.3). The theoretical framework for this study draws on these existing 
conceptualisations and definitions of the local state across a number of general changes 
(sections 2.2.1-2.2.4) and in the context of transformations in the local state to date (sections 
2.3 and 2.4) to explain how and why changes to sub-national government and governance 
have unfolded unevenly across scales, places and actors. 
 
2.5 Research framework and questions 
The literature review explored conceptualisations and transformations of the local state in 
order to ground the study and develop a theoretical framework to guide the research. This 
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showed that, first, there remain limitations in the theory and understanding of institutions and 
the difference they make (Tomaney, 2013) and particularly at the local level (Pike et al., 
2015). Second, a qualitative research approach can help to explain “which institutions, when 
they matter, and precisely how they shape growth” (Farole et al. 2011: 59, emphasis in 
original). Third, examining interactions between institutions and economic development 
requires exploring different geographic scales (Gertler 2010: 5-6). Lastly, a better 
understanding of the qualities and capacities of local political institutions can provide insight 
of how political factors shape incentives for economic action (Tomaney, 2013). 
 
The theoretical framework (see table 2.4 below) provides the bridge between the literature 
review, research gaps identified and resultant research questions, and is summarised in the 
table below. First, it identifies the main themes from the review of literature on the local state 
and economic development, which reflect multiple and some opposing arguments. Second, a 
proposition (or emerging hypothesis) is developed to be explored through the empirical 
research, to provide insight and explain the differentiated growth of cities and localities. 
Third, research questions guide the study. A summary of the theme and proposition 
connecting back to the literature, is discussed below. 
 
The first prominent theme identified from the literature on the local state and economic 
development, was the autonomy and agency of the local state in relation to approaches to 
growth and competition. Specifically how, under neoliberalism and variegated capitalism, 
local states have used their agency and autonomy to influence territorial competition and 
growth outcomes. The literature discussed a trend for greater autonomy for localities to 
pursue economic development driven by processes of globalisation, urbanisation and 
centralisation (Rodríguez-Pose and Palavicini-Corona, 2013) but also with political and 
economic constraints on local government in a capitalist society (Cockburn, 1977; Amin, 
1999; Newman, 2014). As part of these broader trends and processes, place has become 
pivotal for localities to develop competitive advantage (Harvey, 1989; Gordon and Cheshire, 
2001) at the same time as growth divergence is occurring between cities in national systems 
(Harrison, 2015). However, growth under neoliberalism has increased competition between 
localities reflecting their subordination to market-driven forces, and with success achieved at 
the expense of failure elsewhere (Peck and Tickell, 1994). New and dominant approaches to 
local and regional development such as Urban Economics and New Economic Geography 
(World Bank, 2009; Glaeser, 2012) have shaped the type of institutions and governance at the 
city and metropolitan level, and accentuated ‘entrepreneurial’ paradigms and territorial 
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competition (Brenner and Wachsmuth, 2012). This has occurred at a time when many 
municipal authorities have increased responsibility and reduced financial capacity (Donald et 
al., 2014). 
 
The second theme identified from the literature was on the type and nature of decentralisation 
being implemented and the political factors that shape this. This referred not only to the type 
of responsibilities and powers being decentralised, but to also understand how it was 
implemented in terms of the process and politics and in response to different objectives. The 
study draws on academic work that has examined the nature of decentralisation and provided 
a finer-grain account of the different types and forms (inter alia CURDS and LSE, 2011; 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2010) and relationship with state rescaling (Lobao et al., 2009). North’s 
(2005: 57) discussion of the “primacy of politics” in economic decision making provides a 
lens to examine how and why decentralisation takes place, noting that decentralisation can be 
designed to encourage or inhibit the capacity of institutional actors (Pike and Tomaney, 
2009). Also recognising that power does not necessarily follow responsibility (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002). The work by Sullivan (2011) and Lobao and Adua (2011) on the role and 
purpose of local government in a decentralised and austere context provides a broader 
perspective on what local government is for as powers and responsibilities shift between 
scales. The research will examine and explain decentralisation changes and their local impact 
to make explicit political choices that have shaped the outcome for institutional actors in 
places. 
 
The third theme focuses on horizontal coordination and capacity to examine and explain the 
interaction and collaboration between different local actors in the city-region for economic 
development and how this could explain differentiated governance and growth outcomes 
across places.The literature showed that while the benefits and challenges of coordination 
versus fragmentation of governance have long been debated (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1998), 
coordination in a multi-level governance context is generally thought to improve governance 
outcomes (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Büchs, 2009) across functional economic areas 
((Nelles, 2012; OECD, 2012; Katz and Bradley, 2013; Ahrend et al., 2014). This theme is 
concerned with the institutional environment and arrangements (Martin, 2000) or institutional 
regime (Pike et al., 2015) of places in order to explain differentiated growth and governance 
outcomes. The study focus on local government in the local state draws on discussions of 
both territorial and relational approaches and the continued importance and relevance of the 
territorialities of institutions and boundaries in governing economic development (Pike and 
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Tomaney 2009: 29; McCann and Ward, 2010) and the associated struggles and tensions 
(Hudson, 2007; Harrison, 2012). This takes the view of Jones and Woods 2013: 39) that 
localities are “multifaceted, dynamic and contingent entities” and governance reforms 
therefore interact with the institutional context of localities and in the spatially contingent 
evolution of governance. 
 
The fourth theme is vertical coordination and centre-local relations in order to examine this 
the interdependence between levels of government and governance actors at different scales 
and how centre-local relations have shifted under a vision of decentralisation and localism. 
The renewed focus on cities and city-regions has seen spatialised social relations shaping the 
evolution of state spaces (MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010). Local politics must therefore operate 
in multiple spaces, including supra-local ones - “a politics of place beyond place” (Clarke and 
Cochrane, 2013: 22). The focus on network governance across different actors has shifted 
attention away from the role and implications of the state within collaborative arrangements, 
for example discussions on a qualitative state (O’Neill, 1997), and threatens to dilute the role 
of democratic institutions within governance systems (Crouch, 2011). The research will draw 
on the work of Jessop (2002), Goodwin et al., (2005), Shaw and MacKinnon (2011), Jessop 
(2000) to critically examine whether there is an adjustment between different levels of 
government or ‘filling in’ (MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010) and ‘steering’ (Martin and 
Guarneros-Meza, 2013: 585), rather than a scaling back or weakening of the nation state. 
 
The next section discusses the methodology for the research. 
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Table 2.5 Research framework and questions 
Theme Proposition Research question 
Autonomy and 
agency 
 
That the local state is shaped by approaches to 
growth and competition.  
Within a system of variegated capitalism and the 
uneven development of localities, the extent to 
which the local state is subordinate to growth and 
competition or is able to exercise agency and 
autonomy to influence local outcomes, and the 
processes and relationships which enable it to do 
so are variable 
What is local state’s role 
in economic development 
and how is it shaped by 
new and dominant 
approaches to local and 
regional development?  
Type and 
nature of 
decentralisation 
 
That local government still matters to economic 
development but finds itself in a constrained form. 
Within an increasingly decentralised and austere 
context, what is the shape, form, extent and nature 
of decentralisation and how does this contribute to 
addressing local growth outcomes/objectives 
What characterises and 
explains the 
government’s 
programme of changes 
to the sub national 
governance of economic 
development? 
Horizontal 
coordination 
and capacity 
 
That governing and governance arrangements can 
contribute towards a variation in outcomes.  
Within a system of variegated capitalism and 
territorial competition, some local states are 
moving faster and further are more adept at 
influencing outcomes  
How and why have 
changes to powers and 
resources unfolded 
differently across and 
between scales, actors 
and places? 
Vertical 
coordination 
and centre-
local relations 
That the local state is profoundly conditioned by 
its relationship with the central state.  
Within multi scalar and multi agent frameworks of 
government and governance, the extent to which 
the relationship between central and local state 
actors determines or influences outcomes from the 
perspective of local government and in the context 
of austerity.  
What do these changes 
mean for the centre-local 
relations in the sub-
national governance of 
economic development? 
Source: Author’s illustration 
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Chapter 3. Examining local government in the local state:  
methodology and approach 
 
This chapter explains and justifies the methodological approach for this research and 
provides the rationale and context on the study focus and case studies, also reflecting on the 
practical difficulties and how they were managed. The chapter outlines the research design 
rationale and examines methodological issues relevant to the study. The approach also takes 
into account methodological critique and limitations in the field of human and economic 
geography. 
 
3.1 Research design 
The aim of the research was to better understand the changing role and structure of local 
government within new frameworks of government and governance for economic 
development at the city-region scale, and to examine how this has unfolded across scales, 
places and actors. The research examines what makes local government unique and 
distinctive amongst the plethora of actors that make up the local state in economic 
development and explores whether local government remains a pivotal actor in the local state 
for economic development.  
 
Situating local government within multi-scalar and multi-actor frameworks of governance for 
economic development is important to understand its role as a “constituent part of urban 
governance” (Hendriks 2013: 2). Furthermore, the political rhetoric of decentralisation and 
devolution of powers and responsibilities does not always translate into greater autonomy and 
improved outcomes for local areas (as discussed in Section 2.4). Adding to this, at the local 
level, the effects of austerity are having a variable impact geographically and institutionally 
on the capacity of local government to deliver statutory functions but also on the capability to 
take on new functions and responsibilities through devolution. The research design was 
therefore qualitative and in-depth in order to examine these issues. 
 
3.1.1 Approach and justification  
Guided by the examination of a central argument – that the political institution of local 
government is pivotal to the local state in economic development - the research follows a 
deductive approach by examining a series of research propositions (see table 2.4) that were 
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drawn from the literature review. The resultant research questions for the study, developed 
from these propositions, sought to address the gaps in the literature (Table 1) through the 
empirical research. The research is intensive in scope, to understand the local institutions of a 
small number of case studies. Contrasting with extensive research which looks for the 
regularities and common patterns within a representative sample, intensive research is 
concerned with the causal explanations of events in a case(s) and offers “real explanatory 
power” on processes or events produced through a combination of necessary and contingent 
relations (Sayer and Morgan 1985: 150). Further to this, given the contemporary policy 
relevance of the research, an intensive approach is better for making policy recommendations 
as it has a “causal grip on the agents of change” (Sayer and Morgan 1985: 154). However 
intensive research is not without its limitations. The unrepresentativeness of findings 
obtained through intensive research methods, mean these are unlikely to be generalisable to 
other contexts (ibid: 145) but can still provide lessons on the context-specificity and 
applicability of theories. The research therefore focused on examining two case studies plus 
the national context in-depth and their different historical contexts, to identify “force of 
example” rather than formal generalization (Flyvbjerg 2006: 227). This approach focused on 
clarifying the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences as opposed to 
describing the symptoms and frequency of the problem. 
 
3.1.2 Case study method 
This research used the analysis of in-depth interviews and secondary data to construct case 
studies of how decentralisation of government and governance for economic development 
has unfolded, recognising that,  
“the meticulous description of a case can have an impact greater than almost any 
other form of research report” (Gillham 2000: 101). 
 
The research design was in-depth and qualitative to uncover and explain the complexities of 
local institutions, for example by recognising that governance is not apolitical (Storper, 
2013). The purpose of the case studies – heeding Gerring’s (2007) call for the importance of 
carefully defined case studies – was to provide new insight of the changing role and structure 
of local government in new frameworks of government and governance for economic 
development. Of particular relevance to this research was that case studies helped to elicit 
context-dependent knowledge and aid learning (Gillham, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2006), to provide 
lessons for theory and policy. Case studies denote a “spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) 
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observed at a single point in time or over a period of time” (Gerring 2007: 19), to explore 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin 2003: 1). They are used to investigate contemporary 
phenomena and complex social phenomenon (Yin, 2003) and can be flexible where the 
organizing concepts may change a little or a lot as the study moves on. 
 
The research also considered and addressed the criticisms of the case study method through 
research design and execution. These included concerns relating to a lack of rigor, bias, and 
having little basis for scientific generalisation (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This was achieved by 
corroborating interview data with secondary sources, interviewing a range of local actors in 
the case study geographies and nationally and establishing cross-case perspectives through a 
relational comparison approach (Ward, 2010). This was strengthened by using ‘extended case 
methods’ to explore and challenge rather than just confirm theory (Burawoy, 1998) and 
prolonged forms of engagement, which required continuously reflecting on both methods and 
theory (Putnam, 1993; Barnes et al. 2007: 21). Extended case methods contribute to 
interpreting continuity and change in institutions by following the evolution of relationships 
and practices over time (Gertler, 2004) through “sustained collaboration” and “prolonged 
forms of engagement” with the case studies (Barnes et al. 2007: 20-21). To achieve this, 
close contact was maintained with the PhD Collaborative Partner (Newcastle City Council) 
throughout the study to reflect on the approach and emerging insights in order to develop a 
finer grain understanding and analysis of the issues. Extended case methods thereby 
complemented the relational comparative approach (Ward, 2010) employed in this research, 
through an iterative reflection of the theoretical perspective while conducting the empirical 
research on the ground (Barnes et al. 2007: 143; see also Yin, 2003), and composing the case 
studies in an engaging way (Yin, 2003). 
 
3.1.3 Comparative research focus and rationale  
The research is a comparative study to understand the changing role and structure of local 
government in economic development. The rationale for comparison was to contextualise and 
interrogate the experience of the core case study (the North East), through a focus on the 
processes and relationships of institutionally similar cases (Greater Manchester) but with 
different governance and economic outcomes, within a single national context. The themes 
for comparison derive from the research propositions which underpin the research questions, 
(see table 2.4). To address the study aim, the research was particularly interested to explore 
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the specific and general characteristics of the institutional environment and institutional 
arrangements (Martin, 2000; Rodriguez-Pose, 2013) – the “institutional regime” (Pike et al. 
2015: 5). This was to understand why governance outcomes vary across city-regions and the 
reasons why difference or similarity persists, in order to identify the distinct patterns of 
governance (Tilly, 1984; Ward, 2010). 
Recognising the different manifestations and configurations of governance for economic 
development, this research will compare the urban governance arrangements of the local state 
and local government’s role within this. This ‘functional equivalence approach moves away 
from comparing institutions like for like, and instead compares similar sets of modes, patterns 
and processes of governance (Cox and Mair, 1991; Ward 2010). The approach acknowledges 
that a range of institutions and agencies are involved in governing cities and is useful for 
examining governance at different stages of development. In constructing and examining the 
case studies, through analysis of primary and secondary data, the approach used similar and 
comparable actors and networks and documents across the cases, where possible. This was to 
illuminate the case specific context and dynamics which contributed to a variation in 
governance outcomes for economic development and the role of local government within 
this.  
 
The research adopted a “relational comparative approach” to scale that recognised both the 
territorial and relational histories and geographies that are tied in with the production and 
reproduction of urban governance (Ward 2010: 480). This broadened the interrogation and 
interpretation of the data through the case studies posing questions of one another (ibid.) and 
was used as a tool to explore the strengths and limitations of existing conceptual frameworks. 
To understand and explain how the process for policy learning and transfer – ‘policy 
mobility’ (Ward, 2010) - occurs in specific contexts, the research used a ‘distended case 
approach’ (Peck and Theodore, 2012). This ‘follows the policy’ laterally through networks 
whilst also remaining attentive to hierarchical and nodal sources of power, and asymmetries 
in capacities and resources. This is critical to examining the evolution of institutions and 
structures and explaining the uneven governance outcomes of city-regions. The approach also 
allows for a greater focus on how policies from elsewhere are put to work by local actors, and 
how they are translated, contextualised and embedded (Peck and Theodore 2012: 25) which 
was particularly useful in examining how the well-established Greater Manchester model of 
governance and decentralisation shaped the approach and outcome of the North East. This 
was combined with an ‘incorporated comparison’ (McMichael, 1990) perspective which 
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recognised that interrelated instances are integral to, and define, the general historical 
process, and this provided for a more dynamic comparison of economic development 
processes and relationships across city-regions, continuously evolving in and across time. 
 
This study examines decentralisation changes to city-regions and localities as the spatial unit 
of comparison and preferred scale for sub-national economic development and growth 
activities (HM Government, 2010b; OECD, 2012) and a relevant scale to examine the 
implications of austerity (Peck, 2013; Donald et al., 2014). Cities have long been recognised 
as arenas of policy experimentation and industrial restructuring (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002). In developing a comparative urban and regional studies perspective, this research 
sought to respond to calls for “more rigor, transparency, and dialogue about the relationships 
between theory, concepts, methods, politics and policy” (Pike et al. 2015b: 124; see also 
Barnes et al., 2007) and to deepen our understanding of both the economic and political 
processes underpinning the contemporary urban condition (Harrison, 2015). In taking 
forward a relational comparative approach (Ward, 2010), as already discussed in this section, 
to examine the changes across and between city-regions, the research also draws on 
McMichael’s (2000) ‘incorporated comparison’ to apply “cross-space” and cross-time” 
comparisons (Pike et al. 2016c: 136) and explain the unfolding of decentralisation processes 
and politics, at different points in time and space. 
 
3.1.4 Selection strategy and criteria for the case studies 
To address the study aims and to examine how changes have unfolded across and between 
different spatial scales and geographic contexts, the research looked beyond the core case 
study (the North East) to develop a rich and in-depth understanding of the issues as well as a 
finer grain analysis of the core case study itself. In selecting the comparator cases, the 
approach was cognisant of the critique of research claiming causation and generalisation, and 
instead focused on the causal mechanisms at work within comparators, and the relations and 
processes which make this contingent. 
 
Figure 3.1 below summarises Flyvbjerg’s strategies for the selection of samples and cases 
(2006). Flyvbjerg points out that when the objective is to achieve the greatest possible 
amount of information on a given problem or phenomenon, a representative sample may not 
be the most appropriate strategy, because the typical or average case is often not the richest in 
information. Rather, when the objective is to elicit greater understanding, Flyvbjerg argues 
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that ‘information-oriented strategies’ help to clarify the deeper causes behind a given 
problem and its consequences, moving beyond describing the symptoms of the problem and 
how frequently they occur. He points to atypical or extreme cases which often reveal more 
information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation 
studies. The extreme case can therefore be well-suited for getting the point across in an 
especially dramatic way (ibid.). Drawing on Flyvbjerg’s strategies, the approach used in this 
research was an ‘extreme/deviant’ case selection strategy in order to “obtain information on 
unusual cases, which can be especially problematic or especially good in a more closely 
defined sense” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 230). According to Gerring (2007) this approach is also 
suited to examining city-regions that over-perform and underperform relative to a set of 
expectations. The following section sets out how the case studies were selected using this 
method.  
 
Figure 3.1: Strategies for the Selection of Samples and Cases  
Source: Flyvbjerg (2006: 230) 
 
3.2 Case selection and rationale 
The research developed two comparator case studies selected from within a single national 
context to elicit greater understanding and insight as part of a relational comparative 
approach (Ward, 2010), along with analysis and explanation of what was happening in the 
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national context. The case studies were informed by the PhD Collaborative Partner 
connection as well as a socio-economic and contextual analysis of city-regions in England. 
Greater Manchester was identified as the ‘extreme’ case and the North East as the ‘deviant’ 
case study using Flyvbjerg’s information-oriented case selection strategy (2006). This 
represented a comparison of a shared economic and institutional context (austerity and 
decentralisation) but with different governance and economic development outcomes 
(establishment of city-region structures and agreeing Devolution Deals with central 
government). The rationale for the case study selection is discussed in detail below. 
 
The PhD Collaborative Partner in this project was Newcastle City Council. The decision to 
focus on the North East city-region rather than on Newcastle was because this scale better 
reflected the economic geography and policy focus for economic development under 
decentralisation in England, which was the focus on this study. Using Flyvbjerg’s case 
strategy for ‘extreme/deviant’ cases, the North East case offered interesting insights as the 
‘deviant’ or problematic case for the following reasons. First, the Coalition government’s 
changes led to a new scale of collaborative working and functional economic area in the 
North East for the governance of economic development based on a grouping of seven local 
authorities. This was in contrast to the 12 local authorities which comprised the North East 
before 2010 and the five local authorities which were formerly known as Tyne and Wear city 
region. Second, the process for defining and establishing a new functional economic area in 
the North East was fragmented and contested and resulted in central government steering the 
final decision. Third, the history of collaboration across local authorities in the North East has 
been well documented (cf. OECD 2006; OECD 2012), and these assessments point to 
underlying and unresolved challenges such as a lack of consensus on the urban core and 
parochialism inhibiting cooperation. These issues continued to face the new arrangements. 
 
From an analysis of the core cities socio-economic indicators and economic performance (see 
table 3.2) and secondary material, Greater Manchester was selected as the ‘extreme’ case for 
comparison for the following reasons. The analysis showed that there was a long and 
established history of working at the scale of the ten districts which continued under the 
Coalition government’s sub-national arrangements. Second, economic indicators at the time 
of selecting the case studies showed the GM LEP outperforming other LEPs on growth 
measured by Gross Value Added (GVA). Third, Greater Manchester was the first city-region 
to establish a Combined Authority and paved the way for other places to follow this lead. 
There are many accounts of the history of collaboration in Greater Manchester (cf. Emmerich 
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et al., 2013; Holden and Harding 2015) which explain how cooperation between the 
constituent local authorities and other actors has been nurtured over time. This research was 
interested to explore how these institutional processes and relationships were negotiated in 
this latest episode of decentralisation under the Coalition. The remainder of this section 
explains why the UK was chosen as the study context and then introduces the two case 
studies. 
 
Table 3.2: Core Cities comparison 
  Population GVA Employment 
English Core 
Cities (LEP) 
LA LEP GVA 
total 
(2013)  
Annual 
growth 
in total 
GVA 
(2013) 
by LEP 
GVA 
per 
head 
growth 
rate by 
LEP 
(2013 
(%) 
GVA 
per 
head 
(2013) 
by 
LEP 
(UK = 
100) 
GVA 
per 
head 
(2013) 
by LEP 
Employment 
rate (LEP) 
Unemployment 
rate (LEP) 
Birmingham 
(Greater 
Birminham and 
Solihull) 
1,092,330 1.96m  £41.3bn 4.3% 3.7% 89.6 £20,969 65.3% 11.7% 
Bristol (West of 
England) 
437,492 1.1m £29.3bn 3.5% 2.3% 114.6 £26,820 73.3% 7.2% 
Leeds (Leeds 
City Region) 
761,481 >3m £60.5bn 2.9% 2.4% 86.6 £20,249 70.3% 8.5% 
Liverpool 
(Liverpool City 
Region) 
470,780 1.4m £27bn 2.6% 2.5% 76.3 £17,852 66.5% 9.5% 
Manchester 
(Greater 
Manchester) 
514,417 2.7m   £56.3bn  4.6% 
(£2.5bn) 
4.1% 88.6 £20,724 67.5% 9.4% 
Newcastle (North 
East) 
286, 821  2m   £33.9bn 3.6% 3.3% 74.6 £17,443 67.3% 9.0% 
Nottingham 
(Derby, 
Derbyshire, 
Nottingham, 
Nottinghamshire) 
310,837 >£2 £41.3bn 2.7% 2.1% 82.6 £19,329 70.2% 8.0% 
Sheffield 
(Sheffield City 
Region) 
560,085 1.8m £30.6bn 2.9% 2.5% 71.8 £16,786 68.7% 10.0% 
Sources: ONS, Nomis, Ward 2017 
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3.2.1 Context selection rationale: Creeping centralisation and uneven localism in 
England  
Within the UK, the English case presents an advanced example of local state restructuring. It 
has witnessed a continuing revolution of sub-national governance arrangements in the post-
war period, culminating in the abolition of the regional tier by the Coalition government in 
2010. Abolition of public bodies charged with helping to spark regeneration across the 
regions has impacted on the ability of the existing and new structures to retain and build on 
knowledge and experience over time. Despite the changes introduced by the Coalition to 
promote growth and make local decisions more accountable, widening spatial inequalities 
persist and are also compounded by the distribution of austerity cuts to public finances. In 
examining how new frameworks of government and governance for economic development 
have unfolded differently across places, scales and actors, the UK presents an interesting case 
for a number of reasons.  First, it has one of the most centralised systems (see figure 3.2 
below) of public finance, policy-making and political control among OECD nations (London 
Finance Commission, 2013; Ahrend and Schumann, 2014) which is recognised by all the 
main political parties as constraining economic and social development (RSA, 2015). 
 
Figure 3.2 Taxation revenue attributable to sub-national and central/federal government as a 
percentage of GDP, 2010 
 
Source: London Finance Commission (2013: 25) using OECD Stats Index 
 
Second, and in the context of addressing uneven development, this is further compounded by 
the economic dominance of the global city of London which reinforces spatial imbalances 
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and regional disparities across the UK (Martin et al., 2015). Economic growth in England is 
dominated by London in contrast to comparisons between first and second tier cities in other 
Western European countries (OECD, 2012). England’s highly centralised system of 
government invests heavily in the capital city and has second tier cities that significantly 
underperform compared to the best performing European cities (Parkinson 2013: 18; see also 
Overman, 2012; OECD, 2012; OECD, 2014). The debate on the economic contribution of 
first and second tier cities and whether countries perform better if they concentrate their 
investment in their national capitals and larger cities is explored in theoretical approaches to 
growth including New Economic Geography and Urban Economics (e.g. Glaeser, 2012) - or 
spread investment across a wider set of cities (OECD, 2012; Parkinson, 2013). In England, 
the second tier cities form part of a Core Cities network comprising Birmingham, Bristol, 
Cardiff, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Sheffield. Third, 
whilst decentralisation of powers and resources below the national level has been a 
longstanding political debate nationally (and discussed further below), the referendum on 
Scottish independence accelerated devolution debates in England particularly at the city-
region level, and also because of the asymmetrical and uneven governance developments 
taking place that do not add up to a “systematic, sufficiently-funded or coherent strategy for 
spatially rebalancing the economy” (RSA 2015: 12). 
 
In order to analyse and interpret contemporary changes it is important to reflect on the 
historical context of sub-national governance in England to understand where the genesis for 
localism comes from. The lack of autonomy of local government today is a legacy of the 
post-war welfare state and creeping centralisation in the post war period. Over time, 
successive governments have reconfigured and experimented with the sub national or 
intermediate tier to address economic disparities between regions and to improve local 
democracy between the state and citizens. This has resulted in an “oscillating pendulum” 
(Pike at al. 2016: 10) between overlapping forms of decentralisation to regions and the local 
level (see figure 4 below).  
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Figure 4: Pendulum swings in economic development governance in England  
 
Source: Pike et al. (2016: 10) 
 
Regardless of which political party was in power, the different approaches to governance 
have not fundamentally addressed the reliance on the distributions of funding from the centre 
to local government. The ability to raise taxes and decide on shape of local services has 
become progressively limited. By the 1970s, 60% of local government expenditure was 
determined by central government and by 2000 the proportion was 85% (Crewe, 2016). This 
raises questions as to where the genesis for localism comes from if local areas are not able to 
shape local services and with the necessary resources. Furthermore, overlapping forms of 
decentralisation have resulted in the upheaval and churn of local institutions, and the 
knowledge and capacity within them. 
 
In the post war period, local government was increasingly seen as a means to administer 
central services and serve national goals and centralisation was cultivated and reinforced by a 
reliance on central funding, made worse according to some, by local authorities demanding 
more money regardless of freedom (Wills, 2016) but also by people being promised uniform 
delivery and entitlement across the country. Shaped by the “geography of political power” 
and “long established tendency to prioritise the national over the local”, growth became a 
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‘zero-sum game’ as the local state and local charities lost power to the central state (Wills, 
2016: 2). Centralisation and reduced autonomy of local government crept in as part of the 
post-war settlement but prior to this there was example of strong local government at the 
city/municipal level. Under municipalisation, councils of all political persuasions bought out 
gas, water, electricity and tramway companies, according to Crewe (2016) on “practical 
rather than ideological grounds” and reinvesting the income in further improvements. 
Described as the “golden age” of municipal government and institution building (Wills 2016: 
72), an important contrast to the centre-local relationship of today was that the centre acted to 
increase the role of the local rather than in competition. A victim of their own success, as 
these experiments by individual authorities were deemed effective they became legally 
mandated across the country with the transfer of assets and profits under central government 
control “depriving councils of a huge chunk of independent income” (ibid.). Central 
government linked funding to the fulfilment of particular policy objectives and reduced local 
authorities to mere agents of the welfare state.  
 
Metropolitan councils were created in 1974 as a result of a new two-tier system of counties 
and districts was established across England and Wales. This led to the creation of six upper-
tier units known as ‘metropolitan counties’ to represent the heavily built-up areas outside 
Greater London, and constituting metropolitan districts. While metropolitan counties covered 
all areas of local government like non-metropolitan counties, the distribution of 
responsibilities was different to that of the county/district authority district structure. 
Metropolitan districts were responsible for a greater number of services than non-
metropolitan districts such as education and social services. The metropolitan county councils 
ran from 1974 to 1986, when they were abolished in the Local Government Act 1985. This 
followed clashes between the mostly Labour led metropolitan county councils the Thatcher 
Conservative government due to overspending and high rates charging. Despite being a 
Conservative government creation, during this period of metropolitan county councils, the 
Thatcher government “launched a sustained attack on the authority of local government” 
(Crewe 2016: 6-10) on many fronts. This included: reducing council funding, placing caps on 
their rates of spending and taxation (ultimately introducing the poll tax); centralising the 
collection of business rates and redistributing the income according to a formula devised in 
Whitehall; among other measures weakening local government autonomy and oversight of 
services, for example education and bus regulation (ibid.).  
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Over the 2000s, there were a number of reports, including on European comparisons (e.g. 
Parkinson, 2006; Rodriguez-Pose, 2008; Overman and Rice, 2008), that all made a strong 
case for devolution to cities and city-regions and supported the view that cities and cross-
boundary working across metropolitan areas could lead to greater economic benefits. This 
research evidence, along with questions on the democratic accountability of regional 
structures in the wake of a resounding no vote (78% against to 22% in favour) in the 2004 
referendum for an Elected Regional Assembly in the North East (BBC, 2004), shaped 
Labour’s emerging city-region agenda. The concept of city-regions was developed further 
through The Northern Way initiative, a collaboration between the three northern RDAs and 
the 2007 ‘Sub-national Review of economic development and regeneration’ (HM Treasury, 
BERR, CLG, 2007). The review concluded that you need greater flexibilities and incentives 
for local government and support for collaboration at the sub regional level. This referred to 
strengthening the strategic role of the regional level and with greater accountability, and 
reforming central government’s relations with regions and localities to improve support for 
regions and localities. It also set out a commitment to “explore the potential for groups of 
local authorities to establish statutory sub regional bodies for economic development policy 
areas”, through governance proposals set out in Multi Area Agreements (MAAs) (HM 
Treasury, BERR, CLG 2007: 3). This was seen as an important turning point in Labour’s 
regional project as the minister who commissioned the review, John Healey, “switched at that 
point from old style regionalist to a more sophisticated model” (Author’s interview 46, 
leader, GM local authority 1, 2016). In the April 2009 Budget, the then Chancellor Alistair 
Darling announced plans for two “pilot city-region” around Leeds and Greater Manchester, 
seen as a recognition that the south-east alone cannot provide the stimulus for economic 
recovery (HM Treasury 2009: 83). New pilots were about pooling resources in areas such as 
transport, strategic planning, skills and economic development in travel-to-work-areas 
(TTWAs) that crossed political and administrative boundaries. Proposals were described as 
“light-touch city-region governance” to avoid the criticism that they were introducing another 
layer of government into conurbations (ibid.). 
 
3.2.1 Case study selection rationale  
Based on Flyberg’s ‘extreme/’deviant’ case selection strategy, the case studies of Greater 
Manchester (extreme) and the North East (deviant) were developed. This section provides an 
overview as to how they were determined as well as providing some historical context to 
underpin the empirical analysis. 
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Manchester is the third largest city in England with a local authority population of 514,417 
and the third largest Core City (NOMIS, 2016a).  The Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) 
area of Greater Manchester has a resident population of 2.7m (NOMIS, 2016a). The Greater 
Manchester city-region comprises of the ten districts of Bury, Bolton, Manchester City, 
Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford and Wigan (see figure 3.4 below). 
The under-bounded nature of the City of Manchester means that it is more dependent on its 
surrounding areas than other core cities – a factor that underpins its strong collaborative 
governance (Emmerich et al., 2013). In terms of economic performance, figures at the time of 
selecting case studies for the research showed that the Greater Manchester had the highest 
growth rate of all LEPs in England in 2013 (4.6%) (New Economy, 2015), exceeding London 
and Birmingham. GM also had the highest GVA per head growth rate (4.1% in 2013) of all 
the Core Cities during 2011/12 (ibid.), and the number of workplace jobs in Greater 
Manchester grew at a rate of 3.2%, compared to a national average of 0.5% (IPPR North, 
2014).  
 
Figure 3.4 Map of Greater Manchester Local Enterprise Partnership geography 
 
Source: Holding and Harding (2015: 8). 
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Notwithstanding this positive economic performance, there are also economic challenges 
across Greater Manchester. From 2010/11 to 2015/16, Manchester City Council experienced 
a reduction in spending power that equates to >£200 per head of population or an 18% 
reduction in spending power (Newcastle City Council, 2013) compared to an England 
average of 13.4% reduction. Further cuts announced in the March 2015 budget were slammed 
by Council Leader Sir Richard Leese (Cox, 2015). Furthermore, the levels of growth and 
prosperity are not equally shared across and with the ten districts with entrenched social 
challenges and inequality within the city-region. Greater Manchester ranked in fifth place for 
the proportion of neighbourhoods that are in the most deprived 10 per cent of areas nationally 
using the 2015 Index of Multiple Deprivation (DCLG, 2015). 
 
Following the abolition of six metropolitan councils nationally in 1986, the ten Greater 
Manchester local authorities established a voluntary body – the Association for Greater 
Manchester Authorities (AGMA). AGMA was created to provide oversight of GM level 
bodies and discussion of issues at this scale. The voluntary alliance recognised that working 
together as a single economic geography could achieve more than individual boroughs and 
over time further GM-wide institutions joined providing thinking and delivery capacity for 
the ten local authorities (Holden and Harding, 2015). Manchester was also selected as one of 
the eight city regions that were announced as part of the Northern Way initiative in 2004, 
reflecting a strengthening of city-region arrangements within regions. 
 
Under the Coalition government’s move towards the further decentralisation of powers and 
resources to city-regions scale, Manchester was seen as a trailblazer with then Chancellor 
George Osborne describing Manchester as “a grown-up city, one that has pulled away from 
regional centres” and one which is competing with Birmingham to become the “second city” 
to London (Jenkins, 2015). In recent years, Manchester City Council and Greater Manchester 
had piloted approaches locally to inform national policy in a number of policy areas 
including apprenticeships and troubled families and in February 2015 announced a further 
devolution agreement to create a £6m integrated health and social care budget (GMCA, 
2015), reinforcing its trailblazer status. Under the public service reform work, to achieve 
greater flexibility in local services, driven by Greater Manchester and the rest of the 
England’s Core Cities, there was a move towards integrating outcomes across policy area and 
linking social and economic outcomes. A further development towards integrating city-region 
powers and resources was the Greater Manchester Spatial Framework which sought to 
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integrate planning with growth objectives across the ten local authorities (Tomaney and 
McCarthy, 2015). 
 
City-region collaboration in Greater Manchester follows a long history of local authority 
cooperation across the ten districts of Greater Manchester through the Association of Greater 
Manchester Authorities (AGMA) and wider governance mechanisms such as the Business 
and Leadership Council. In 2011, Greater Manchester was the first city region partnership in 
England to achieve legal status by becoming a Combined Authority, receiving powers for 
economic development, transport and housing. The following year, Greater Manchester was 
one of the first wave of City Deals agreed with HM Treasury, with their innovative ‘Earn 
back’ model (GMCA, 2012). A further Devolution Agreement was signed with central 
government towards the end of 2014, which will give greater powers to the GM Combined 
Authority working in partnership with a directly-elected mayor in additional policy areas 
including the Work Programme, public service reform and health and social care. The 
Greater Manchester agreement was seen as a core part of the government’s vision of a 
‘Northern Powerhouse’. 
 
The process of devolution and decentralisation in Greater Manchester under the Coalition 
government has been characterised by secret negotiations and bilateral deals between 
Manchester City Council’s leader and chief executive and Chancellor George Osborne and 
HM Treasury officials (Jenkins, 2015). This has sparked concern from some Greater 
Manchester Labour MPs that there is no consultation beyond the local authority chief 
executives on the models of decentralisation (CLG Committee, 2015). Alongside this, there 
are a number of policy and government links to individuals with Manchester connections 
who have played important advocacy roles along the way (Jenkins, 2015). The first GM 
Devolution Agreement in 2014 included the condition of a directly-elected mayor from 2017, 
which presented an interesting development given that Manchester, along with nine other 
cities in England, rejected proposals for a city mayor back in 2012.  
 
Newcastle is the largest urban centre and employment centre in the North East with a 
population of 296,500 (NOMIS, 2016b) and is the eighth largest core city by population in 
England. Population of the Local Enterprise Partnership geography is just under 2m 
(1,966,900) (NOMIS, 2016b). The North East city-region comprises the seven local authority 
districts of Durham, Gateshead, Newcastle, North Tyneside, Northumberland, South 
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Tyneside and Sunderland (see figure 3.5 below). In 2013, at the time of selecting case studies 
for the research, the North East LEP GVA total was £33.9bn with annual growth at 3.6%, the 
third highest performing of the English core cities. The North East was also facing significant 
economic challenges. Analysis by Newcastle City Council showed that Newcastle 
experienced the highest overall cuts of £289 per head of population with the North East 
experiencing £215 per head, equating to a 19.5% reduction in spending power (Newcastle 
City Council, 2013). Economic and social prosperity is not shared across the city-region, and 
the North East LEP area is ranked tenth in the proportion of neighbourhoods that are in the 
most deprived 10 per cent of areas nationally using the 2015 Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(DCLG, 2015). 
 
Figure 3.5: Map of North East Local Enterprise Partnership geography  
 
Source: North East Combined Authority  
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Following the abolition of the Tyne and Wear Metropolitan Council in 1986, the Tyne and 
Wear Development Company was established to invest in regeneration and development. 
Despite being a relatively small region, the challenges of collaboration between local 
authorities in the North East have been well documented. In 2006, the OECD Territorial 
Review of Newcastle in the North East described regional governance structures as “weak 
and fragmented” and suggested that “consolidating governance functions of local authorities 
and strengthening governance capacity at the city-region level may be a good option” (OECD 
2006: 7). This report highlighted that, 
“Political fragmentation is not always a problem if there are strong mechanisms of 
coordination and governance concerning important issues: that is not the case in the 
North East” (OECD 2006: 209). 
Whilst sharing a similar institutional, economic and political context as Newcastle, 
Manchester’s experience of the institutional processes and relationships that have shaped and 
influenced devolution and decentralisation, have been different. This research project will 
examine and explain differences in governance and economic development outcomes across 
and between city-regions. In particular, the research will contrast the particularities of 
institutions in Greater Manchester and the North East and draw insights from a comparative 
analysis of frameworks of government and governance for sub-national economic 
development.  
 
 
3.3DData collection  
This section explains the approach to collecting data and key considerations. 
3.3.1 Data sources, collection strategies and techniques 
This qualitative, in-depth study of the local state and economic development combined 
analysis of primary and secondary sources. Primary data was obtained through fieldwork 
interviews with local and national government officials, city-region governance, 
representative organisations (e.g. business, trade union, voluntary and community sector), 
and individuals selected based on their knowledge and expertise relating to the topic and case 
studies. Secondary sources included academic and policy research, policy documents and 
reports, corporate documents, minutes of meetings, committee documents and papers and 
geographical and historical readings to build up a contextual background. The data from the 
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interviews was analysed and synthesised along with secondary sources in constructing 
narratives of the two case studies. 
 
Interviewees were selected through a combination of a stakeholder mapping to identify the 
key actors and networks, consultation with the PhD Collaborative Partner and snowballing 
recommendations by interviewees. An important consideration in identifying interviewees 
was their involvement and insight over the relevant study timeframe and of historical events, 
and the selection included organisation and governance representatives as well as decision-
makers, across different scales and actors and those with an understanding of the research 
topic. Background information on interviewees was identified through internet searches, 
publications, and governance charts which also provided contextual information to inform the 
interviews themselves. The PhD Collaborative Partner was consulted on the list of 
prospective interviewees identified through stakeholder mapping, however the researcher 
made the final decision.  
 
Secondary sources were reviewed throughout the project and were organised by theme. 
Given the policy focus of this research, and the timing of the fieldwork which come after the 
UK General Election in May 2015, there was an abundance of research and policy material to 
examine and reflect on. The data collection challenges were therefore not related to access of 
relevant material, but instead to carefully consider and sift through arguments and analyses 
and to recognise partisan or special interest views and to develop an objective and critical 
perspective. To address this, secondary sources were drawn from a range of sources and 
triangulated with academic and independent sources where possible. 
 
3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews and interviewing elites 
In economic geography, interviews are seen as the method of choice for large parts of the 
discipline (Barnes et al., 2007) and the open-ended corporate interview as a valuable 
component of evidentiary strategy (Schoenberger, 1991). Indeed, interviews are one of the 
most important sources of case study information (Yin, 2003). In weighing up which method 
to use, Schoenberger argues that “in dealing with historical, institutional and strategic 
complexity, and particularly during periods of economic and social change, the corporate 
open-ended interview is deemed more sensitive than survey methods” (1991: 180). In 
contrast to extensive research methods, Interviews allow nuances of linkages and power 
relations within networks to be explored (Barnes et al. 2007: 265). 
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There were a number of considerations to mindful of when doing interviews. Validity of 
responses was a key consideration and to this end, Schoenberger’s (1991) views appear to 
chime with Flyvbjerg (2006) in terms of defining validity and accuracy in line with learning 
and contextual discovery. Schoenberger argues that the “open ended interview, when 
carefully administered, may offer greater accuracy and validity because it allows a more 
comprehensive and detailed elucidation of the interplay among strategy, history and 
circumstances” (1991: 184). However, this must be approached with caution as to what 
information people choose to give in an interview, as these are “verbal reports only” (Yin 
2003: 92). Interviewing can therefore also be inherently problematic because the stories 
people tell about how decisions are made are radically different from the ways those 
decisions were actually made (Barnes et al 2007: 82). 
 
In total, 50 interviews were conducted for this study to achieve a comprehensive and 
reflective account of the individual cases in addition to a better understanding of national 
policy. This consisted of 20 interviews in the North East, 22 in Greater Manchester and 8 
interviews comprising central government officials and representatives of national 
organisations. The aim was to interview 15-20 in each case study in order to capture a range 
of perspectives across different sectors (i.e. local government, private sector, voluntary and 
community sector, academia), across the city-region geography, at different scales (i.e. local 
and city-region) and with different perspectives (i.e. local government officers, politicians, 
business representatives) (see table 3.3 below).  
 
Prior to commencing fieldwork interviews formally, the researcher conducted three pilot 
interviews (two North East and one Greater Manchester) to examine and refine the approach, 
identify interviewees and to generate policy examples to provoke discussion and to use in the 
distended case examples. Alongside the interviews for each case, there were a small number 
of interviews with civil servants, national cities organisations and think tanks. The purpose of 
this was to better understand the role and perspective of central government and to gain an 
‘outsider’ perspective on the processes and relationships of individual cases. Sayer and 
Morgan (1985: 155) highlight the importance of interviewing “both sides” in order to garner 
and examine different perceptions and responses. This was achieved in this study by 
interviewing actors at different sub-national scales (e.g. local, city-regional, national) and 
trying to capture the different perspectives, including political, where possible by asking 
interviewees to identify who may have an opposing view (Nelles, 2012). 
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Table 3.3 Breakdown of interviewees 
 
 
 
The interviewees were identified through own knowledge of networks and speaking to 
contacts at the outset. Interviewees were predominantly ‘elites’ (Woods 1998: 2101-2119), 
such as politicians, technocrats and businesspeople, representing local actors with a role or 
interest in economic development governance. It was also important to identify those who 
could provide local knowledge to develop a “highly contextualised understanding of patterns 
and processes in particular geographical settings” (Yeung 2007: 289). The interviews were 
important to build a historical understanding, alongside secondary data, of the intent of local 
institutions and governance changes (Glasmeier 2007: 218-19). Interviews were semi-
structured and open-ended to assume a conversational manner with “guided conversations 
rather than structured queries” (Yin, 2003) to provide insight to the political institutions of 
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the city-region. While the interviews were semi-structured, the researcher aimed for 
‘collaborative dialogue’ to engage interviewees in the research aims and questions, allowing 
them to shape content rather than control it (Schoenberger 1991: 182), an important 
consideration in interviewing elites (Gillham, 2003). This interaction was also used to 
“enhance information flow” (Sayer and Morgan 1985: 157). The majority (apart from two) 
were recorded which enabled active listening and interaction. 
The interviews were relatively straightforward to arrange with a largely positive response 
from interviewees. This was particularly the case in Greater Manchester, and probably 
reflected their more advanced position having already secured a Devolution Agreement. A 
couple of people did not respond or acknowledge the request and one person declined to 
partake. It was not possible to speak directly to business representatives of the Local 
Enterprise Partnership (LEP) in either case study. In the North East, no one responded to 
requests for interview and in Greater Manchester the researcher was steered towards the 
Greater Manchester Integrated Support Team (GMIST) who coordinated the work of the 
LEP. Three pilot interviews were carried out to refine the questions and to establish and make 
further contacts, also to consider the sequencing of interviews, where this was possible. The 
approach to interviews was to meet with officers first to build up background and then to 
approach politicians for their perspective and reflection, recognising that it could be more 
challenging to get time in their diaries. The invitation for interviews was framed to highlight 
the comparative aspect of the research and this was particularly helpful in securing interviews 
in the North East as there was a lot of interest in how Greater Manchester were progressing 
with devolution at the time. Invitations were also tailored to the individual and their specific 
contribution, sometimes mentioning names of other interviewees, when they had given their 
permission to do so. Five interviews were conducted over the phone due to unavailability to 
meet. 
 
The power relations between researcher and interviewee varied across interviews with no 
particular pattern relating to position held, it mostly came down to the individual. Interviews 
were conducted in a formal manner but once a relationship with the interviewee was 
established this became more relaxed and informal. There was only one interview where the 
researcher felt the power dynamics were too pronounced by the interviewee to overcome. In 
this particular instance, while all the interview topics were covered, there was no offer of 
follow up or further introductions, as with other interviewees. Having an awareness and 
understanding of current policy and politics was critical for interviewees to open up and talk 
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in detail about examples and to elicit insight. The interviews were coded to differentiate 
between local authorities and positions held. 
 
The analysis of interview material was conducted in two ways. First, when typing up the 
transcripts reoccurring themes were highlighted as well as the range of perspectives on that 
theme, and grouped these under the respective research question. Throughout the analysis, 
emerging findings were discussed and reflected upon with the PhD Collaborative Partner and 
explored further through interviews – with the more controversial points as provocations – to 
get a deeper understanding of the commonalities and differences in comparing the 
experiences of the two case studies. In the earlier stages of the analysis, NVIVO was used to 
classify and retrieve information by themes which were refined and modified on an iterative 
basis. This helped to confirm the structure of the empirical chapters. To cross-validate the 
findings in the context of the analytical framework, individual transcripts were revisited and 
reflected upon as new insights emerged. This parallel approach to data organisation and 
analysis helped to mitigate the possible limitations and biases of qualitative research. 
 
3.3.3 Positionality, methodological reflexivity and role of the interviewer  
Within economic geography, it is argued that issues of researcher positionality remain 
unacknowledged and unexamined (Barnes et al. 2007: 22). Furthermore, personal reflexivity 
is not being matched by a theoretical reflexivity, a key concept and practice in the 
identification of standpoints (Ward and Jones 1999: 302) and one which helps to avoid 
becoming engrossed in a single paradigmatic explanation (Yeung 2007: 289). In turn, 
methodological reflexivity – ‘what I am doing as well as how and why I am doing it’ - is seen 
to “open up and sharpen questions of politics, purpose and priorities” (Barnes et al. 2007: 
23). 
The collaborative aspect to this study presented its own challenges to consider in terms of co-
production, independence and objectivity. Being able to draw on the resources and 
knowledge base of the PhD Collaborative Partner provided benefits particularly in grounding 
the study in the policy context and framing ideas and questions to explore in detail through 
the interviews. This required the researcher to evaluate this contribution in the context of the 
wider study so not to bias the scope and aims of the study. Politics is inherent in processes of 
government and governance and to ensure the study reached beyond the dominant views, 
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interviews were held with different districts within the city-region, and with both executives 
and politicians.  
Further to this, in thinking about the researcher-subject relationship whereby “reflexivity 
involves a radical consciousness of self in facing the political dimensions of fieldwork and 
the construction of knowledge” (Barnes et al. 2007: 267 quoting Callaway); the researcher’s 
previous work experience in regional development could shape convictions and analytical or 
political bias. Reflexivity also considered how this previous affiliation with the regional tier 
was perceived by interviewees and well as how the findings were interpreted. Being able to 
discuss the history of regions and city-regions proved useful in interviews to elicit further 
insight and the ongoing relationship with the PhD Collaborative Partner helped to interpret 
the local implications of the study. 
Finally, being aware of the temporal angle to the research (further discussion in Section 
3.3.4), Ward and Jones (1999) advocate an approach sensitive to research “situatedness” 
(with respect to the politics of time as a ‘research moment’), which they argue is essential to 
avoid over generalising from experiences.  
 
3.3.4 Researching policy change in real time 
Reflecting on the research, there are a number of issues and challenges that researching 
moving policies in real time presents. First, in researching an evolving and unfolding policy 
agenda, it was important to look beyond claims and announcements to evidence of action and 
impact, where this was available. Second, to also consider the cumulative impact of the 
different policy changes on local government over time to understand the full extent of 
changes and the variation in outcomes across different cities. Third, understanding the 
context was also critical to interpreting the timing and politics of announcements as well as 
the different stages of decentralisation and devolution of the two case studies, in order to 
explain findings. Last, having a detailed understanding of developments and building up 
background knowledge was critical to accessing and conducting interviews in order to 
develop a finer-grain understanding of changes.  
 
These issues were managed in the research project by undertaking the fieldwork interviews 
relatively close together to and in the same political context, after the May 2015 General 
Election. Where possible, the research draws on independent and credible analyses to 
develop a finer grain and more critical understanding of changes although this was often 
delayed due to the pace of changes driven by central government. The interdependencies of 
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local economies and associated policy interventions also became clear through the research 
which identified the strong links between economic and social policy broadening out the 
initial research focus on economic development.  
 
3.3.5  Ethical considerations: Confidentiality, Anonymity and Informed Consent 
For the research interviews, participants received an information sheet with details of the 
project and supervisors and a broad outline of the themes that would be covered. It was stated 
in this sheet that the details of interviewees would be anonymised in the report where quotes 
would be used and a consent form was included for them to read prior to the interview. All 
participants were happy for the interviews to be recorded and the recordings were stored in a 
password protected file and by a code rather than a name. 
Interviews were coded to differentiate between case studies, positions and organisations and 
to preserve anonymity. A follow up email was sent after the interview to thank participants 
and outline next steps for the study, to reiterate confidentiality and to remind them of contact 
details if they had further queries.   
 
3.3.6 Substantiation, corroboration and triangulation  
“Qualitative economic geography research needs a wider array of methods and 
techniques that allows us to see what people do as well as what they say they do” 
(Barnes et al. 2007: 82) 
A criticism of case study research is that it is hampered by disinclination across the field to 
invest in corroboration, triangulation and interrogation across comparative sites (Barnes et al. 
2007: 22). This study sought to mitigate against these concerns by employing multiple 
methods in constructing the case studies as this strengthens the validity of interview data 
(Gillham 2003: 93). The approach used in-depth interviews to build an understanding based 
on organisational and individual perspectives in addition to pursuing a ‘distended case’ 
approach (Peck and Theodore 2012: 25) that ‘follows the policy’ through networks, and 
provides a relational account of the decentralisation of economic development. Also from the 
perspective of the territorial entities of central and local government. As the empirical work 
progressed and data was collated and analysed, the analytical themes were honed as refined 
accordingly as new insights emerged from a finer grain analysis of the issues. Using both 
approaches was useful when interrogating the data to provide a more rounded picture of what 
was happening in practice. Corroboration and substantiation of the interview data was also 
achieved by cross-interrogation of data using Ward’s (2010) relational comparative approach 
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to the case studies. This used the case studies to pose questions of each other and the outputs 
were triangulated through interviews and with an analysis of secondary sources. By analysing 
and distilling the findings and policy lessons with interviewees and the collaborative partner 
as part of the ‘extended case methods’ approach, this enabled context-specific lessons on 
praxis to be drawn from the research process (Barnes et al., 2007). While the strategy for 
interviews was to obtain a comprehensive overview that incorporated a range of perspectives, 
the analysis of interview data had to be mindful of special interests and bias. Seeking out 
different or opposing perspectives and those at different scales and across actors was 
important to achieve a cross-section of views where possible.  
 
3.4 Reflections on the PhD Collaborative Studentship 
This research was initiated and carried out with Newcastle City Council as the ESRC 
Studentship PhD Collaborative Partner. The partnership relationship and working 
arrangements were not prescribed which enabled the researcher to develop a relationship 
which was conducive to the aims of the research. This was based on some degree of 
familiarity through personal connections and was flexible and consultative which allowed the 
researcher space to design and develop the research while situating it within the policy 
context. Having the PhD Collaborative Partner in the core case study provided opportunities 
for dynamic knowledge formation, novel forms of exchange and dissemination.  
As the research was developed, there were a number of important issues to clarify. First, the 
focus on economic development at the city-region level meant this was not a review of 
Newcastle City Council’s economic development programme, nor an assessment of the City 
Council as an organisation. As economic development was increasingly being incentivised by 
central government to take place at the city-region scale it made sense to focus the research 
on the (then) emerging North East city-region. Newcastle City Council were interested in the 
lessons emerging from collaborative working within this city-region partnership. This meant 
that the role of Newcastle City Council in the research, beyond shaping the initial research 
objectives and focus, was to assist with access to interviewees and to provide contextual 
information and reflection throughout. The Assistant Chief Executive acted as the main 
sponsor with day to day contact provided by the Head of Economic Policy, which was pivotal 
to accessing people within the Council, in the North East and nationally. Second, the purpose 
of the research was to provide an in-depth assessment of the changes over the longer term 
rather than short term commentary and reflection on individual policy and funding 
announcements along the way.  
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There were a number of benefits to having Newcastle City Council as a Collaborative Partner 
which helped to situate the research. As a member of the Core Cities network, this helped to 
build up knowledge for the comparative aspect of the research with Manchester as well as to 
develop an understanding of the national position and politics on decentralisation and 
devolution to city-regions. Also, having a good relationship with people at different levels in 
the City Council helped build up an understanding of both strategic and operational issues, 
and to talk through and develop ideas. This also helped when conducting fieldwork to be able 
to ground ideas and questions in policy terms and examples which resonated with 
interviewees and helped to elicit insight. There were also some challenges. The affiliation 
with Newcastle City Council had to be carefully explained to reassure potential interviewees 
of the independence and objectivity of the research. Also the timing of the fieldwork was 
delayed slightly as North East councils were engaged in politically sensitive discussions to 
agree a devolution deal. 
 
In conclusion, to address the aims of the study, the empirical research has investigated 
whether the role of local government in economic development is being redefined by 
examining the central argument: to what extent the political institution of local government 
has a pivotal role in the local state in contributing to economic development, how this is 
changing and why? In so doing, the empirical analysis has addressed the central argument by 
examining a series of research propositions and question (see table 2.4). Recognising the 
interconnected trajectories of different places, the research also used relational comparisons 
to pose questions of one another (Ward, 2010: 480). This helped to provide critical insight on 
the core case study as well as offering new frames of reference for interpreting and 
interrogating the data. Rather than seeking to develop ‘ideal types’ of governance from 
findings, the research was guided by “an attendance to the difference the diversity of cities 
makes to theory” (Robinson 2002: 549; Ward 2010: 482), thereby helping to uncover the 
context-specificity and evolution of theories (McFarlane, 2008; Ward, 2010), and the distinct 
patterns of governance for each case that could not be accounted for wholly by external 
factors (Ward 2010: 478).  
 
Chapters 4-7 introduce and discuss the empirical analysis and address the research questions. 
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Chapter 4. What is the local state’s role in the sub-national governance of 
economic development and how is it shaped by new and dominant 
approaches to local and regional development? 
 
This chapter examines the autonomy and agency of the local state in relation to new and 
dominant approaches to local and regional development. This is to understand how local 
states shape and are shaped by new approaches to local and regional development and 
addresses the first research question to understand and explain the local state’s changing role 
in the governance of economic development. This addresses the aim of the research by 
identifying and explaining how factors of growth and competition shape the governance of 
uneven development.  
 
The review of literature identified a renewed academic and policy interest in cities as vehicles 
of growth as well as diverging perspectives on sources of growth and the role of institutions 
in enabling and facilitating growth. This showed that theories of Urban Economics and 
agglomeration economies (e.g. World Bank, 2009; Glaeser, 2012) were highly influential and 
transferring to mainstream thinking and policy practice in relation to concentrating growth in 
cities. This is in contrast to focusing on local and more diverse sources of place-based 
approaches to growth (OECD, 2012). The aim of the empirical research here is to examine 
how in this period of the Coalition government, local states have used their agency and 
autonomy in response to uneven growth and competition.   
 
The chapter is structured in two sections. First, the chapter examines the main arguments and 
rationale underpinning the Coalition government’s approach to the sub-national governance 
of economic development and how it was shaped by dominant approaches to local and 
regional development (Section 4.1). Second, the chapter examines how the approach to 
growth has been negotiated and implemented locally. This explores how the new institutional 
framework for the sub-national government and governance of economic development 
announced by the Coalition was defined and implemented locally (Section 4.2). The 
experiences of the two case studies are examined under the themes of autonomy and agency 
to explain how the new approaches to local and regional development were configured, 
negotiated and implemented. 
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The chapter makes the case for examining both political and economic arguments in order to 
explain how and why changes to sub-national governance for economic development have 
unfolded differently across place, scale and actors. 
 
4.1 A renewed focus on cities and agglomeration economies: implications for scale and 
governance    
This section examines and explains the rationale and arguments for the new territorial focus 
of sub-national governance of economic development between 2010-15 – functional 
economic areas and city-regions - and the transitions and implications for local places. The 
renewed interest in cities as engines of growth, particularly over the last two decades, reflects 
a growing academic and policy recognition that scale is important to sub-national economic 
development (see inter alia Parkinson 2006; Katz and Bradley, 2014; Storper et al., 2015). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, more recently ideas relating to the theories of New Economic 
Geography (NEG) and Urban Economics have been influential in shaping contemporary 
policy understanding and approaches to sub-national economic development and particularly 
growth in cities (World Bank, 2009; Glaeser, 2012). These spatially-blind, or “place-neutral” 
(Barca et al., 2012) growth perspectives focusing interventions on people, advocate 
agglomeration economies and densely populated cities that offer advantages for economically 
connected areas and see a limited role for institutions in coordinating activity (Glaeser, 2012). 
The territorial policy focus for the sub-national governance of economic development from 
2010 by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government can be explained first by 
examining their critique of the previous Labour administration’s policies alongside the 
rationale and objectives for new policies. It is important to examine the economic arguments 
on scale alongside the political arguments and rationale for new forms of governance to 
understand how one has shaped the other. For example, central government’s drive towards 
localism and decentralisation of policy below the regional level must be seen alongside their 
fundamental critique of regions.  
 
In the lead up to the 2010 General Election, the Conservative government vehemently 
opposed the regional tier of government and governance describing it as an “artificial 
construct that serves only to add layers of bureaucracy and complicate the job of local 
government” (Conservatives 2009: 28). This policy green paper first trialed the idea of 
replacing the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) with business-led Local Enterprise 
Partnerships – comprising groups of local authorities and businesses across the functional 
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economic area scale. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats proposed a more moderate position 
initially by refocusing RDAs “solely on economic development, removing duplication with 
other parts of government and allowing substantial budget reductions” thereby shifting 
responsibility for economic development to local authorities and allowing RDAs to remain 
where they had “strong local support” (Liberal Democrats 2010: 26). Despite what were 
deemed as “circumspect” views by both political parties on regions (Sandford, 2013) leading 
up to the General Election, the position agreed in the newly formed Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat’s ‘Coalition government: A programme for growth’ confirmed the intention to 
dismantle regional planning, reduce the number of quangos, and shift power from 
Westminster to local councils, communities, neighbourhoods and people (HM Government 
2010b: 11). A position which the Coalition presented as being in “direct contrast” to previous 
arrangements (HM Government 2010a: 13). The table below summarises the critique as set 
out in the ‘The Coalition: our programme for government. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of Coalition government critique and new proposals for local growth  
Coalition critique Coalition policies 
Top down targets and regional planning, 
artificial administrative boundaries 
bureaucratic regions 
 
Functional economic areas 
Decentralisation of powers, resources and 
responsibility 
Cities and localities  
Unbalanced growth across regions and 
sectors, failed to ‘close the gap’ in 
economic growth dis  – failed to ‘close the 
gap’ in economic growth disparities 
between regions   
Regional Growth Fund 
Enterprise Zones 
Northern Powerhouse 
Lack of democratic and accountable 
decision-making, decisions taken by 
unelected quangos 
Big society 
Localism 
Democratically elected mayors 
Source: Author’s interpretation based on HM Government (2010b)  
 
The new arrangements for promoting local economic development were announced quickly 
after the General Election with the main proposal being a rescaling of economic development 
governance as follows, 
 “We will support the creation of Local Enterprise Partnerships – joint local authority-
business bodies brought forward by local authorities themselves to promote local 
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economic development – to replace Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). These 
may take the form of the existing RDAs in areas where they are popular.” (HM 
Government 2010a: 10). 
The invitation of 29 June 2010 to local authority and business leaders to form new Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) (Cable and Pickles, 2010) provided further detail on the 
geography central government envisaged for LEPs. There was an expectation that 
partnerships would include groups of upper tier authorities to be sufficiently strategic, and 
could match existing regional boundaries if supported by business and civic leaders. 
However, the letter also noted concerns by the Coalition that RDA boundaries did not reflect 
the economic reality and recommended that partnerships better reflect the “natural economic 
geography” and cover functional economic and travel to work areas (DCLG and Cable and 
Pickles, 2010). This was identified as the most appropriate scale to deliver economic 
development activities to maximise impact and switch from administrative regions.  
 
In practice, the process of identifying functional economic areas (FEAs) – broadly defined as 
the area that a local economy and its key markets operate (DCLG, 2010) - as the new scale 
for economic development was variable and based more on the interpretation of economic 
flows. The arbitrary nature of defining functional economic areas was highlighted in a report 
by the Communities and Local Government Committee (DCLG, 2010), citing earlier work by 
Coombes (2009) and they concluded that there is “no universal approach to defining 
functional economic market areas” as the patterns of economic flows can be different 
“depending on which local markets are being considered” (DCLG 2010: 3). This was based 
on their analysis of the 39 LEPs finally approved. Based on their assessment, the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills judged that for the 39 LEPs approved: seventeen made a 
strong case that they represented a FEA, sixteen made a plausible case, four made a weak 
case, and we have no information on two” (NAO 2013: 30).  
 
One aspect of spatial policy already developed under the previous Labour administration and 
continued by the Coalition government (and subsequent Conservative government from 
2015) was the territorial policy focus on the role of cities, city-regions, and agglomeration 
economies for economic development and growth. Over the study period, cities and city-
regions grew in prominence both as an actor engaging and shaping discussions on economic 
development and as an important scale for interventions, while agglomeration theories have 
shaped local and national strategies for economic growth. As the focus and political will from 
central government, particularly from the Chancellor, for decentralisation to cities and city-
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regions continued and accelerated under the Coalition and subsequent Conservative 
government, Labour initiatives for cross-boundary governance were disbanded and Multi-
Area Agreements, City-region Pilots, Urban Regeneration Companies and City Development 
Companies were abolished too (NAO, 2014). A central argument in support of 
decentralisation to cities was that they are lagging behind their European counterparts on 
GDP as a measure of economic growth and a range of socio-economic measures (HM 
Government, 2010a). 
 
A significant step in decentralisation to cities was the Core Cities Amendment to the 2011 
Localism Bill which enabled Core Cities to develop ‘City Deal’ proposals for the transfer of 
powers and resources. City Deals, introduced in 2012, were designed to represent a “new way 
of working” (NAO 2015: 6) by providing local places with a chance to set out their own 
priorities and local leaders to explain their growth priorities and negotiate directly with senior 
government decision-makers. In response, the Coalition government committed to removing 
barriers to cities’ growth plans by providing funding and devolving specific decisions. In 
response to this flexibility, the scale of City Deals varied as some were developed for the 
LEP geography (e.g. Greater Manchester) while others, for a particular urban footprint (e.g. 
Newcastle and Gateshead).  
 
The growing evidence and arguments on the potential benefits of agglomeration economies 
and concentrating growth in urban core continued to develop and inform the Coalition’s 
territorial and growth policy focus. The ‘Local growth: realising every place’s potential’ 
White Paper (HM Government 2010a: 7) referred to the strong focus in recent years on “the 
role that agglomeration effects - the concentration of people and businesses within a defined 
area – can have on economic performance”, citing London as an example that has benefitted 
from agglomeration in terms of growth and global standing.  Notwithstanding a recognition 
in the White Paper that some smaller towns had actually grown faster than larger towns, the 
paper set out measures to support the mutually beneficial economic relationship between 
larger cities and surrounding urban areas with a focus on the eight English core cities outside 
London: Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and 
Sheffield. In articulating what the role of central government would be in growing these 
economies, investment in infrastructure was cited as one area where it makes sense for 
government to intervene in market failures, connecting people to opportunities and 
maximising agglomeration benefits (ibid: 31).  
 
  88 
It is important to stress that research evidence on the role and contribution of cities, city-
regions and agglomeration economies was also commissioned by the cities themselves and 
they have a crucial role, particularly through the Core Cities network - an interest group for 
the eight largest English cities outside London plus Glasgow and Cardiff. The Core Cities 
network had been making the economic case around devolution to cities based on creating 
the right policy environment for cities to thrive and seeing cities as opportunities and 
solutions to economic, social and environmental problems. Interviewees described their 
contribution as important to shaping the debate, particularly through the RSA City Growth 
Commission (2014) which also published the DevoMet (RSA City Growth Commission, 
2015) report and policy recommendations. In addition to setting out the opportunities for 
more growth and better outcomes for citizens, the report also identified barriers for cities, 
including uncertainty in the overall process of devolution and the uneven outcomes and 
implications for different places. An important aspect of the growth narrative of Core Cities 
was not advocating growth at the expense of London and the South East, but instead a place-
based approach of realising untapped potential across places. In doing so, the Core Cities 
linked with the London Finance Commission to examine how the recommendations on fiscal 
decentralisation in the report (London Finance Commission, 2013) could be extended to 
England’s Core Cities. 
 
A clear expression of the Chancellor George Osborne’s interest in agglomeration economies 
was what he termed, the Northern Powerhouse initiative which was focused on increasing 
economic growth and productivity to rebalance growth in the North, followed by the 
proposals for a Midland Engine (Bradley-Depani et al., 2016). It was announced by the 
Chancellor in a speech in Manchester in June 2014 and was based on ideas of agglomeration 
economies and achieving economic growth by concentrating growth across cities in the 
North, he argued,  
“The cities of the north are individually strong, but collectively not strong enough. 
The whole is less than the sum of its parts” (Osborne, 2014). 
This built on previous concerns that northern cities could function better as a single economic 
unit due to their size, and economic research on agglomeration had become increasingly 
influential through the more recent ideas of New Economic Geography and Urban 
Economics (Lee, 2016). The underpinning argument was that cities and their hinterlands 
across the North would benefit from greater connectivity between towns and cities and 
concentration of labour markets. This led Jim O’Neill, chair of the RSA City Growth 
Commission, to describe a vision of “ManSheffLeedsPool” as region of 7 million people with 
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the potential to generate “many agglomeration benefits” (RSA City Growth Commission 
2014: 9) . However, the ability of different cities and towns in the North to connect with and 
benefit from concentration of investment, particularly around Manchester, was unclear 
without investment or interventions across a range of policy areas, including schools and 
transport. As highlighted by an interviewee,  
“Among the Core Cities there are two types. There is Manchester, Leeds and 
Birmingham and then there is the rest. There are cities that absolutely dominate their 
regional economy and then there are cities that are part of their regional economy, so 
Bristol, Nottingham, Newcastle and Sheffield they don’t dominate in the same way. 
Even though they don’t like to put themselves in two leagues there are definitely two 
leagues in terms of the capability of a Core City to determine the whole level of 
prosperity around that” (Author’s interview 32, director, North East local authority 6, 
2015).  
 
Also, despite the Northern Powerhouse being personally championed by the Chancellor and 
advocated at the centre of government, it was unclear what the financial and political 
commitment to individual proposals would be, leading some to suggest it was mainly a brand 
(Lee, 2016). It represented the latest phase in the rebalancing agenda, the debate on city-
regions, and the role of cities as the focus for efforts to reduce regional disparities (Lee 2016: 
2), but with fewer resources and capacity than Labour’s previous Northern Way initiative.  
 
In summary, this section has provided a contextual discussion of the how a focus on cities, 
city-regions and agglomeration economics has shaped the Coalition government’s approaches 
to growth and competition in England since 2010. The following sub-sections discuss how 
this has unfolded across the two case studies and draw conclusions in relation to the 
arguments and aims of the study.  
 
4.1.1 Greater Manchester: Embedding and unfolding a strategy of agglomeration 
The development of the Greater Manchester (GM) city-region can be viewed as a process of 
political and economic construction by actors at different levels of government and 
governance to “build, maintain and nourish a particular set of governing arrangements” 
(Ward et al. 2016: 417) spanning over at least three decades. Events that have formed part of 
the historical development of the city-region are discussed in Section 3.3.2. This section 
examines how economic arguments and rationale for the city-region concept and economic 
strategy were configured and enacted in GM by local and central government actors, in the 
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context of an evolving and emergent agenda for economic development at the city-region 
level. 
 
Fundamentally, the scale of the ten districts of the city-region was already well established in 
2010 and with governance mechanisms at this scale, therefore the objective was to continue 
and grow.. In the mid 2000s, even after almost two decades of economic interdependencies 
and linkages within GM, there was a sense from local actors that there were gaps in city-
region strategy making capability as expressed by this interviewee,  
“[the] area didn’t have a strong enough narrative about what its growth aspirations 
were, it had a decent working relationship with government but not as progressive as 
now, and we didn’t really have answers to some of the difficult economic questions, 
on disparities and growth between north and south Manchester, and concentration of 
intergenerational worklessness” (Author’s interview 27, director, GM organisation 2, 
2015). 
As a response to this, the Manchester Independent Economic Review (MIER) was launched 
in 2008 by then Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Hazel Blears and 
Chancellor Alistair Darling and was overseen by an independent Commission for the New 
Economy. The review cost £1.3 million and was funded by a combination of local and 
national agencies (North West Development Agency, Nesta, AGMA and the Learning and 
Skills Council) (Holden and Harding, 2015). The purpose to of the MIER was to inform the 
development of Manchester city-region. This was cited by central government as a good 
example nationally and represented the first independent study undertaken by a city-region in 
Europe that analysed the economy as a cohesive whole (DCLG, 2010). MIER consisted of a 
commission of prominent economists and business leaders, supported by a Policy Advisory 
Group and Secretariat, with responsibility for commissioning high quality evidence-based 
research to inform decision-makers in Manchester. Critical to local buy-in and ownership of 
the recommendations was having the ten councils contribute funding, thereby tying it back to 
the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA), a voluntary grouping of the ten 
district councils. Also, the decision to include the national Daresbury Review as part of the 
local study gave credence and interest from central government for the wider findings from 
the study, “government saw MIER as something they were anticipating the outcomes of” 
(Author’s interview 27, director, GM organisation 2, 2015).  
 
The case for supporting economies of agglomeration in GM was developed in the MIER. The 
MIER identified a trend for growth in the city centre and in southern districts of the 
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conurbation (Trafford, Stockport, Manchester, Salford) and recommended investing in this 
approach, which if supported, could lead to additional growth. To reinforce the message of 
concentrating growth in specific locations, the MIER concluded that there was “no rationale 
for supporting policies which try to redistribute activity in some places at the expense of 
others which are more productive” (MIER 2009: 20, ‘The Case for Agglomeration 
Economies’). For the remainder of the conurbation outside the growth areas which the MIER 
referred to as ‘Sustainable Communities’, the review recommended that the priority should 
be understanding the characteristics of the most deprived neighbourhoods. This identified 
education and skills, linkages to the jobs market, and housing tenure as the “main avenues 
along which policy interventions might be effective” (MIER 2009: 44-45, ‘The Review’). 
The premise underlying these assumptions, as articulated by those overseeing the process, 
was to go with the grain of the market, as illustrated by this interviewee, 
“in the absence of tangible examples of what we could practically and tangibly do to 
shift the market that would help to shift the debate” (Author’s interview 27, director, 
GM organisation 2, 2015).  
 
The MIER was therefore used as the primary tool to enact a strategy of agglomeration and 
concentrated growth in the urban core and key employment sites. It was perhaps no 
coincidence that the academic and urban economist Ed Glaeser, author of Triumph of the 
City (Glaeser, 2012) sat on the Commission. The agglomeration approach was also aided and 
facilitated by the further development of a Single Assessment Framework (SAF), which was 
used in GM to appraise projects, some deemed politically sensitive, and rank them in terms of 
their total impact on the GM economy and thereby removing the politics from decision-
making (Holden and Harding, 2015). In practice, the SAF appraisal of projects was 
undertaken by a team who were almost exclusively recruited from the private sector and 
didn’t have a local government background so were seen to avoid any political bias,  
“…they don’t care if it’s in Bolton or Wigan, but if we lend them £5m will they be 
able to pay it back, just in a way a bank does…taking local dimension out of it and 
investments made purely on the benefits they would bring” (Author’s interview 17, 
manager, GM local authority 1, 2015).  
 
To build the understanding of an agglomeration approach to economic development strategy 
among policy officers, New Economy embedded economic thinking across a whole range of 
activities in GM, and “created the conditions” (Author’s interview 42, former director, GM 
organisation 2, 2015) as MIER was progressed. This included a programme of 
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“consciousness building” (Author’s interview 27, director, GM organisation 2, 2015) through 
a non-economist guide to economics, available to local council policy officers, to “change the 
way people thought” (ibid.). Central to this was articulating a vision of commuter towns and 
suburbs benefitting from the growth of the city centre and urban core,  
“…can we talk about the notion of [X district] might be a commuter town for 
Manchester? And some people got it straight away because it already is, but a lot of 
people were saying we’re not having that, and I’d say why not? Because we have a 
proud tradition…. So if your people can get better paid, better jobs by commuting, 
you’re saying that you are going to put lower pay, inferior quality jobs in [X district] 
– you want your people to be poor?” (Author’s interview 42, former director, GM 
organisation 2, 2015). 
 
In addition to building up the evidence, GM level organisations were also very effective in 
communicating the findings of the MIER not only within GM but also to central government 
to influence GM’s position and standing in relation to other cities and thereby shaping 
national ideas,  
“These rankings point to the potential for Manchester ahead of all other cities outside 
London (due to Bristol’s small size and peripheral location) to take advantage of the 
benefits of agglomeration and increase its growth” (MIER 2009: 4, ‘Case for 
agglomeration’). 
 
While agglomeration became the orthodox approach to growth in Greater Manchester, with 
the findings from MIER reflected in the 2009 Greater Manchester Strategy (AGMA, 2009), 
the central tenets and assumptions of this approach to economic development and growth did 
not go unquestioned. Not least because the growth focus of MIER also represented a 
continuation of the strategy of investment in city centre development that had spanned a 
number of decades in Greater Manchester (Author’s interview 49, academic, Manchester 
University, 2015), leading some to suggest the MIER was more of a “reinforcing document” 
(Author’s interview 2, former councillor, NE local authority 2, 2015), and questioning 
whether the strategy came out of the MIER or MIER came after the strategy and could be 
justified (Author’s interview 4, academic, Manchester University, 2015). Manchester City’s 
approach to commercial development, and the relationship between property developers and 
investment funds, has contributed to a “narrow rather than rounded approach to economic 
development” (Author’s interview 3, director, GM local authority 4, 2015). 
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The later decision to identify priority sectors for growth in areas of comparative advantage in 
the 2013 Greater Manchester Strategy (GMLEP and GMCA, 2013) – from an approach based 
on key sites and projects and ‘trickle down’ economics - was seen as a sign that things were 
beginning to change from a hard-stance on agglomeration economics (Author’s interview 3, 
director, GM local authority 4, 2015). However, it was acknowledged by some of those 
previously involved in the MIER that it stopped short of setting out “what is the economic 
future for the north of GM” and addressing unemployment and inequality (Author’s 
interview 27, director, GM organisation 2, 2015; also Author’s interview 49, academic, 
Manchester University, 2016), and reflecting local issues that are being examined more 
closely now through the Public Service Reform work by central and local government.  
 
While many interviewees in Greater Manchester did not oppose a focus on growth in the city 
centre, over time some queried who that growth was for and who would benefit (Author’s 
interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016; also Author’s interview 31, 
director, think tank 2, 2015) and whether there could be scope to bend some policies to be 
more flexible and fair (Author’s interview 38, chief executive, think tank 1, 2015). Different 
levels of inequality across GM suggest there are limitations in understanding how the wider 
economy functions and the policy measures needed to remove somewhat significant and 
entrenched barriers to preventing individuals from benefitting from concentrated growth in 
the urban core. This question can even be applied to the City of Manchester district as 
articulated by one interviewee, “North Manchester is affected, if you take the figures for 
Manchester overall and discount the regional centre their performance is not much higher 
than [X districts]. So agglomeration isn’t even working for all bits of Manchester, let alone 
for all bits of GM” (Author’s interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016). 
Despite questions being asked increasingly by individual districts and other stakeholders on 
who benefits from growth in GM, there is still a recognition of the benefits of being part of 
GM, described as “better to be part of a bigger thing” (Author’s interview 38, chief 
executive, think tank 2, 2015). 
 
In summary, the Greater Manchester case study has shown how GM was already configured 
– spatially and institutionally - at this scale and had developed underpinning evidence on the 
city-region economy to support new proposals. The analysis has shown how an approach to 
agglomeration and growth has been actively promoted and embedded in local institutions 
over time, enabling GM governance organisations to prioritise investment in this way and 
also to make the case to central government and position GM as a frontrunner for a city-led 
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approach. However, economic challenges within the conurbation and reduced public 
resources across districts have led some to question the extent that economic development 
benefits are being realised across GM and the assumptions underpinning agglomeration, 
exposing the limitations of this approach. 
 
4.1.2 North East: Coordinating a city-region with multiple centres 
The new city-region landscape in the North East in 2010 was initially reconfigured by the 
decision of Tees Valley to depart and to establish its own separate governance arrangements. 
Over the previous decade there had been a number of studies which examined the economic 
geography and linkages of the North East region as defined by Government Office 
boundaries (OECD, 2006; Tyne & Wear City Region Economic Review, 2009; NERIP, 
2009; OECD, 2012). These studies showed, as summarised in DCLG report on functional 
economic areas, that, 
“… there are a number of economic centres within the region, which are to a greater 
or lesser extent linked with one another. The complexities identified militate against 
the commonly assumed concept that the North East consists of two city-regions, 
centred around Tyne and Wear and Tees Valley. Two city-regions were identified, but 
they did not dominate the region – there are too many other powerful secondary 
centres in the North East to allow this to be the case” (DCLG 2010: 9) 
 
Building on the findings of two previous independent assessments of the regional economy 
namely the OECD Territorial Review of Newcastle in the North East (OECD, 2006) and the 
Tyne and Wear Independent Economic Review (T&WIER, 2009), further analysis by the 
OECD showed that economic linkages between towns in the Tyne and Wear city-region 
varied with some strong connections also linking with more rural areas and some more 
localised housing and labour markets, resulting in a “degree of fragmentation within its 
functional borders” (OECD 2012:170). The OECD report (2006) also recommended 
strengthening the role of Newcastle as the urban core which was politically difficult to 
achieve support for, as described by this interviewee, 
“there was a lot of hang your hat on Newcastle, it was Newcastle offers you the best 
hope, and that is a really difficult message for the region, something that doesn’t 
always play particularly well, made things awkward at a regional level to what extent 
do you endorse the OECD review?” (Author’s interview 2, former councillor, NE 
local authority 2, 2015). 
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The role of the urban core within the city-region has been a contentious topic for many years. 
This is despite Newcastle being recognised economically for having the largest labour market 
in the conurbation and growing influence as the economic centre. This is due to being a 
primary service centre within the city-region and with a larger functional labour market area. 
Sunderland as the second largest city has a more localised labour market in the south of the 
city-region (OECD, 2012). As noted by the OECD in their review, there is no consensus on 
supporting the brand of Newcastle across the city-region, resisting external recommendations 
as well (OECD, 2006). The Tyne and Wear City Region Economic Review analysis of the 
city-region economy, also recognised the different economies around Newcastle and 
Sunderland, was signed off by local authority leaders in 2010, as expressed by one 
interviewee, 
“there was a beginning of an understanding that there was a complex sort of 
geography but a role and relationship between the different sorts of areas... But then 
the LEP stuff came and swept a lot of that aside” (Author’s interview 10, associate, 
Newcastle University, 2015).  
 
Despite the geography of the North East LEP representing a degree of continuity from 
previous collaborative structures, the OECD case study of Tyne and Wear suggested that the 
city-region has seen less bottom up organisation of key stakeholders than in other city-
regions in the north of the UK to provide ongoing stability during period of institutional 
change (2012: 171). 
 
For reasons of the geography and politics, the concept of the North East as a well-functioning 
city-region, that was also redefined in 2010 to include Durham and Northumberland, was less 
universally understood than in Greater Manchester,  
“that’s not the terminology that is used in the North East, other [local authorities] 
would say we are a three city-region” (Author's interview 20, director, NE local 
authority 4, 2015). 
In contrast to the agglomeration economies strategy pursued in Greater Manchester through 
the Single Assessment Framework, the approach in the North East whilst also prioritising 
investment in strategic sites and sectors and identifying opportunities and economic linkages 
with other parts of the North East, does not offer the same level of spatial prioritisation for 
economic prioritisation. This is probably a reflection of the geography and politics, but also 
the economics of polycentric region. Negotiations taken forward under central government’s 
devolution programme talk about proposals that benefit rural and urban areas the same. 
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Interviewees already described an approach to prioritising investment that takes account of a 
broader set out outcomes,  
“Something that if landed in Newcastle would have marginal impact but in an 
outlying areas could have significant and transformative impact on community and 
economy. If you do purely on an impartial financial approach then everything will be 
centred into the main areas and it won’t give you the regional solution. That is what a 
broader based approach to this is” (Author’s interview 20, director, NE local authority 
4, 2015). 
 
In summary, the analysis of this case study shows how a narrow interpretation of 
agglomeration economies presents challenges for places with diverse economic geographies 
and structures and a lack of political will to work together.  
 
4.2 Defining and implementing the new institutional framework locally  
This section examines how the new institutional framework – of Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) and Combined Authorities (CAs) - for the sub-national government and 
governance of economic development was defined and implemented locally post 2010, and 
how different institutional configurations emerged unevenly across places and why. This 
section examines for, both case studies, the process of establishing the LEP as the principal 
actor and scale of economic development and local growth policy and the Combined 
Authority as the statutory and accountable body. This contributes empirically to questions 
explored in the literature review (Chapter 2) on the “imagined and material coherence” of 
localities that makes them meaningful (Jones and Wood, 2013), on urban regime formation 
(Stone, 1987; Harding, 1994; Ward, 1996), and intermunicipal cooperation (Nelles, 2012) 
and ‘institutional variation (Gertler, 2010). Understanding how these institutional processes 
are defined and implemented locally also provides insight and context to examine the 
horizontal governance coordination and capacity of local actors in Chapter 6. 
 
The introduction of LEPs as the main sub-national governance arrangement for economic 
development was a central pillar in the Coalition’s programme of decentralisation and part of 
the new institutional framework. The Coalition framed decentralisation changes in the 
context of a shift in power away from the centre to the local arguing that centralised and top-
down approaches have failed (HM Government, 2010b). The rationale for LEPs was 
presented by the Coalition as,   
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“The Government wishes to see partnerships which understand their economy and are 
directly accountable to local people and local businesses… Previous arrangements 
also involved significant complexity and duplication of responsibilities, which led to 
increased costs to the public purse. Our focus should be on giving local areas, 
councils, communities and businesses the right tools, incentives, freedoms and 
responsibility to make their own choices” (HM Government 2010a: 12-13). 
Alongside the dismantling of the regional tier and invitation by central government for areas 
to form Local Enterprise Partnerships with voluntary bodies of business and local authority 
leaders (Cable and Pickles, 2010), the Coalition continued with the policy of Economic 
Prosperity Boards (EPBs) and Combined Authorities to interested groupings of local 
authorities. The legislation for establishing EPBs and Combined Authorities was passed 
under the Labour government (Sandford, 2017). 
 
While LEPs replaces Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), not all of the powers held by 
RDAs were transferred to LEPs - instead the government opted for a mixture of local and 
national provision to replace regional provision - and a much smaller proportion of the 
overall budget. This is shown in the following analysis by the National Audit Office (NAO) 
which shows a marked dip in government funding (see figure 4.2 below). 
 
The process for defining functional economic areas and implementing Local Enterprise 
Partnerships across cities and localities was messy and uneven. This uneven process across 
places was further compounded by the need for new partnerships to embed and mobilise 
quickly to bid for pots of money through the Regional Growth Fund and to develop evidence-
based proposals for Enterprise Zones, based on the newly defined economic geography. 
Added to this formation of LEPs took place in parallel to the winding down of the Regional 
Development Agencies, contributing to institutional churn. 
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Figure 4.2 Government spending on Regional Development Agencies and new local growth 
funds and structures, 2005-06 to 2014-15 – payments by departments. 
 
 
Source: National Audit Office (2013: 20) 
 
4.2.1 Greater Manchester: Continuation and consolidation of existing structures 
Table 4.2 Institutional changes in GM 
2000 – 2010 2010- 
North West Development Agency  
Greater Manchester sub-regional 
partnership 
Manchester City Region 
Greater Manchester Local Enterprise 
Partnership (GM LEP) established 2014 
(Winding down of NWDA until Apr 2012) 
Multi-Area Agreement. Combined 
Authority in principle in 2009.  
Greater Manchester Combined Authority 
(GMCA) established April 2011 
Greater Manchester ‘family’ (Commission 
for New Economy, Midas, Marketing 
Manchester) 
Greater Manchester Growth Company 
Source: Author’s adaptation from HM Government (2010a) 
The process for defining and implementing the new institutional framework for economic 
development in Greater Manchester post 2010 was seen as a smooth transition,  
“We had the institutions to say that’s [North West RDA] gone, now we can coalesce 
around this. It was a seamless process” (Author’s interview, director, GM local 
authority 2015) 
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It is argued that Manchester’s unique economic geography is conducive to collaborating 
across local authority boundaries as Greater Manchester’s local authorities have a “more 
economically interdependent and complimentary relationship” than other groups of local 
authorities in UK city-regions (Emmerich et al. 2013: 12). The important characteristics of 
GM collaborating across this geography, as cited by other areas, include the ten local 
authority districts have equal status and powers as metropolitan districts, cover a relatively 
small area and have one ‘core city’ as their major economic driver (South East England 
Council evidence to CLG Committee 2016: 14). Also with clear agglomeration effects in the 
city-region’s urban core because of an usually coherent geography, and a very cohesive 
political culture (NLGN, evidence to CLG Committee 2016: 14, 2016 Jan). 
 
The history of working together at the scale of the ten districts has been critical to 
transitioning to new arrangements as has the recognition by all ten districts that if marketing 
this area on international basis, the brand was Manchester. The establishment of the 
Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) as a voluntary body of the ten 
districts following the abolition of the six metropolitan counties in 1986 demonstrated that by 
working together more could be achieved than as individual boroughs,  
“very early recognition that economically we were one place and that place in global 
terms was Manchester, and that didn’t impinge on identity and autonomy of the areas 
that make that up” (Author’s interview 46, leader, GM local authority 1, 2016).  
Over time, AGMA has been joined by other GM-wide institutions that provide thinking and 
delivery capacity for actions agreed by the ten authorities (Holden and Harding, 2015).  
Policy initiatives which also helped to cement the understanding that the city centre spread 
beyond the boundaries of the city included the 1993 City Pride Prospectus for Manchester. 
Some of the organisations in existence today were formed as part of City Pride - Marketing 
Manchester and Midas.  
 
GM local authorities were already actively lobbying for powers from the regional level 
before 2010. They argued with the North West Development Agency that economic powers 
should be devolved and delivered at a city-regional level and the agency should be a strategic 
body but not a delivery body – which they “agreed in principle but didn’t get round to do”, 
and this led to the development of Greater Manchester strategy and economic development 
institutions and increasingly engaging with government about devolution to GM, particularly 
for business support, skills, inward investment.” (Author’s interview 46, leader, GM local 
authority 1, 2016).  
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The Greater Manchester Local Enterprise Partnership (GM LEP) was established alongside 
the GMCA in April 2011 and it facilitated the continuation of business involvement with the 
appointment of Board members who had previously sat on the Board for the Commission for 
New Economy, and were familiar with the economic strategy. In contrast to other places (see 
Pike et al., 2015), in GM the Combined Authority and AGMA are widely recognised as the 
foremost decision-makers, with the LEP providing advice (Author's interview 26, officer, 
GM business representative body, 2015). The all-party basis of support for the GM 
Combined Authority proposal – both leading up to and after the 2010 General Election was 
also deemed particularly important. Following the Election the two local authorities in GM 
who were Conservative and Liberal Democrat lobbied the Coalition Government that they 
wanted a Combined Authority order for Greater Manchester to be confirmed.  
 
The research interviews also uncovered the importance of the new institutional framework 
being seen to stem from GM as another reason it was implemented successfully. In contrast 
to new governance arrangements being seen as an imposition by central government or a 
necessary condition of decentralisation, the Greater Manchester Local Enterprise Partnership 
(GM LEP) and Combined Authority (GMCA) were seen by the constituent authorities as 
emanating from GM,  
“the origins of the Combined Authority came out of local government not central 
government… Structure of GM was designed in GM for GM. In our devo agreement 
every single element of it came from asks from GM not from Government” (Author’s 
interview 46, leader, GM local authority, 2016).  
Originating as a governance model in GM, the GMCA was seen as the next logical step for 
the ten districts who had been collaborating together and the conditions precedent for it to be 
a success were already in place, in particular,  
‘… GM saw itself as a place, the ten leaders were quite familiar with the limitation of 
what they could do with ten leaders. All the economics had been done” (Author’s 
interview 42, former director, GM organisation 2, 2015). 
 
The next step for city-region governance in GM was the decision by the ten local authority 
leaders and members of the GM Combined Authority to agree to the condition of a directly-
elected metro mayor from April 2017 to secure a second iteration of the devolution deal. This 
decision was heavily criticised by local stakeholders who argued that there should have been 
consultation and engagement on the proposals for a mayor and on the devolution agreement, 
particularly as the powers of the mayor and governance model were still to be decided and in 
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a climate of further reductions to local government funding. In contrast to previous decisions 
on decentralisation and governance changes, this decision proved divisive with different 
perspectives emerging across the districts. The response from some of those in power has 
been to stress that the mayor will be embedded within the exiting Combined Authority model 
and on the issue of engagement, that the ‘real’ debate on decisions of e.g. bus routes, the 
adult skills budget will happen when the mayor is in place (Author’s interview 42, former 
director, GM level organisation 2, 2015; Author’s interview 42, leader, GM local authority 1, 
2016). However, this not a unified view across political leadership in GM (e.g. McMahon 
(2016).  
 
 
4.2.2 North East: Central steer and institutional upheaval  
Table 4.3 Institutional changes in the North East 
2000 – 2010 2010- 
North East Regional Development Agency  
Sub regional partnerships (Tyne & Wear, 
Northumberland, County Durham, Tees 
Valley) 
Tyne and Wear City Region, Tees Valley 
City Region 
North East Local Enterprise Partnership 
(NE LEP) established 2014 
(Winding down of RDA until Apr 2012) 
North East Leaders’ Board; Economic 
Prosperity Board; Integrated transport 
Authority (Tyne & Wear)  
Multi-Area Agreement.  
Combined Authority established April 
2011 
Source: Author’s adaptation from HM Government (2010a) 
 
The process for defining and implementing the new institutional framework in the North East 
can be explained by institutional upheaval, with local institutions needing to negotiate and 
coalesce around a new geography determined by steer from central government, and a 
process marked by political and parochial interests, rather than evidence, 
“What happened straight after the election is very very important and far more so than 
people have given credit, because the government then moved to an almost, letting a 
thousand flowers bloom, do what you want to do, and what has then happened is that 
geographies have emerged around natural groupings, where they already existed, like 
in Manchester” (Author's interview 14, leader, NE local authority 1, 2015). 
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There was an initial uncertainty in announcing the fate of RDAs in the North following the 
General Election in 2010 which did not help the transition to new arrangements. Then 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, had expressed initially 
that these may take the form of existing RDAs in areas where they are popular (HM 
Government, 2010b). This led to protracted negotiations on the new institutional 
arrangements in the North East where was largely support from businesses for economic 
development leadership at the regional scale and then a few iterations of fragmented 
geography proposals based on local alliances rather than economic geography (Author’s 
interview 50, former director, business representative organisation, 2016).  
 
 Following the invitation by Government in June 2010 to establish LEPs, the most significant 
initial shift was the decision by the five local authorities in the Tees Valley to create a 
separate entity, having worked collectively as twelve local authorities under the Regional 
Development Agency for the North East and the Association for North East Councils, for 
eleven years. The decision by Tees Valley was deemed by some interviewees to be politically 
motivated,  
“Tees Valley were so determined to be separate from the region and were encouraged 
politically by Greg Clark and James Wharton to do so, come hell or high water they 
would want to see the Tees Valley succeed. They already had an amount of money 
they were already spending on Tees Valley initiatives” (Author’s interview 12, former 
chief executive, NE level organisation 2, 2015).  
 
Described as an “imposed break” (Author’s interview 20, director, NE local authority 4, 
2015) the transition was seen as starting again and stemming from a new beginning in 2010. 
Prior to 2010 the North East administrative region, based on Government Office region 
definitions, comprised twelve local authorities, four sub-regional partnerships, and two city-
regions (Tyne and Wear and Tees Valley). Whilst the regional tier was not without criticism 
in the North East (political accountability and mission creep), views held among some of the 
business community were that the “regional scale worked, for reasons of scale, shared labour 
market, shared infrastructure, commonality of interests, and a need to do things on a scale 
that matched Greater Manchester or West Yorkshire” (Author's interview 12, director, NE 
business representative body, 2015). It is suggested that there was a shared understanding of 
the priorities for the North East built up prior to 2010,  
“They are more in terms of sectoral priorities in terms of the sorts of things the North 
East should be concentrating on in terms of mix of industries, technologies, 
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renewables, rather than geographical. Obviously the geographical thing is still a 
touchy thing and that is one of the things being discussed at the moment to an extent. 
But nevertheless I do think that emerging agenda was very important at the end. 
Despite the fact it emerged in a period that I think was difficult because there was no 
political accountability” (Author’s interview 14, leader, NE local authority 1, 2015). 
 
The seven local authority leaders in Tyne and Wear could have proposed a LEP for this 
structure, building on existing Passenger Transport Authority and Integrated Transport 
Authority arrangements. Instead there were a myriad of joint proposals from the seven local 
authorities reflecting a “separation of the Tyne and Wear Independent Economic Review and 
political discussions” (Author’s interview 10, associate, Newcastle University, 2015). This 
process resulted in the Regional Director of the Government Office for the North East 
stipulating the composition of the final bid and in a “tortuous discussion with [local 
authority] leaders”, with them already having pursued individual proposals (Author’s 
interview 10, associate, Newcastle University, 2015). The decision to broaden the LEP 
geography to include Northumberland and Durham created a more mixed urban/rural 
geography in the city-region, for some, questions the extent to which you can call the LEP 
geography a ‘city-region’ and functional economic area, possibly adding to the challenge to 
get behind the urban centres (Author’s interview 10, associate, Newcastle University, 2015; 
Author’s interview 48, academic, Newcastle University 2016). An issue any future mayor for 
the city-region would also need to consider to represent the geographically diverse interests 
and needs of the whole region (Author's interview 19, director, NE local authority 3, 2015). 
 
The North East Independent Economic Review (NEIER) was commissioned in April 2013 
once the NE LEP was formed. “I remember at the time, a couple of people saying, we know 
all this and we’ve done all this before, but like I’ve said, 2010 was a thing coming down, so 
even though we’d had the Regional Spatial Strategy and everything else that went with ONE, 
we were in a new era so we badly needed that Adonis Review that took place, and it was one 
of the best things that happened because we didn’t have that history we can talk for ages 
about why not, the closeness of GM joint working, because that wasn’t there to that extent, 
we needed something to become that focus and the NEIER became that starting point and 
focus given that, my view is that, a wall had come down after 2010, so it was a stimulus to 
everything that has followed since then” (Author’s interview 14, leader, NE local authority 1, 
2015). However, commissioning the North East Independent Economic Review (NEIER) to 
provide an assessment of the economy after the formation of the LEP meant sorting the 
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economics - alongside creating the institutions, which is suggested has added to the political 
difficulties (Author’s interview 42, former director, GM level organisation 2, 2015). Added 
to this, there was a sense that issues highlighted in the OECD Territorial Review of 
Newcastle in the North East (2006) on the role and brand of Newcastle in the region hadn’t 
been addressed. At the time of the research, the North East was pursuing discussions with 
central government over having a democratically elected mayor for the functional economic 
area. Some view it as an opportunity for leadership to counter the political and parochial 
interests which routinely mar the area as public disputes are featured in the regional media, 
and do not build credibility of the area with central government. Others suggest it would be a 
challenge akin to having a mayor for the North West “I’m not saying that couldn’t happen for 
the north east but it’s a tricky one” (Author’s interview 6, chief executive, national cities 
group 1, 2015). 
 
Drawing on empirical analysis from the case studies, this section examines the process for 
defining and implementing the new institutional framework in the two case studies. First, it 
examines the transition to new institutional arrangements in Greater Manchester that most 
interviewees described as a continuation and extension of existing governance arrangements 
and economic development strategy, which in turn were devised locally and consolidated 
through the 2009 Manchester Independent Economic Review (MIER) - independent research 
drawing explicitly upon the city-region and agglomeration arguments. Next, this section 
examines the process in the North East and how these changes unfolded. In contrast, 
interviewees here described this as a “break” (Author’s interview 11, leader, NE local 
authority 1, 2015), an interruption in institutional stability, and marked by political and 
parochial interests, rather than evidence, and with central steer.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter sought to examine how new and dominant approaches to local and 
regional development had shaped the local state and autonomy and agency and exploring 
themes of geography, scale, history and understanding at this level. This Chapter examined 
the autonomy and agency of the local state in relation to new and dominant approaches to 
local and regional development. The main findings were as follows. First, that theories of 
Urban Economics and agglomeration economies had influenced the Coalition government’s 
approach to the sub-national government and governance of economic development and 
renewed focus on cities. There were clear expressions of this in the notion of a ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’, City Deals and presenting the benefits of London as the model for other places. 
Second, that cities and agglomeration were both an economic and political decision by the 
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Coalition government who were vehemently – and ideologically - opposed to regions. Third, 
the prioritisation of investment and policies to support an agglomeration approach has shaped 
the autonomy and agency of different city-region governance to respond. This worked 
favourably in Greater Manchester which had the prerequisites (monocentric economic 
structure, long history of collaboration at the scale, institutional capacity to respond to this 
agenda) but this started to unravel within Greater Manchester under a challenging economic 
context. It was more challenging in the North East with multiple economic centres and local 
leaders had to reconfigure the scale of governance and build evidence and collaboration at a 
new scale. Fourth, under this neoliberal agenda of creating competition between places for 
powers and resources, examples of agency and autonomy from cities include the interurban 
network of the Core Cities creating an Amendment to City Deals to be able to set their own 
priorities with government, albeit with central government making the final decision. Also, 
the Core Cities seeking to soften the impact of growth dominated by London and the South 
East by advocating a place-based approach that realises untapped potential across all cities 
and not at the expense of London. The next chapter will explore the type and nature of 
decentralisation under the Coalition government to examine and explain the different 
governance outcomes for places in the context of austerity. 
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Chapter 5. What characterises and explains the government’s programme 
of changes to the sub national governance of economic development? 
 
This chapter examines how the global trend of political and administrative decentralisation to 
cities and city-regions was interpreted and implemented by the Coalition government and in 
turn, informed new frameworks of government and governance for economic development. 
This is to understand and explain how the decentralisation process unfolded differently across 
scales, places, and actors. This contributes to the aim of the research by exploring the 
objectives and constraints and that have shaped the decentralisation outcomes of local states 
and what this means for the role and contribution of local government in economic 
development.  
 
The literature review explored the global trend of governance decentralisation (Faguet, 2013) 
in addition to the different types of decentralisation (CURDS and LSE, 2011) and the 
political factors that shape it. This showed that decentralisation is bound up in processes of 
state rescaling that can be vertical as well as horizontal (MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010) and 
can have multiple (and conflicting) objectives (Le Gales, 2006; Jessop, 2009. Powers and 
resources can also be centralised as well as decentralised with new organisational forms 
emerging through the process of ‘filling in’ (Shaw and MacKinnon, 2011) therefore it is 
important to examine both government and governance. The literature points to broader 
questions on what is the local state’s role, drawing on O’Neill’s (1997) work on  a 
‘qualitative state’, and on what is local government for (Sullivan, 2011; Lobao and Adua, 
2011), particularly in a challenging context of austerity. 
 
The chapter is structured in two sections. First the chapter examines how the approach to 
decentralisation was configured and implemented by examining the different objectives and 
approach by central government (Section 5.1). Second, the chapter examines the reassertion 
of local government in the new framework of government and governance for economic 
development (Section 5.2). The two case studies provide empirical insight and explanation of 
how and why these processes have unfolded unevenly by examining how local government 
and governance in different places have navigated and negotiated changes and outcomes. 
 
5.1 ‘Crisis’, deficit reduction and restructuring the state  
The forming of the Conservative Liberal-Democrat Coalition Government (the ‘Coalition 
government’) in 2010 occurred in the wake of the 2007-08 global financial crisis and ensuing 
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period of recession for the UK economy (2008-09). This section examines how the ‘crisis’ 
narrative was constructed by the Coalition government and then Chancellor George Osborne, 
and how the government responded through a programme of deficit-reduction, austerity 
politics and restructuring the state, as illustrated by this quote, 
“Five years ago, when I presented our first Spending Review, our economy was in 
crisis and there was no money left” (Osborne, 2015 ‘Spending Review and Autumn 
Statement speech’).  
 
When the Coalition government entered office in 2010 the UK economy had emerged from 
five consecutive quarters of negative growth over 2008-09, and the greatest recession since 
the 1930s. In developing their policy response, the Coalition government used the underlying 
or ‘structural’ deficit – the part of the deficit which is not related to the state of the economy 
and remains even when the economy recovers (Keep, 2016) - as a measure of the impact of 
the financial crisis on the economy. Tackling the financial crisis by reducing the structural 
deficit became the overriding objective and rationale of the Coalition government for 
implementing the policy response and resulted in one of the biggest deficit reduction 
programmes seen in any advanced economy since World War II (Riley and Chote 2014: 1). 
To achieve the Chancellor’s target of a budget surplus by the end of the 2010-15 parliament, 
the main burden of deficit reduction was to be achieved by reducing spending rather than 
increased taxes (HM Government 2010: 15). This marked a shift from the previous Labour 
administration’s interventionist and demand stimulus approach of ‘industrial activism’ – 
government in partnership with the private sector – and fiscal stimulus package for housing, 
education, transport and construction (Rhodes, 2015), in the immediate aftermath of the 
financial crisis.  
 
The scale and scope of spending reductions were configured in response to, “an emergency 
we face…. [in addressing] the largest budget deficit in Europe” (HM Treasury and Osborne, 
2010; see also NAO, 2014b), which Chancellor George Osborne attributed to Labour’s 
overspend rather than the banking crisis (The Guardian 2015, 3 May). Reflecting back on his 
period, Vince Cable MP, then Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in the 
Coalition government, suggested that “the legitimacy of the Coalition rested on the fact that 
there was a sense of an emergency" (Cable, 2015). This imperative - presented in the 2010 
Emergency Budget statement, which was itself described as an “unavoidable budget” (HM 
Treasury and Osborne, 2010a), and reaffirmed in subsequent budgets and speeches (e.g. HM 
Treasury and Osborne, 2015b) – was used to present a financial and economic imperative to 
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restore the nation’s finances and credibility with international markets (Osborne, 2015a). The 
goal was to “achieve a cyclically-adjusted current balance by the end of the rolling, five-year 
forecast period” (Osborne 2011, ‘Budget speech’, 23 May). This relentless pursuit by the 
Chancellor to reduce the structural deficit was unwavering throughout successive budgets 
despite downwards revisions of the growth forecasts that underpinned reduction targets, 
failure to meet repayment targets, and concerns from independent analysts on the impact of 
deficit-reduction on growth and the ability of local councils to continue to deliver public 
services. The plans to scale back public spending through an ‘age of austerity’ were proposed 
by the Conservatives prior to the 2010 General Election and forming the Coalition 
government, 
“In this new world comes the reckoning for Labour’s economic incompetence. The 
age of irresponsibility is giving way to the age of austerity” (David Cameron, 2009, 
April 26 Prime Minister’s speech to Conservative Party conference). 
The 2010 Conservative election manifesto pledged to reduce the deficit through state 
restructuring and a programme of public expenditure reductions (80%) and tax increases 
(20%), and the 2010 Emergency Budget provided the mandate to take this forward (Tetlow, 
2010; IFS, 2013; see also Pike et al., 2016). The decision by the Chancellor George Osborne, 
to cut public spending in order to meet his deficit-reduction and surplus target by 2020 
resulted in a significant restructuring of primarily the local but also the central state. The cuts 
to local government grant funding and Labour-approved revenue streams resulted in a 
rescaling of the crisis to the urban and local level (e.g. Peck, 2012; NAO, 2013; Donald et al., 
2014). Over the course of the 2010-15 parliament, ‘unprotected’ government departments 
(defence, justice, home office, local government, and business) were asked to identify and 
implement 30 per cent cuts to their budgets. As the Coalition government was being formed 
in 2010, ministers responsible for central government departments were incentivised to settle 
their departmental budgets early because it would entitle them to join a ‘star chamber’ with 
the power to cross-examine the spending plans of remaining departments (FT, 2010; FT, 
2013). Eric Pickles MP, then Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, was 
the first Minister to join the star chamber having offered to HM Treasury the largest cut of 
any government department - £33.6bn to meet a 25% savings target (BBC, 2010) - in the 
2010 Comprehensive Spending Review. Agreeing to a significant reduction with the 
Treasury, and reportedly before 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review was even published, 
was seen an attempt to transfer blame for cuts from the Coalition to councils.  This alongside 
Secretary of State Eric Pickles’ desire to micro-manage certain local government issues 
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through his “guided localism” approach (Illman 2010: 1) and openly criticising local 
government practices was seen as particularly divisive at a time when local authorities were 
planning and implementing cuts to public services (Betts, 2011). Over the period 2010-11 to 
2015-16 local authorities experienced a 37% estimated real-terms reduction in funding from 
central government and a 25% estimated real-terms reduction in income (including council 
tax) (NAO, 2014). Different types of local authority experienced different rates of reductions, 
with metropolitan district councils on average more greatly affected than county councils 
(29.7% to 22.6%, respectively) (NAO 2014: 13), which pointed to “…a very strong 
correlation between the cuts and levels of deprivation” (Author’s interview 5, chief 
executive, national cities group 1, 2015). The following chart demonstrates that metropolitan 
areas experienced the most significant cuts.  
 
Figure 5.1 ‘Change in spending power by local authority type, 2010-11 to 2015-16’ 
 
Source: NAO (2014: 14). 
 
The cuts imposed were not sensitive to variations in regional economic performance, the 
sectoral composition of local economies and proportion of total public sector employment, 
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demographic profile and the uneven and growing demand on public services. The lack of 
understanding of the impact of cuts on public services in different parts of the country – the 
income-based distributional analysis was eventually removed from budget documentation in 
summer Budget 2015 (HM Treasury Select Committee, 2015) - has led some critics to 
suggest that Osborne had a “clear political framework rather than an economic framework … 
to reduce the size of the state”, and “using deficit reduction as a means to that end” (Wren-
Lewis, 2014). The Conservative Party’s traditional political base is predominantly from rural 
areas and southern counties, and they have struggled to make political gains in urban areas, 
including the North of England, for some, leading some to question their sensitivity to urban 
deprivation (Bogdanor 2015: 34). 
 
The reduction in spending on public services was also presented as a core component of 
addressing the imbalance in economic growth between different parts of the country and 
achieving more sustainable growth (HM Government, 2010a). The cause of the deficit was 
also attributed to the structure of the economy, the sectoral composition and response to the 
crisis by the previous Labour government, 
“But if you look behind the headline figures, you see why we face such a massive 
deficit crisis today: because while the private sector of the economy was shrinking, 
the public sector was continuing its inexorable expansion. While everyday life was 
tough for people who didn’t work in the public sector with job losses, pay cuts, 
reduced working hours, falling profits, for those in the public sector, life went on 
much as before” (Cameron, 2010). 
This critique shaped how the sub national governance of economic development was 
reconfigured in order to reduce the deficit, rebalance growth sectorally and geographically, 
and return powers to communities through a localism (HM Government, 2010). According to 
the Coalition government, this would entail moving from “big government [to] big society” 
with the 2011 Localism Act marking, “the beginning of a power shift away from central 
government to the people, families and communities of Britain” (HM Government 2010b: 1). 
However, policies to rebalance growth, including a Regional Growth Fund, and to devolve 
powers to the local level were implemented alongside a reduction in local government grant 
funding, top slicing departmental budgets, and changes to how local government is financed 
in future, through business rates and council tax.  
 
The overriding focus on cuts was also acknowledged by those working in central government 
at the time,  
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“…decentralisation is the primary vehicle to deliver the cuts” (Author’s interview 35, 
civil servant, BIS, 2015).  
The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills Vince Cable also stated – after the 
Coalition’s term – that “Osborne is trying to do all this stuff with city government which is 
actually mainly a way of cutting funding” (Cable, 2015). However, central government 
repeatedly argued that their funding decisions were underpinned by fairness, which has been 
contested by a number of independent organisations (e.g. National Audit Office, 2014) and 
local authorities The extent to which senior government ministers understood the situation 
faced by local authorities in trying to maintain service provision in the face of cuts was 
unclear. This was illustrated by the correspondence between Prime Minister David Cameron 
and Oxfordshire County Council in his constituency in which he questioned the cuts being 
implemented. The response from the Liberal Democrat leader Cllr Richard Webber noted “It 
is staggering that the prime minister knows so little of the impact of his government’s cuts in 
his own backyard” (Oxford Mail, 2015). In other instances, the politicking by Conservative 
ministers was more explicit in appeasing Conservative backbenchers and progressing the 
programme of spending cuts to local government. The introduction of a £300m transitional 
relief fund in 2016, which disproportionately benefitted Conservative-run councils, was 
calculated based on future reductions to the 2015-16 local government finance settlement and 
ignored those cuts that had already taken place since 2010 (The Guardian, 2016). The 
following empirical analyses of Greater Manchester and the North East examines how issues 
of ‘crisis’, deficit-reduction and restructuring the state have unfolded sub nationally.  
 
5.1.1 Greater Manchester: Political pragmatism, a coherent argument and credibility 
Faced with some of the most severe cuts to local government funding across the country 
(Newcastle City Council, 2013 see ‘heat maps’) the ten Greater Manchester (GM) local 
authorities, through the GM Combined Authority and GM Local Enterprise Partnership, 
managed to maintain a constructive dialogue with central government through successive 
waves of funding cuts, phased grant reduction and restructuring of public services through 
austerity measures. In turn, Greater Manchester was rewarded with several iterations of 
devolution deals.  
 
The response by local council and business leaders to the ‘crisis’ constructed by central 
government and the imperative for deficit reduction was to develop a coherent economic 
argument and narrative for greater decentralisation of powers and resources to counter the 
austerity measures and to improve outcomes for public services locally. Building on the 
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economic arguments in the Manchester Independent Economic Review (MIER) (Commission 
for the New Economy, 2009) the argument by the ten local authorities was that in order to 
grow the economy you also have to reform public services in order to reduce the overall 
deficit and to enable all parts of the population to take advantage of and benefit from policy 
interventions (Greater Manchester Strategy, 2010). This case was also made by the Core 
Cities network and extended the focus of local growth policy beyond a narrow economic 
agenda to also address social objectives through reform and looking at the linkages between 
the two. This was argued as critical to the financial survival of the local state, and mentioned 
in interviews, “the survival of local authorities is based on the integration of health and social 
care” (Author’s interview 3, director, GM local authority 4, 2015). Also by looking at which 
policy areas could be delivered at scale on a larger Greater Manchester footprint, as 
illustrated, 
“If you look at health and social care which has attracted a lot of attention. Integration 
of health and social care is probably a good thing in its own right, but the interest of 
the local authorities, there isn’t any desire to run health services it is to get health as 
an integrated part of how we tackle other issues particularly worklessness” (Author’s 
interview 46, leader, GM local authority 1, 2016). 
 
Since 2014, the focus in GM has been on constructing a narrative around “closing the gap” 
and Greater Manchester becoming a “net contributor to the national economy”, which chimes 
with central government’s priority of financial savings and reducing the deficit (Author’s 
interview 3, director, GM level organisation, 2015). This narrative and supporting evidence, 
including the MIER, along with a business planning and financial modelling approach, has 
been critical in presenting the case for devolving further powers and resources to Greater 
Manchester and building credibility with government ministers,  
“…ultimately if you want government to give powers and resources back, not only 
have an evidence base that says it is a good thing to do. You also need to have a 
business plan and financial model as to how you are going to do it” (Author’s 
interview 46, leader, GM local authority 1, 2016). 
The approach of Greater Manchester’s mostly Labour local authority leaders to work with the 
Coalition and Conservative government, while not without its tensions, “there was a lot of 
unhappiness in the Labour party that effectively eight Labour leaders did a [devolution] deal 
with a Conservative Liberal-Democrat government in its dying days” – underlies the much 
cited pragmatism and that “Howard and Richard will do business with anybody that is of 
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benefit to Manchester and Greater Manchester” (Author’s interview 47, chief executive,  GM 
local authority 2, 2016).   
 
The response of the local leaders in Greater Manchester to central government’s austerity 
measures has been one of opportunism, using it to make the case for greater freedoms and 
flexibilities through devolution. However, GM Members of Parliament (MPs) and some local 
stakeholders have voiced concerns about taking on powers and responsibilities of policy 
functions when the overall budget is being cut centrally (e.g. HoC debate, 3 Mar 2015). Also 
the leader of Manchester City Council wrote to the Chancellor to criticise the cuts which had 
fallen disproportionately on deprived areas (Leese, 2015). There are, unsurprisingly, different 
views of the government’s austerity measures across the political spectrum in local 
government in Greater Manchester. These range from a “huge abhorrence to the term 
austerity… it is a very London centric label… very clever of the government getting us to use 
it like we agree with it” (Author’s interview 27, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016). 
To those who view it more opportunistically by “creating a fiscal imperative to do things a bit 
differently, enforcing and embedding change across the city” (Author’s interview 44, leader, 
GM local authority 6, 2016). To respond to central government’s austerity measures, GM 
local authorities presented a compelling economic case to HM Treasury based on the 
following argument, 
 “The hard headed fiscal view is that 5 years of austerity has resulted in negligible 
savings on public sector expenditure in Manchester….. as local authorities, we’ve had 
billions of pounds taken out of us [and] all we have done is shunt spend from one area 
of the public sector to somewhere else” (Author’s interview 46, leader, GM local 
authority 1, 2016). 
Furthermore, with spend on public services across the city at £27bn, and £20bn generated in 
tax receipts, GM is a “drain on the public purse” and a £7bn gap has to be eliminated, “if you 
raise GM productivity to national average you’d generate an additional £8bn a year – so 
eliminate that gap” (Author’s interview 44, leader, GM local authority 6, 2016). 
“we are the second city of this country and we are £5bn[sic] a year in debt, that is 
unacceptable to us, is that acceptable to you? No, right then what are we going to do 
about, better run things differently - it’s an unstoppable argument” (Author’s 
interview 42, former director, GM level organisation 2, 2016). 
 
Critical to this was developing a “credible proposition” with “key people”, such as Mike 
Emmerich (former chief Executive of New Economy) with his HM Treasury background and 
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Sir Howard Bernstein with a longstanding reputation in Manchester and also crucially in 
central government (Author’s interview 46, leader, GM local authority 1, 2016; Author’s 
interview 3, director, GM local authority 4, 2015).  
 
The risks associated with decentralising powers and resources at the same time as 
implementing cuts and restructuring the state, are understood differently across the ten 
districts and among local actors. However most agree that by taking decisions locally you 
have a better understanding of the consequences of those decisions and the resources to take 
advantage of policy interventions – central government is “too detached and far away” to 
achieve greater value from spend and better services (Author’s interview 46, leader, GM 
local authority 1, 2016).  However, the prospect of the retention of business rates locally 
along with the phased reduction in local government grant funding would create additional 
challenges for less economically prosperous districts such as Oldham. This led to more 
divergent views on the GM approach and concentrating growth in the urban core (McMahon, 
2016; Author’s interviews: 15, 28, 29, 38, 37). While a number of local groups and 
stakeholders in Greater Manchester had been vocal in opposing austerity measures over the 
course of the 2010-15 parliament, this did not appear to have influenced the pace and scale of 
devolution developments for Greater Manchester.  The further cuts to local government 
funding, transition to business rate retention, and the planned phasing out of local 
government grant by 2020 had the potential to lead to different outcomes for different 
districts, depending on how resources are pooled and whether equalisation measures would 
be introduced (Author’s interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016; Author’s 
interview 29, officer, GM local authority 3, 2016).  
  
In summary, GM approach to the Coalition’s approach reflects one of pragmatism rather than 
stemming from the politics of austerity, and opportunism by adopting the crisis and economic 
narrative to its advantage to reflect local objectives. But a financial context of continuing 
austerity and changing nature of local government finance and unclear local distribution 
mechanisms has led to diverging views on growth from individual districts. 
 
5.1.2 North East: Party politics, fairness and discord 
In the North East, opposition from Labour council leaders to the extent of the cuts proposed 
and implemented characterised particularly earlier discussions with central government on 
the devolution of powers and resources. The Coalition government prioritised deficit-
reduction by reducing public spending across the country at a time when English regions 
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were emerging from the economic recession and the North East had the highest levels of 
unemployment across England (Centre for Cities, 2011). The employment gap between the 
North East and the UK average, which had begun to narrow in the years prior to the 
recession, had started to widen again reflecting the recession impact on less buoyant parts of 
the economy (ibid.). This opposition created tensions between local authority leaders and the 
business representatives on the NE LEP who acknowledged the challenge of reduced 
resources but at the same time were also trying to set out an ambition and vision of growth 
for the North East.  
 
The restriction on and scaling back of public spending on economic development with 
immediate effect following the formation of the Coalition government had a number of 
implications for the North East. First, one of the initial measures taken by the Coalition 
government in 2010 was to stop special funding that was previously allocated to deprived 
areas for neighbourhood renewal. This meant that many programmes that were providing 
additional funding to specific local areas and voluntary groups in the North East for 
regeneration just disappeared overnight, 
“… it had a much more disproportionate impact on the deprived areas of the North 
East and North West... what was seen by the Conservative government as ‘Labour 
money for Labour authorities’” (Author’s interview 43, former director, NE local 
authority 2, 2016). 
Second, policies to ‘rebalance’ growth across sectors, while positive for the manufacturing 
sector and export potential of the North East, sought to also address what was deemed by the 
Coalition government as public sector dominance in certain areas which crowded out the 
private sector. This also had a disproportionate impact on the North East, given the region’s 
sectoral composition and greater representation of public sector employment as a total 
proportion of employment. Third, exemption from in-year budget cuts for the Devolved 
Administrations meant that, at a time when the North East had restrictions placed on public 
spending for economic development, Scotland bordering with the North East was able to 
continue spending money on foreign direct investment, business grants and tourism 
promotion among other areas, as noted by the then chief executive of the Regional 
Development Agency, One North East, 
“We certainly cannot commit any money beyond March 2011, so Scotland already 
has a relative advantage” (Clarke, 2010) 
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The uneven implications of cuts to local government funding over the period 2010-15 
combined with the changing nature of local government finance as local government grant 
funding was being phased out toward 2020 and replaced with revenue collected locally 
through business rates and council tax, continued to shape the restructuring of the local state. 
In the North East this led to questions of fairness in the distribution of funding as well on 
constraints within the local government funding system. 
“So Westminster will generate £1.8bn of business rates, South Tyneside will generate 
£30-40m….. Needs to be an understanding that you cannot have a system that has 
council tax and business rates alone funding statutory services” (Author’s interview 
43, former director, NE local authority 2, 2016). 
Discussions between local and central government on whether local government grant 
funding allocations represent fair settlements have been an ongoing and characteristic part of 
the North East’s devolution negotiations with government. Issues faced by North East local 
authorities included uneven spending power following budget cuts, a grant funding formula 
which no longer took account of need, the uneven landscape of councils to raise income 
through local taxes, in addition to the increasing demand and cost pressures for some 
statutory services in particular areas, 
“It comes to a very simple view amongst certain politicians that if someone is getting 
more it is wrong without an understanding that what the grant was supposed to do was 
to recognise differences in need and recognise difference in resource” (Author’s 
interview 43, former director, NE local authority 2, 2016). 
Analysis by Newcastle City Council (2015) showed how local government funding cuts had 
disproportionately impacted on poorer parts of the country over the funding period 2010/11 – 
2015/16, like the North East. The findings chimed with research by the National Audit Office 
(2014). Nick Forbes, Labour leader of Newcastle City Council said this showed that the 
Government’s claim to be fair was wrong,  
“The heat maps we produce uncannily resemble the political map of the country 
showing that the Government is presiding over a wholesale shift of resources 
predominantly from the north to the south of England. This undermines our efforts to 
grow the North East’s economy and will accelerate the point at which councils fail to 
fund statutory services.” (The Chronicle, 2015) 
 
In addition to the overall amount of funding available to local government being impacted by 
funding cuts, the way money is allocated for economic development has also changed. This 
resulted in a reduction in revenue used to fund economic development but an increase in 
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capital funding over the period through schemes such as the Regional Growth Fund, 
subsequently constraining what can be done to support economic development. 
“So you have got this immediate cut in resource which has an immediate impact and 
an increase in capital resource which has a medium and long term benefit. So you are 
seeing and have seen a real problem with financing of economic activity since 2010 
and to date” (Author’s interview 43, former director, NE local authority 2, 2016). 
Given these funding system constraints, the benefits of devolution would be having a flexible 
investment fund, moving away from separate central government departmental funding 
streams determined by HM Treasury, and being able to plan over the medium to longer term 
and deploy resources to the most pressing needs to achieve the greatest growth, 
 “Even if you got no more money, having the flexibility and confidence of having 
certainty about the money you have been allocated over a period is a very positive 
thing” (Author’s interview 43, former director, NE local authority 2, 2016). 
However, even with the allocation of Local Growth Funds, the lack of certainty provided by 
central government on future funding made available in Spending Reviews has undermined 
confidence locally to proceed with projects and issue tenders. This places the associated risk 
on local authorities, 
“So the Treasury are very positive about growth, their accounting systems, the 
bureaucracy doesn’t facilitate giving confidence to local authorities to proceed, at a 
time when the revenue budget constraints are stripping resources out of local 
authorities and therefore they are more risk averse in terms of taking risks. It’s a 
broken system of funding economic development and local government in that way” 
(Author’s interview 43, former director, NE local authority 2, 2016). 
In summary, the North East experience of transitioning to the Coalition’s programme of 
deficit reduction and restructuring the state has been characterised by party politics, debates 
on what constitutes fairness and internal divisions and disagreements on how to respond to 
government’s agenda.  
 
5.2 A reassertion of the role of local government in economic development 
Changes to the sub national governance of economic development and local growth policy - 
introduced by the Conservative and Liberal-Democrat Coalition government in 2010 and 
continued by the subsequent Conservative government in 2015 - ascribed new roles and 
responsibilities for local authorities within a new economic and political context. The 
previous section (5.1) discussed how these changes were framed and guided by a series of 
(partly-defined) political objectives – decentralisation, rebalancing, and localism – which also 
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formed the arguments and rationale for changes. Critically, the changes to governance giving 
local authorities an enhanced role in economic development with financial incentives for 
generating local growth were introduced at the same time as measures to reduce the budget 
deficit and scale back public spending through the government’s austerity approach. This 
section critically examines how and why this reassertion of local government in economic 
development has occurred through changes to powers and governance and the factors that 
have shaped this process and outcomes locally. 
 
The Heseltine report set out a case for reconfiguring responsibilities for economic 
development between central and local government, and between government and the private 
sector (Heseltine, 2012). This called for “effective and empowered local authorities” (ibid: 
50) to collaborate at the ‘functional economic market area’ and be the accountable bodies for 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), with two obstacles to this: no legal duty on local 
authorities to undertake economic development, unlike social functions and services, 
resulting in local economic development being vulnerable to increasing pressures on statutory 
services and cost savings; and local authority boundaries not reflecting functional economic 
market areas. The recommendation in the report for local authorities to have an overarching 
legal duty to have regard for economic development in the exercise of all their functions was 
‘accepted in part’ by central government (HM Treasury / DBIS, 2013). Heseltine estimated 
the proposal would require a regional funding pot worth £12.25bn per annum over four years 
and subsequently Chancellor George Osborne allocated £2-3bn over the same period instead. 
As part of the Coalition approach to localism and decentralisation, the 2012 Local 
Government Finance Act sought to redress this imbalance by introducing a Business Rates 
Retention Scheme to enable councils to keep a proportion of the business rates generated in 
their areas thereby giving them a financial incentive to promote local economic growth and 
providing them with more control over their own funding streams (Heseltine, 2012), and 
allowing local authorities to keep 100% of the income they collect by 2020 (DCLG, 2016). 
However, as highlighted in a number of analyses (e.g. Centre for Cities, 2012) issues of how 
revenue will be pooled within larger economic and governance geographies, and balancing a 
safety net with incentives for growth, need to be resolved.  
 
The reassertion of local government has taken place at different scales and in different forms. 
For England’s Core Cities and city-regions, this has primarily emerged for some areas in the 
form of Combined Authorities at the functional economic area, with varying powers across 
different policy areas coordinated and relinquished to this scale. Besides the economic 
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arguments for doing economic development at that scale, there are perceived incentives to 
this approach in an austerity context, 
“you might not have the statutory duty to concentrate on growth at the local authority 
level, but actually pool a small amount of resource at a Combined Authority level 
working with your LEP [and you] can then take the decision at that level 
instead…and have a wider economic area and release the local authority area to focus 
on the statutory duty and obviously there are many links between the two” (Author’s 
interview 40, civil servant, DCLG, 2016). 
 
Following the abolition of Regional Development Agencies and the emergence of Local 
Enterprise Partnerships, over the course of the 2010-15 parliament discussions on the role of 
local government in economic development and local growth policy were further shaped and 
influenced to varying degrees by a number of policy studies, independent commissions and 
also by civic leaders. First, the aforementioned Heseltine report ‘No Stone Unturned: in 
Pursuit of Growth’ (Heseltine, 2012) recommended the merging of various funding streams 
to provide much greater local responsibility for economic development. Second, the 
referendum on Scottish independence in 2014 accelerated discussions between government 
and cities and city-regions on the additional powers that would be made available for cities in 
England in line with a new settlement for Scotland post the referendum. Third, following the 
publication of the London Finance Commission report ‘Raising the Capital’ (2013) which 
recommended a package of measures to give Londoners a more direct say over a greater 
proportion of taxes raised in their city, the Core Cities network joined forces with the London 
mayor to push government to apply these measures to support the growth in other cities too 
(Core Cities, 2013). The RSA Independent Growth Commission (RSA, 2014) which also 
involved the Core Cities made recommendations to central government for a greater transfer 
of powers to metro leaders to coordinate resources across the city-region, agree multi-year 
finance settlements with government and have flexibility to set and retain taxes and do place-
based budgeting. These events and publications contributed to strengthening the case for 
greater powers and responsibilities to be transferred to local authorities, particularly in 
metropolitan areas.  
 
The reassertion of local government in economic development and local growth policy 
therefore reflects both local and national efforts to bring decision making closer to local 
people and is examined here across four themes: reconfiguring city-region governance; new 
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powers for economic development and local growth; local government funding; and the 
process of devolving powers and resources.  
 
First, the reconfiguration of sub national governance arrangements for economic 
development – with the abolition of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and invitation 
to civic and business leaders to form voluntary Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) - gave 
local authorities an enhanced role alongside other local actors in determining priorities and 
spending decisions at the functional economic area, or city-region scale. Further to this, the 
formation of Combined Authorities by groups of local authorities, initially in metropolitan 
areas – an approach developed by and implemented first in Greater Manchester - provided 
the legal mechanism to combine the powers and functions of constituent authorities in 
recognition of the strong links between economic development, regeneration and transport 
provision (Sandford, 2016).  
“Combined Authority concept is a very important stepping stone along the way to 
running a city in a better, more economically sensible, grown-up way that answers 
that question that Whitehall used to ask. Who is in charge?” (Author’s interview 46, 
former director, GM organisation 2, 2016). 
 
Establishing these new governance structures has been an uneven process for local leadership 
teams across England (see chapter 4.2) at a time when local government has had to 
implement funding cuts and efficiency savings and manage a reduction in capacity through a 
reduced workforce. Further to this, the role of LEPs evolved and they were given greater 
responsibilities and money to spend through a Local Growth Fund, and local authorities were 
the accountable body for this. The reconfiguring of governance arrangements meant the 
reassertion of local government took place through new institutional forms (LEPs, CAs), at 
new scales (functional economic area) and through new institutional processes and ways of 
working with central government (e.g. City Deals, Local Growth Deals, Devolution Deals). 
This placed a greater emphasis on those local authorities that could work effectively across 
administrative boundaries, a factor deemed critical to governance success (e.g. OECD, 2012; 
Nelles, 2012). Given the joint responsibilities and collaborative working between the LEPs 
and Combined Authorities in new economic geographies, the interdependencies between 
local authorities and the new institutional arrangements - and in turn their vulnerability - has 
materialised over time, with the NAO noting that “LEPs are highly dependent on local 
authorities, and the sustainability of this support is uncertain” (NAO 2016). As expressed by 
one interviewee, 
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“For LEPs to function well they need to have a good, strong local authority partner…. 
To deliver the leadership that a place needs in terms of its economic focus, strategy 
and so on, it’s got a democratic mandate that has got statutory functions that it can put 
at the disposal of the LEP” (Author’s interview 5, chief executive, national cities 
group 1, 2015). 
 
The Coalition government’s criteria and condition of the new groupings of local authorities, 
particularly around cities, having a directly-elected mayor, stipulated by the Chancellor 
George Osborne, sought to address the democratic deficit of governance structures formed at 
the sub-national scale. The introduction of directly-elected mayors in some areas will prove a 
further test of the ability of individual local authorities to accept and adapt to new decision-
making arrangements, within a mayoral model. The emergence of ‘meta-narratives’ of pan-
regional initiatives such as the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and the lesser-established ‘Midlands 
Engine’ also raised questions of governance. The most developed governance example to 
date is Transport for the North (TfN) which comprises local transport authorities, Combined 
Authorities and Local Enterprise Partnerships from the whole of the North of England to 
speak with a single voice to central government. However, the tension that emerges from 
these new forms of governance based on larger geographies is that individual members are 
not elected to take decisions for a larger geography, which is why central government and 
particularly Chancellor George Osborne have pushed the idea of metro mayors. 
 
Second, the Localism Act (2011) provided the legislation to devolve greater freedoms to 
local authorities and communities, and cities in particular through an amendment to the Act 
proposed by the Core Cities, however the ongoing transfer of powers is generally seen as 
incremental, centrally determined, with no indication of pathways and timescales (CURDS, 
2016; NAO, 2016; CLG Select Committee, 2016). The Core Cities Amendment to the Act 
enabled local councils to make the case for further transfer of power between local authorities 
and central government, without the need for primary legislation. An important pillar of this 
being a ‘general power of competence’ for local authorities to do “anything that individuals 
generally may do” (Sandford 2016: 8), beyond their specific statutory powers in the interests 
of their electorate. Examples include special purpose vehicles to promote regeneration and 
establishing funds to provide loans to businesses with growth potential (LGA, 2013). To date 
the power has been taken up by local authorities to varying degrees (Sandford, 2016) - and 
while recognised as an improvement, is still constrained by the command and control 
structures of central government (LGA, 2013).  
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The push towards rebalancing power between central and local government and to address 
the interconnected challenges of economic growth and societal challenges through public 
service reform, resulted in a widening scope of the government’s devolution programme to 
include health and social care. This resulted in a shift from a devolution process to date that 
has been a relatively narrow process of devolution focused on economic objectives to one 
that was starting to include social or democratic transformation (Author’s interview 31, chief 
executive, think tank 2, 2015). The powers and responsibilities made available to local 
authorities has enhanced their role in economic development, but with limited or variable 
scope across local areas to influence the types of powers made available, and still managed 
within an overall centralised system. 
 
Third, changes to the way local government is funded, alongside local authorities 
implementing the most significant cuts across all government departments, is shaping the 
financial sustainability and type of role that local government can perform. Taken together, 
the reduction in funding since 2010 and the changing nature of funding that provides 
incentives for local growth has, according to the NAO, “created financial opportunities for 
local authorities, but also increased financial risks and uncertainty” (2014: 5). The Chancellor 
George Osborne’s plan is that by 2020, local councils will be 100% funded by council tax, 
business rates and other local revenues, compared to in 2010 when councils were 80% 
dependent on central government grants (Clark, 2015b). Furthermore, there are local 
government finance system constraints which don’t recognise: the impact of a shift towards 
capital and a reduction in revenue on poorer local authorities where financial benefits and 
savings from local government spending are captured outside of local government,  
“Huge fiscal fracture between investment and the proceeds of success and a public 
spending fracture between intervention and the savings from these interventions” 
(Author’s interview 5, chief executive, national cities groups 1, 2015). 
Furthermore, the need for certainty from HM Treasury for long term investments is at odds 
with the annual approval of the local government funding settlement (Author’s interview, 
former director 43, NE local authority 2, 2016). The cumulative effect of these changes, in 
addition to increased costs of statutory services for some local authorities, are presenting 
greater challenges for local government (NAO, 2013; NAO, 2014), even with efficiency 
savings and innovative initiatives.  
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Fourth, as new structures have emerged and evolved, so has the process for negotiating new 
powers and responsibilities with central government and individual local authorities and/or 
city-regions working bilaterally with government departments and HM Treasury. Given the 
iterative nature of how decentralisation has unfolded, questions of parity of outcomes 
(CURDS, 2016) across place settlements and policies also emerge, particularly with a 
“spectrum of leeway” available to more ambitious places (Author’s interview 35, civil 
servant BIS, 2015). Likewise, where central government appears willing to bend the rules for 
some places on conditions which were essential requirements for others, this adds to the 
confusion, as seen with the West Midlands Combined Authority departing from guidance 
convention on election of a Mayor and proposing it would be via local government electors 
rather than the electorate (Alldritt, 2015). 
The process of devolving powers and resources has been led by HM Treasury and 
championed by the Chancellor. However proposals are not equally supported and balanced 
across other central government departments relevant to the economic development and local 
growth agenda. The Department for Education (DfE) and Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) were cited as those which take longer to convince that some policies can be devolved, 
“that is partly the department needing convincing and area needing to put forward a strong 
case” (Author’s interview 40, civil servant, CLG, 2016). The experience of this interviewee 
illustrates this, 
“the Chancellor has approved all this but cross-working at Whitehall can really slow 
down the speed and the timescales we are working to that involve government 
departments, when we say Jan 2016 they will be thinking Jan 2018…… That scuppers the 
whole thing. We’ve had problems like that. Things that we believed we agreed under 
devolution agreement, hurdles were then put in the way afterwards” (Author’s interview 
29, officer, GM local authority 3, 2016). 
 
The NAO’s (2013: 8-9) analysis of changes to funding for local economic growth, shows 
how since 2010 there has been a shift from initial fund allocations with bidding rounds and 
competitive selection determined centrally (Regional Growth Fund, Enterprise Zones) to 
bilateral negotiation between local actors and central government and multi-year settlements 
available to all places with certain governance conditions attached (City Deals, Growth 
Deals, Devolution Deals). While the latter approach represents a more significant transfer of 
powers and responsibilities (but not yet wholly evidenced in implementation and statute, 
local actors describe a centralist approach in determining what is available in negotiations 
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(CURDS, 2016). This reflected a mismatch in the aspiration for devolved powers from 
localities and the forms and types offered by central government, most notably relating to 
devolution of fiscal resources locally and the flexibility to generate revenue through the local 
tax base.  
 
5.2.1 Greater Manchester: Power, relationships and influencing the agenda 
The reassertion of local government in economic development in Greater Manchester can be 
described as the consolidation of well-established cross-boundary local authority 
relationships at the Greater Manchester scale. An approach that has adapted to and shaped a 
new institutional context for the governance of economic development.  
 
For the ten local authorities in Greater Manchester (GM), the enhanced role for local 
government in economic development and local growth policy from 2010 occurred at a time 
when the local authorities were already seeking to consolidate and formalise their voluntary 
governance arrangements and decision-making capability of the Association of Greater 
Manchester Authorities (AGMA) with a statutory Combined Authority. Before 2010, local 
authorities had been arguing for economic powers to be devolved and delivered at a city-
region (GM) level and for North West Regional Development Agency to be a strategic body 
but not a delivery body,  
“We were lobbying the RDA for devolution to the city-region level and increasingly 
engaging with government about devolution to GM” (Author’s interview 46, leader, 
GM local authority 1, 2016). 
The case for formalising city-region governance arrangements through statute was based on 
the argument that you couldn’t achieve the things Greater Manchester wanted to do on a 
voluntary basis,  
“You couldn’t do long term planning and devolved arrangements when any one of the 
partners could walk away, needed statutory arrangement to tie people in” (Author’s 
interview 46, leader 1, GM local authority, 2016).  
The announcement of a city-region pilot for Greater Manchester in the 2009 UK Budget (HM 
Treasury 2009: 83) and legislation for establishing Combined Authorities enacted by the 
2009 Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act enabled GM local 
authorities to propose a Combined Authority in 2009 but which was not implemented then 
because of the 2010 General Election. The all-party basis of this proposal is cited as 
“important” as following the General Election, it was the Liberal Democrat and Conservative 
led Councils – Stockport and Trafford respectively – that lobbied the new Coalition 
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government for the Combined Authority order to be confirmed (Author’s interview 46, 
leader, GM local authority 1, 2016). The first Combined Authority was agreed for Greater 
Manchester and signed November 2011. 
 
This local authority-led approach to the devolution of powers and resources to GM, while not 
without criticism particularly for its lack of engagement with local actors (see section 5.2.2), 
has largely been supported across sectors and local authority districts in Greater Manchester. 
Mainly because the benefits of being associated with the Manchester brand are understood 
and accepted,  
“the overall benefit is greater than sitting outside of it…. also our relationship with 
centre of Manchester is better than with Whitehall” (Author’s interview 28, director, 
GM local authority 5, 2015).  
Also because the approach taken is seen as progressing an agenda devised in and for Greater 
Manchester – “In our devolution agreement, every single element of it came from asks from 
GM, not [central] government” (Author’s interview 46, leader, GM local authority 1, 2016) - 
and raising the profile of the city-region with central government ministers and international 
investors. However, it is also seen to reflect a “culture of conformity” (Author’s interview 4, 
academic, University of Manchester, 2015), preserving an existing way of working – first 
established through the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) - and an 
approach to economic development and local growth which, at times, offers limited scope for 
local variation and prioritisation (Author’s interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 
2, 2016; Author’s interview 28, officer, GM local authority 5, 2015). The challenge, 
described by interviewees, for the local authority districts outside of Manchester City and for 
partners in other sectors is how to participate in, and inform an established way of working to 
widen benefits across Greater Manchester, particularly with fewer public sector resources and 
an increased scrutiny of functions, as illustrated by this interviewee, 
“I could spend 2/3 days a week in Manchester/Trafford just dealing with the GM 
programmes. But if we are not there round the table, if we don’t get to a meeting, read 
the papers and submit comments by email, if you aren’t participating in that sort of 
way our needs won’t be heard” (Author’s interview 28, officer, GM local authority 5, 
2015). 
In GM’s local authority-led approach to devolution, the GM LEP - which comprises business 
and civic leaders - is described by local actors as being on the periphery, as a subset to 
decision-making or more of a private sector sounding board to the Combined Authority 
(Author’s interview 26, officer, GM business lobby group, 2015). The GM LEP is however, 
  126 
credited with progressing devolution negotiations with central government (Author’s 
interview 46, former chief executive, GM level organisation 2, 2015). In contrast to the North 
East LEP, the GM LEP has to date maintained an outwardly mutually reinforcing relationship 
with the Combined Authority, perhaps a reflection of its origins and continuation from the 
Board for the Commission for the New Economy. Also, access to the GM LEP is seen as 
“tightly controlled” through the Greater Manchester Integrated Support Team (GMIST) and 
through Sir Howard Bernstein as lead chief executive for economic strategy in GM. As in 
other places, questions have been raised on how representative the business members of the 
LEP Board are of sectors across GM, as at one stage there were no manufacturers and mainly 
big employers represented, perhaps also a reflection of who has time to participate (Author’s 
interview 28, officer, GM local authority 5, 2016). 
 
There is a sense among some local actors outside local government, that the local authorities 
themselves are too dominant and not prepared to reassess their roles in relation to other 
public and voluntary sector bodies, particularly in light of challenging financial times ahead, 
“But what I am getting at is that these are all the same clique of people who work like 
a little group, behind the scenes and they won’t relinquish power. So the huge issue 
that we have got… massive cuts to public money, and some of the smaller authorities 
have been very, very badly cut are trying to do quite radical things and put more 
money out into community investment and that kind of stuff and cut some of their 
own work. But most of them are trying to hang onto their own power base, keep 
providing everything themselves, keep as may staff as they can even when their funds 
have gone, and cut, cut, cut” (Author’s interview 38, chief executive, voluntary and 
community sector organisation in GM, 2016. 
 
In the second iteration of the GM Devolution Agreement (GMCA, 2014), local authorities 
agreed to a democratically-elected mayor for GM, in return for additional tax revenue raising 
powers. This raised questions locally as to whether the local authorities – and Manchester 
City Council in particular - would retain their dominance in decision-making with the 
incoming elected mayor from May 2017. The intention is, at least initially, this will be a one-
tier and “embedded” model with decisions made by majority consensus. Some districts 
outside Manchester City, and other public sector representatives suggest the mayor will be an 
opportunity to break up Manchester’s dominance, over time,  
“I’ve always thought the mayoral system will get [X local authority] a much greater 
set of opportunities. Because whilst we sit around all happily, Manchester are very 
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much in control. Everything is happening at the behest of Manchester and we just 
have to try and influence around the edges” (Author’s interview 29, director, GM 
local authority 5, 2015). 
 
 
5.2.2 North East: Contestations, deliberations and a lack of clarity 
The reassertion of local government in economic development and local growth policy in the 
North East has been an protracted and, at times, turbulent process, with local authorities 
navigating both local and national challenges in defining and clarifying their emergent role 
while also implementing significant cuts to their budgets. These challenges can be 
summarised as: a lack of clarity on the responsibilities and relationship between the 
Combined Authority and the Local Enterprise Partnership in providing regional leadership; 
time taken to build credibility with central government to secure the transfer of significant 
powers and resources and support from local actors during periods of disagreement and 
infighting; and a strong opposition by Labour civic leaders towards a Conservative 
government’s proposals for a directly-elected metro mayor to provide regional leadership and 
accountability.  
 
Central government’s push to establish Local Enterprise Partnerships and Combined 
Authorities moved at pace, and their functions and responsibilities have continued to evolve 
over time. This exposed tensions among local actors in the North East where new governance 
partnerships based on newly configured economic geographies, had not built up a shared 
understanding of the evidence base and maturity to prioritise and take difficult decisions 
collectively. In the North East, these challenges became evident in both the politics and 
process of governance changes. In terms of the process of transitioning to and establishing 
the new governance arrangements for economic development and local growth policy, the 
chronology of forming the Combined Authority after the LEP was established in the North 
East, didn’t help to clarify the individual roles and accountability arrangements as new 
powers and responsibilities were devolved,  
“… there’s been tensions between the LEP and the Combined Authority in terms of 
who is responsible for what, and various governance arrangements. Taken a long time 
to get to where we are, a joint chief executive would be in my view, be a real bonus in 
taking the relationships and actions forward” (Author’s interview 20, director, NE 
local authority 3, 2015). 
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As questions were raised by independent analysts of whether appropriate accountability 
mechanisms were in place to take into account the expanded delivery role of LEPs alongside 
strategic responsibilities (NAO, 2014), and Combined Authorities were confirmed as the 
accountable body for LEPS, this also created some tension locally,  
“From a LEP perspective, I think that people that got involved in the LEP expected it 
to have a lot more autonomy, be better resourced, for it to make its own decisions, and 
not for those to be contested too much” (Author’s interview 2, former councillor, NE 
local authority 2, 2015). 
The North East LEP is also unique in that all local authority leaders within the geography are 
represented on the NE LEP Board unlike in Greater Manchester, which some interviewees 
suggested will make it more difficult for the NE LEP to get things done.  The North East 
local authorities carried out a governance review which determined that a Combined 
Authority – as already established in GM - was the most appropriate governance structure for 
the new city-region arrangements. As highlighted by one interviewee,  
“the problem is that a Combined Authority is not the answer to all problems, it is part 
of the next phase and I think one of the problems is, and we have seen this, that there 
is lots of hard work to do across an emerging polity, that’s really going on here” 
(Author’s interview 46, former chief executive, GM body 2, 2016). 
 
Bilateral negotiations between local government and central government became the main 
mechanism for agreeing the transfer of powers and resources, and that this was mainly done 
with HM Treasury, therefore evidence-based proposals and the credibility of local actors 
were critical. The North East Independent Economic Review (NEIER) (instigated by an HM 
Treasury employee who had been seconded to lead the NE LEP) was seen locally and by 
central government as a step in the right direction in providing a shared and common 
understanding of the issues at the NE scale. Also, the decision to form a Combined Authority 
as a legal entity to pool resources for economic development, skills, and transport. However, 
particularly in the earlier days, local civic and business leaders were unable to agree 
collectively on priorities for economic growth (see chapter 5.1.2) despite having the NEIER. 
Disagreements surfaced between local authority and business leaders on the LEP over 
individual roles, and these disagreements were aired publicly in meetings and in regional 
newspapers, which negatively overshadowed some of the good examples of collaborative 
working. This picture was also complicated by the Combined Authority having economic 
development powers alongside the local authorities whereas transport powers have moved to 
the Combined Authority (Author’s interview 43, former director, NE local authority 2, 2016). 
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This created a negative perception of leadership in the North East in the eyes of civil servants 
and ministers,  
“[central government] are taking an approach with the NE Deal which is about we 
need to see stronger leadership as evidenced through a mayor. Why? Because genuine 
belief in government that the political leadership is just a bunch of clowns and frankly 
who would argue with them” (Author’s interview 39, civil servant, BIS, 2015). 
Local government officers in the North East who had also spend time working in central 
government were seen as important to building credibility in the negotiation process 
(Author’s interview 46, former chief executive, GM level organisation 2, 2016). The 
Combined Authority also enlisted a central figure in the GM devolution negotiations with 
central government to advise on the North East’s deal and be present in negotiations, 
demonstrating the strength of GM as a model for other places (Author’s interview 10, head of 
department, NE local authority 2, 2015). 
 
Politically, the challenge has been for the Labour local authority leaders to do deals with a 
Conservative government that has implemented cuts that have disproportionately impacted 
on poorer areas and Labour authorities.  
“I think a large part of it in early days of the LEP is the political view that, do you 
know what, a lot of the things the LEP are charged with doing we would see more 
comfortably sits within a local authority environment. My view is that it is a purely 
political viewpoint that Labour politicians do not stick their hand up very easily for 
significant parts of the economic growth agenda to be driven by the private sector in a 
governance scenario, and that was there before the Combined Authority, a bit of 
tension before the Combined Authority came in” (Author’s interview 19, director, NE 
local authority 3, 2015). 
Also, the condition of a directly-elected mayor attached to the transfer of powers and 
resources through devolution, is also viewed by some as a Conservative strategy to break up 
Labour dominance in the North and to take powers of decision-making away from the 
individual local authorities. These political issues have contributed to disagreements between 
local authority leaders and some business representatives on the NE LEP who have expressed 
their frustration at the lack of progress and approach to negotiation with government 
(Chronicle, 2015).  
 
In conclusion, the chapter shows that the Coalition government had configured and 
implemented their approach by orchestrating a crisis narrative to take forward a programme 
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of deficit reduction and restructuring the local state at the same time as reasserting the role 
and responsibilities of local government in the governance of economic development. There 
are a number of findings discerned from the analysis in this chapter. First, the type and nature 
of decentralisation and devolution that shaped new frameworks of government and 
governance for economic development was the outcome of political choices and central 
imposition of changes with complicit local actors. Second, there were contradictions in the 
Coalition’s localist approach which instead showed certain decisions were centrally-
prescribed. Third, the reassertion of local government as a local state actor in economic 
development took place in the context of local government as a sector absorbing a significant 
proportion of overall departmental savings, thereby reducing the agency and autonomy of 
local governments through a centrally determined approach. The empirical analysis of the 
two case studies shows how and why some places were better able than others to move 
further and faster towards decentralisation to city regions because of how decentralisation 
and devolution were configured. The next chapter continues to explore why some places are 
better able to adapt than others by examining horizontal coordination and capacity within 
city-regions. 
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Chapter 6: How and why have changes to powers and resources unfolded 
differently across and between actors, scales and places? 
 
This chapter examines the roles and relationships between institutions and governance at the 
city-region level, and how changes to powers and resources have been mediated, negotiated 
and implemented locally by actors over this period. This is to understand why some local 
states are moving further and faster to decentralisation of powers and resources by examining 
whether this can be explained by horizontal coordination and capacity. The chapter 
contributes to the overall thesis argument by critically examining the institutional processes 
and relationships that enable or constrain collaboration in a multi-level and multi-actor 
context and how this has shaped governance and economic development outcomes at the 
city-region scale. 
 
As discussed in the literature review, uneven local governance and growth outcomes can be 
explored through the notion of an ‘institutional regime’ (Pike et al., 2015), drawing on 
Martin’s (2000) institutional environment and institutional arrangements. To address the third 
research question, this chapter examines how local institutions and city-region collaboration 
are constructed over time (McMichael, 2000), their ability to coordinate horizontal 
collaboration in new frameworks of government and governance (Nelles, 2012), develop and 
adapt their institutional capacity in a context of instability and churn, and negotiate the 
politics of local growth. An institutional perspective (Nicholls, 2005; Koch, 2013) is applied 
to the analysis which considers the complex political dynamics of governance changes. This 
allows for an analysis of governance reforms that is sensitive to the way political institutions 
interpret exogenous developments and relate then to the institutional context (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2004). 
 
This chapter is organised into two sections. First the chapter examines how local government 
and governance actors have configured city-region governance arrangements for the transfer 
of powers and resources (Section 6.1). Second, the chapter explores the politics of local 
growth to consider the types of institutions that enable or facilitate city-region collaboration 
(Section 6.2). The empirical analysis of the two case studies offer insights on how local 
places have reconfigured institutions and governance over time and negotiated local politics 
to respond to these changes. 
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6.1 Building governance coordination and capacity across scales and actors  
This section examines how local areas have sought to (re)configure city-region governance 
and institutions for economic development in response to the proposed and actual transfer of 
powers and resources under decentralisation. In doing so, it considers how local institutions – 
formal and informal (see Section 2.1.1) – have shaped the coordination and capacity of civic 
actors at the city-region scale to explain uneven outcomes. 
 
In both theory and policy practice, horizontal as well as vertical governance coordination 
across functional economic areas and policy areas is recognised as being important to clear 
and effective decision-making at the relevant scale (e.g. Nelles, 2012, Charbit, 2011; OECD, 
2012). Conversely, poor performing institutions can have a negative effect on economic 
growth (Tomaney, 2013). Local Enterprise Partnerships were formulated by Coalition to lead 
and coordinate economic development activity in functional economic areas. In November 
2010, six months after the invitation to local areas to form Local Enterprise Partnerships 
(LEPs), the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee published its first report on LEPs 
where they gave their “broad support” for their creation as a way of addressing local growth 
and build on the affinity between business, local government and other partners at a local 
level (BIS Committee 2010: 3). The Committee also noted the potential for improved co-
operation between local businesses and local government, more so than RDAs (Ward 2017: 
15). There were a number of challenges for local areas in responding to the Coalition 
government’s invitation to create LEPs and to access further proposals for decentralisation to 
the functional economic area scale. First, the different geography of places, economic 
structure and whether places had one or multiple economic centres influenced the case for 
collaboration. Also, overlapping geographies for existing structures might influence the 
ability to coalesce at that scale. Second, the centrally-prescribed approach to establishing new 
governance arrangements while providing uniformity across the country did not take into 
account the diverse needs of local places and scope for variation to suit local circumstances, 
particularly where there was not a history of collaborating at this scale. Third, this episode of 
decentralisation has taken place in the context of a longer history of disruption, churn and 
hiatus in economic development and local growth policy in England (Pike et al., 2016), 
which included the dismantling of local institutions and capacity following the closure of 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). Furthermore, the pace of the Coalition’s changes 
to powers and funding did not give local teams time to form new relationships and crucially 
build trust. Fourth, local actors to varying degrees had to balance collaboration and 
competition between places and in new and larger geographies. Finally, the significant cuts to 
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local government funding presented a dilemma for those local authorities facing the most 
extreme cuts when negotiating with an opposition political party implementing the cuts, and 
achieving consensus on a position locally across the different civic actors.  
 
Analyses of the Coalition government’s episode of decentralisation and state restructuring in 
England have mostly focused on the relationship between central and local government and 
how effective local areas have been in establishing new governance arrangements and 
negotiating the transfer of powers and resources within a competitive framework for places. 
This is reflective of a centrally orchestrated – and, at times, fast-paced - process that has 
provided local areas with limited opportunities to consult widely on changes to powers and 
resources and on the range of implications. This process was framed by the Coalition 
government as a localist approach with the emphasis on local areas to define and determine 
the scale of governance arrangements based on functional economic areas (HM Government, 
2010). This focus and rhetoric on locally-driven or ‘bottom-up’ empowerment sought to 
present a level playing field for places to come forward with proposals. The previous chapter 
showed that the design and implementation of changes to powers and resources under 
decentralisation – as well as lack of – has shaped how this process has unfolded differently 
for places and resulted in uneven outcomes.  
 
Local leadership teams had to decide how LEPs would be resourced in terms of finance and 
people to facilitate the coordination required, resulting in a range of constitutions and 
configurations across the 39 LEP areas (Pike et al., 2015a). For LEPs negotiating Growth 
Deals and Combined Authorities negotiating Devolution Deals, the challenge was addressing 
the coordination of different policy and investment activities - for economic development, 
housing, transport, skills, innovation and planning – and across different public agencies and 
urban/rural geographies. The critical challenge for horizontal coordination was different 
economic development actors being willing not only to adapt to city-region governance 
arrangements but also to invest time, commitment and resources to strengthen arrangements 
at this scale,  
“Whatever arrangement you come up with as local authorities…. the more you get 
other agencies to align with that arrangement the stronger that will make your 
governance” (Author’s interview 8, chief executive, national cities group 2, 2015). 
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6.1.1 Greater Manchester: Established footprint and governing capacity through 
leadership  
The starting point for Greater Manchester local authorities, in establishing the new city-
region governance arrangements following the 2010 General Election, was formalising a 
series of institutions and programmes already based on a coherent, co-terminous and stable 
boundary and a long history of joint working at this scale, as illustrated by this quote, 
“We understand how our local areas tick, we understand the personalities, we 
understand the strengths and weaknesses at a local authority level, neighbourhood 
level and at a GM level, and all of that informs our place-based plan” (Author’s 
interview 24, director, GM level organisation 1, 2015). 
Compared with other cities in England, other than in London, this was unique. The decision 
to become a formal city-region body was agreed by all ten districts under the previous Labour 
government reflecting the progress that had already been made as a city region development 
pilot, and the move to constitute the Combined Authority was approved by the Coalition 
following the change of government in the election (Williams, 2010).  
 
Throughout different reorganisations to sub national governance structures in England over 
the last 30 years, Greater Manchester has held on to governance capacity at the city-region 
level. First informally through the Association of Greater Manchester Councils established in 
1986 following the abolition of metropolitan councils. Then building collaboration and 
integration as a Manchester city region development pilot in 2004 under the Northern Way 
initiative (SQW, 2011). Finally, with formal statutory powers through the Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority established in 2011 and through the first Greater 
Manchester Devolution Agreement signed in 2014. This history and evolution of governance 
at the scale of the ten GM districts is seen to provide a “source of strength for new 
institutional arrangements” (Cowie et al., 2013). Also for a number of GM interviewees in 
this research, the transition in 2010 was viewed as just formalising what was already in place. 
At the heart of this is a widely-held belief of unity across the ten districts as illustrated by this 
quote,  
“… we are absolutely as one, really strong public face, genuinely, genuinely believe 
this is a collective endeavour and we wouldn’t have got as far as we did” (Author’s 
interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016). 
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From the research interviews and secondary analysis, there are two themes which have 
characterised governance coordination and capacity in Greater Manchester over this latest 
episode of decentralisation. First, the existing institutional footprint of public bodies already 
operating at the GM scale in 2010 which enabled a greater number of local actors to come 
together and take collective decisions at this scale and based on a widely-held understanding 
of the local economy through the Manchester Independent Economic Review (see Section 
4.1.1). The economic development agencies in GM at the city-region scale are known as the 
‘Greater Manchester Family’ and included New Economy (economic intelligence and 
analysis) and Midas (inward investment). As the individual agencies grew in number and 
complexity they were consolidated under the Growth Company. The ability to grow this 
institutional coordination and capacity at this scale was further demonstrated through the GM 
Growth and Reform Plan (GMCA, GMLEP and AGMA, 2014) and integration of economic 
and social policy through subsequent devolution deals agreed between GM local authorities 
and central government. This resulted in a greater integration with a number of institutions at 
the GM scale including the Greater Manchester Police. 
 
As a sign of the commitment by individual districts to city-regional working, GM structures 
and partnership arrangements have been mirrored within local authority districts to improve 
coordination. For example, growth and reform boards at both GM and district levels to 
improve alignment of activities. Second, interviewees referred to how capacity was governed 
rather than the design of the structures themselves as a critical factor. There were two aspects 
to this: having a clear sense of a plan and leadership. The Manchester Independent Economic 
Review (Commission for the New Economy, 2009) and ensuing Greater Manchester Strategy 
(GMCA and AGMA, 2013) provided a sense of purpose and priorities for institutions at the 
GM scale to get behind. This ‘clarity of plan’ was seen as a differentiating factor between 
Greater Manchester and other places,  
“I think at the root of, and I think that is where we differ from a lot of other places, 
because they will go straight to establishing governance, without actually having a 
[…] true place-based plan. Actually, that is the wrong way round, form follows 
function and your governance needs to be appropriate for what you are trying to do” 
(Author’s interview 24, chief executive, GM level organisation 1, 2015). 
 
The plan – set out in the GM strategy, then the Growth and Reform Plan - was based on 
setting and delivering economic priorities at the GM scale rather a flexible approach which 
could be adapted to local circumstance and priorities. It guided activity and governance 
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across actors and scales, “people are bought into a set of principles and priorities” and with a 
“sensible approach” as to what should be done at a GM level compared with a local authority 
level, and “respecting that difference” (Author’s interview 24, director, GM level 
organisation 1, 2015). This approach, consolidating economic development activity at the 
GM level, has been developed over time and required,  
“building trust with districts over time, working through scepticism around the GM 
level service and demonstrating this with actions” (Author’s interview 17, officer, 
GM local authority 1, 2015).  
 
The second aspect to explaining effective institutional coordination and capacity in GM is 
leadership. A consistent theme to emerge from the interviews in this context was the strong 
managerial and technocratic leadership provided by Sir Howard Bernstein, Chief Executive 
of Manchester City Council, in coalescing local actors at the GM scale,   
“…an absolutely critical difference between the North East, particularly Tyne & Wear 
and Manchester is that Howard partly on the grounds of longevity, and seniority 
therefore, partly on the grounds of Manchester simply being much bigger than 
anywhere else and economically more important, is able to sit at the centre of a 
structure and not direct it but lead it…with absolute authority. …He doesn’t do that 
on a command and control basis, he does it on the basis of being very well connected, 
very able, and coming forward with propositions people are then keen to take 
forward” (Author's interview 3, director, GM local authority 4, 2015). 
Described as more akin to a city-region chief executive because of the proportion of his time 
spent on city-region matters, which some put at 75% of total time (Author's interview 3, 
director, GM local authority 4, 2015) interviewees point out, both advantages and challenges 
in the power of the individual behind the changes. While being described as inclusive and 
collaborative, the leadership style was seen as being very strong and directional,  
“people are given a job, that is outside their job, goes across GM, good way of giving 
ownership to people, and politicians have that as well…. It’s a very very useful way 
of getting to know how another Council operates” (Author’s interview 15, chief 
executive, GM local authority 7, 2015). 
 
Individual portfolio areas for each chief executive identified by Sir Howard Bernstein are 
linked to skills, knowledge and interest. There was also decision to bolster political not just 
officer capacity through the portfolio arrangements both within individual local authorities, 
with lead members supporting leaders, but also across districts with leaders from other local 
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authorities supporting chief executives. For districts, the lead themes allocated to individual 
districts were seen as an opportunity to influence the agenda in that area,  
“… this is the year for us to influence things” (Author’s interview 29, manager, GM 
local authority 3, 2016). 
As responsibilities grew in GM, the Wider Leadership Team – comprising the ten district 
council chief executives plus the chief executives of Greater Manchester family agencies and 
chaired by Sir Howard Bernstein (as the Head of Paid Service for the GMCA) – was critical 
to supporting the GM Combined Authority in its work programme at a leader and chief 
executive level and alongside the executive GM Integrated Support Team. This was the 
mechanism for commissioning work to inform ‘forward plans’ and supporting institutional 
coordination and capacity at the GM scale. 
 
Third, the expansion of powers and responsibilities to GM under decentralisation and 
devolution also presented challenges in managing the complexity of overlapping structures 
and adapting city-region governance arrangements to ensure they remained fit for purpose, 
particularly in the context of cuts to local authority funding. In 2014, a governance review 
commissioned by GM districts resulted in rationalising economic development structures 
which led to the creation of the Greater Manchester Growth Company, as an umbrella 
organisation with New Economy and Midas, Marketing Manchester, the AGMA 
infrastructure and Chief Executive structure. Rationalising structures and streamlining 
decision-making was deemed important to demonstrating transparency to the public across 
the different GM organisations. However some interviewees believed that the complex 
structures were deliberate to support the hegemonic approach to governance. 
 
The institutional capacity of GM level governance, built up over 30 years, is credited by 
those both in GM and outside (e.g. Commission for the New Economy, 2009; OECD, 2015) 
as one of its main strengths in city-region governance. A less explored theme that emerged 
through the interviews is the extent to which this carefully configured institutional 
coordination and capacity locked-in a particular economic agenda in GM, one based on 
agglomeration economics and concentrating growth in the urban core. Also, how the 
governance approach was resistant to calls within GM for local variation and flexibility in 
policies and economic priorities, particularly with the unfolding reduction of local 
government funding and changes to local government finance. Examples of how this 
dominant and narrow approach to governing economic development at the city-region scale 
was implemented included the development of a spatially-blind GM Single Investment 
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Framework (GMCA, 2012) to remove the politics of place out of decision-making. Also, 
Manchester City Council’s involvement in pilot activity was seen by them as important and 
an opportunity to influence the overall approach by being involved from the outset (Author's 
interview 18, policy officer, GM local authority, 2015). Furthermore, the diminishing 
resources and capacity across individual local authorities was seen as an opportunity to 
centralise decision-making at the GM scale, as expressed by this interviewee,  
“Where you can have resistance [to GM decisions], is where [local authorities] have 
their own provision…. discussion becomes more imperative when you don’t have 
people in the districts working on this. Attrition on budgets mean that they rely on the 
central service” (Author’s interview 17, manager, GM local authority 1, 2015). 
 
For districts less economically connected to the growth areas, it was deemed critical to be 
able to influence the outcome at the GM level and at the right stage in the decision-making 
process. This required retaining officers who could work across GM scrutinising, inputting, 
offering resources or ideas, to prevent the core from dominating, as once proposals were 
submitted to leaders and chief executives, there was no room for debate or discussion,  
“Danger is if there isn’t resource within the districts that will then go forward and 
they will make assumptions about what GM needs and go back to the one size fits all, 
which isn’t needed” (Author’s interview 29, manager, GM local authority 3, 2016). 
As a response to this, more recently the north-eastern districts of Oldham, Rochdale and 
Tameside developed an “informal arrangement” of local authorities who,  
“have things in common with each other, older industrial… building alliances across 
authorities so that we can strengthen our position and voice in GM” (Author’s 
interview 29, policy officer, GM local authority 3, 2016). 
One of the proposals was for a North East Productivity Commission to examine the North 
Eastern economy of GM. However, this was seen by some local leaders as an “attempt to 
exit” GM, despite the shared aims of addressing low productivity areas and improving 
economic links in GM (Author’s interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016).  
“If I’m being completely candid it is quite frustrating, there is quite a strong attempt 
to close you down […] in my view you cannot argue for differential devolution in 
England and then say one size fits all in GM” (Author’s interview 47, chief executive, 
GM local authority 2, 2016). 
 
In summary, the Greater Manchester case analysis illustrates how having institutional 
coordination and capacity at a city-region scale has enabled local authorities to consolidate 
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and strengthen governance arrangements and achieve further powers at responsibilities to this 
scale. However, the analysis also shows that a strengthened GM has been achieved by 
weakening local autonomy and resisting further devolution and local variation. The approach, 
however, has demonstrated that dominant ways of working advocated by certain actors are 
not open to local flexibility and variation where this goes against economic objectives as set 
out in the main strategies, leading to any challenge to the GM approach being seen as a risk.  
 
6.1.2 North East: Disruption, upheaval and lack of learning 
The institutional landscape for economic development in the North East in 2010 consisted of 
an already-weakened regional tier and emerging voluntary city-regional governance around a 
smaller Tyne and Wear geography. Through the Tyne and Wear city region development 
pilot from 2005, there had also been some pooling of resources and investment at this scale. 
City-region collaboration had been reignited in the mid 2000s under the Northern Way 
initiative following the abolition of the Tyne and Wear metropolitan authority in 1986. 
Notwithstanding the steps taken to strengthen city-region governance, including a 
commissioned Tyne and Wear City Region Economic Review in 2009, the OECD (2012: 
173) pointed to the city region having seen “less bottom-up organisation of key stakeholders 
than in other city regions in the north of the UK to provide ongoing stability during the period 
of institutional change”.  
 
The establishment of the North East Local Enterprise Partnership (NELEP) in 2011 and, 
following this, the North East Combined Authority in 2014 while based on a newly defined 
economic geography were both based on the same coterminous geography of seven local 
authorities and this was seen as an advantage over other places which had overlapping 
institutional boundaries. There are a number of themes which characterise how institutional 
coordination and capacity at the city-region level have unfolded in the North East and under a 
new framework of government and governance for economic development, and contrasting 
this with Greater Manchester. First, developing institutional coordination horizontally 
between constituent local authorities and other city-region actors was described by 
interviewees as mostly driven by external incentives and imperatives, and mainly attached to 
the amount of funding available, rather than a commonly shared internal rationale and 
motivation (Author’s interview 1, former head, NE organisation 2, 2015). Second, there has 
been a hesitance – and at times resistance – to shared powers and pooled resources at the city-
region level, relinquishing individual sovereignty for some policy areas other than transport, 
thereby not investing and building capacity at this newly formed scale over the longer term. 
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Third, some interviewees cited the urban-rural geography of the North East which made it 
more difficult to develop a city-region case and common understanding of the economic 
benefits to different parts of the city-region from joint investments and prioritisation. For 
example investing joint resources in the urban Metro system which did not provide clear 
benefits for rural areas provided a challenge for individual authorities to fund and finance 
city-region priorities. Fourth, the latest churn of institutional arrangements in the North East 
which saw Tees Valley leave the North East region in 2010 and has resulted in fragmentation 
and disagreement between local authorities and business leaders on the NE LEP has 
presented an additional challenge of building coordination across and between scales in 
addition to across actors. This was not helped by the chronology of the North East Local 
Enterprise Partnership (NELEP) being established first followed by the North East Combined 
Authority two years later. This resulted in an economic plan at the city-region level set by the 
LEP and in place beneath that, seven local authority plans in different states and no 
connection between the two (Author's interview 19, director, NE local authority 3, 2015). A 
consistent theme to emerge from interviews was in relation to who provides the leadership 
for coordinating joint-working, in a city-region with multiple economic centres. The lack of 
agreement and clarity on who speaks on behalf of the new governance structures has led to a 
“deliberate decision by some to fragment [joint-working]” (Author’s interview 10, associate, 
Newcastle University, 2015). 
“We don’t have a high profile person across the region […] Who represents the North 
East?” (Author’s interview 10, associate, Newcastle University, 2015). 
 
In terms of the institutional capacity to deliver this, the Total Place initiative under Labour 
started to align significant spending across statutory functions including transport, health, 
education, welfare, and the different organisations and agencies and look at things from a 
place-based perspective. 
“There was a way of identifying who to speak to. Now it feels like that infrastructure 
is missing a bit and is more difficult to make the links” (Author’s interview 2, former 
councillor, NE local authority 1, 2015). 
This raises questions on the role of both central government and local actors in understanding 
and developing the institutional capacity required to transition to new governance 
arrangements and implement new powers and responsibilities and whether certain actions or 
inactions undermined local efforts. From a central government perspective, any 
decentralisation of powers and responsibilities were rarely matched with the administrative 
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capacity to deliver it, in the same way that administrative capacity followed the centralisation 
of policies upwards following the dismantling of RDAs, as illustrated in this quote, 
“If you try and do some of these things with existing capacity you can’t do it, and if 
you are going to devolve some of the powers you need to devolve some of the 
capacity as well” (Author’s interview 12, director, NE business representative 
organisation, 2015). 
 
The evolution of governance arrangements and joint-working across different public agencies 
has not kept pace with decentralisation and devolution – the powers and resources available 
span a number of different agencies at different scales, such as fire and police services in the 
North East. One of the main lessons from Greater Manchester and what has been achieved 
there is that institutional capacity is crucial and it is built up over time (Holden and Harding, 
2015). How it is constructed is dependent upon a number of aspects such as being able to 
resource the capacity financially and administratively, but also to have a sense of purpose and 
incentive.  
“The LEP and Combined Authority hasn’t got levers or big things on the agenda to 
create a life of its own - challenge and predicament for newly formed structures where 
you need to establish the structures to take on the policy levers, but that you also need 
to have worked with the policy levers at that scale to create that capacity in the 
structures in the first place” (Author’s interview 9, head, NE local authority 2, 2015)  
Within the North East, some of the challenges to building capacity have stemmed from a lack 
of trust between individual organisations in the new framework of governance for economic 
development and local growth and investing in building city-region capacity, in a climate of 
reduced resources for local government, as illustrated: 
“LEPs could bid for various funding rounds, but there was no funding to have a base 
of people. I thought the low point at a LEP meeting was when [a local authority 
leader] had to go out and do the photocopying because there was no one to do it. That 
was the level to which the administration, there was no money to do anything, 
because it came from nothing” (Author’s interview 14, leader, NE local authority 1, 
2015). 
Also, as the role of Local Enterprise Partnerships evolved and the NE LEP in line with other 
places was given additional powers and resources, some questioned the representativeness of 
LEP Board Members to make these decisions and on the links back into the wider community 
(Author’s interview 12, director, NE business representative organisation, 2015).  
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In thinking about how crises can galvanise collaborative working as happened in Greater 
Manchester following the 1996 bomb attack in the heart of Manchester, one interviewee 
reflected that, “Interestingly, I’m, not quite sure the shock that the region had here, the 2004 
Referendum, had the same catalytic effect” (Author’s interview 10, associate, University in 
the NE, 2015). This raises issues of institutional capacity to learn from what works in the NE 
and interviewees suggested there is not a clear understanding of what works that could lead to 
successful to long-term successful restructuring of the economy and the businesses in the area 
(Author’s interview 10, associate, University in the NE, 2015; Author’s interview 11, former 
chief executive, NE organisation 1, 2015). 
 
In conclusion, the lack of institutional coordination and capacity in the North East has been 
well documented and discussed both internally and externally to the region. The challenges 
can be explained by the geography of the city-region and disagreement over the role and 
contribution of different parts of the geography. This has led to a lack of trust between actors 
and inhibits effective joint-working at this scale. The multiplicity of voices and lack of 
leadership has ensured that no voice or interests between local authorities and business is 
dominant – although the establishment of the Combined Authority as the accountable body of 
the LEP clarified the position in some respects - however this does not appear to have led to 
improved or more inclusive decision-making between civic actors. 
 
 
6.2 Negotiating the politics of local growth  
This section examines how local politics shaped city-region collaboration in terms of 
establishing and embedding the new frameworks of government and governance for 
economic development and in negotiating powers and resources for economic development 
under decentralisation. In particular, by examining the political institutions that enable and 
facilitate city-region collaboration and what constrains it.  
 
There are two dimensions to this analysis: first the inter-local authority political dynamics 
and interactions within the city-region; then looking at the city-region scale and how that 
relationship has been brokered with external actors and particularly central government.  
The starting point for this analysis is the Coalition government’s critique of local political 
involvement in sub national structures for economic development arguing that they lacked 
democratic accountability, with decisions made by unelected officials at an artificial scale, 
adding,  
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“The secret to success is natural local economies - not artificial political regions - that 
better reflect the natural economic geography of the areas they serve. This is an 
economic problem that needs an economic solution, not a political one” (Eric Pickles 
MP, 2010). 
 
Removing regional structures to replace with ‘localism’ was intended to give new powers to 
local councils and businesses through the business-led Local Enterprise Partnerships, but also 
through decentralisation to communities, neighbourhoods and individuals (HM Government 
2010). The newly formed Local Enterprise Partnerships were deemed at the time by the BIS 
Committee (2010: 4) to offer both advantages and disadvantages as they might offer more 
cohesion, but also run the risk of being undermined by political instability as they were 
“creatures of local political persuasion”. According to the BIS Committee, a measure of 
success of the new LEP project would be, 
“the extent to which central and local government, business, and other sectors can 
offer stability alongside local diversity… it would be a retrograde step were the 
RDAs’ successes in overcoming unfruitful local rivalries to be lost in a disorderly 
competitive scramble” (ibid: 3). 
The remainder of this section examines how the politics of growth and shaped governance 
outcomes in the two case studies. 
 
6.2.1 Greater Manchester: Politics of technocracy, power and persuasion 
In examining and explaining the politics of economic development and local growth in 
Greater Manchester over the period 2010-2015, two particular aspects emerge: where 
political leadership and power was concentrated in GM and how it was enacted over time to 
support a strategy of economic growth largely in, and benefitting, Manchester City and the 
urban core. 
 
A notable feature of party politics across Greater Manchester local authorities is that apart 
from Trafford and Stockport, the remaining districts have been under Labour control for a 
number of years. Further to this, within some individual districts, Labour members dominate 
local council seats with relatively little opposition – Manchester City Council Labour seats 
comprise 98% of overall seats. The implications of this, according to some, are a “culture of 
conformity” (Author's interview 4, professor, University of Manchester, 2015) resulting from 
a lack of political challenge from other political parties and from local actors, and preserving 
a status quo. Despite the strong Labour representation across some districts across GM, there 
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are still disagreements about place policy between local authorities in city-region 
development,  
“… the bulk of the disputes are between Labour Councillors, they are not with the 
other parties… it’s more about the differences of what will benefit each place” 
(Author's interview 15, chief executive, GM local authority 7, 2015).  
 
In contrast to the North East, the disagreements between local actors rarely surface publicly 
and local authorities appear to have collaborated well across the different political parties 
with Trafford’s Conservative-led and Stockport’s, Liberal Democrat leadership, initially 
within the voluntary Association of Greater Manchester Authorities and now under a formal 
GM Combined Authority. There are a number of number of issues that help to explain how 
collaboration takes place in GM. First, Manchester City Council’s role in galvanising and 
coalescing the other districts around particular set of growth objectives is central to local 
politics in GM. In particular it has been the role of Sir Richard Leese and Sir Howard 
Bernstein, as the long-standing leader and chief executive, in bringing everyone along, 
“It is done very smoothly, it is to do with managerial leadership, Howard’s leadership 
is very inclusive, collaborative” (Author’s interview 15, chief executive, local 
authority 7, 2015). 
As political and executive leadership within other district councils has changed over the 
years, the stability of political and executive leadership at Manchester City Council has 
contributed to strengthening and consolidating Manchester City Council’s position and 
decision-making influence within GM. The established ways of working through political 
leadership in GM have therefore been entrenched over a number of decades. It is perhaps for 
these reasons that moves by individual districts to question this dominant Manchester City 
way of working is seen as a threat by those who stand to benefit greatest from a concentration 
of investment and growth in the urban core. 
 “…the first thing I was asked when I took leadership here, what is your view of the 
GMCA? Are you going to be a maverick leader in [district X] that doesn’t give a 
toss?” (Author’s interview 44, leader, GM local authority 6, 2016). 
 
Second, Manchester City Council’s under-bounded geography provided the motivation and 
incentive for collaboration and reinforced the economic interdependencies across the 
administrative and political boundaries of districts. Economic reviews and analyses such as 
the Manchester Independent Economic Review (MIER) described how other districts would 
benefit from being part of the Manchester city-region as part of building the narrative. 
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However, less explored and discussed was how and to what extent Manchester City 
benefitted over other districts from the design of growth priorities and objectives and how it 
relied on other districts for issues such as greenbelt, property development and scale 
(Author’s interview 3, director, GM local authority 4, 2015) – and the costs or risk to other 
districts of this approach, particularly when confronted with reduced levels of public sector 
spending and the phasing out of local government grant.  
 
Third, a notable feature is how local actors refer to the way city-region propositions are 
carefully crafted and how the political differences on place priorities are resolved. According 
to those involved, lessons were learned from the failed congestion charge referendum in 2009 
which was seen as “divisive… a city centre focused policy” which was to the advantage of 
some and perceived disadvantage of others, 
“… there’s a little of bit of everybody has to be seen to be, be getting something and 
there’s also an almost unwritten assumption that you can’t have pain for someone 
else’s gain. There is a degree of understanding that don’t put [forward] propositions 
that are politically intolerable” (Author's interview 3, director, GM local authority 4). 
Manchester City Council have achieved this with what some describe as “neo-colonial and 
imperialist tendencies…by telling a story beyond the boundaries” and sharing in successes 
(Author's interview 4, academic, University of Manchester, 2015). Also by Manchester City 
Council positioning itself to lead on the “interesting work” (Author’s interview 50, academic, 
University of Manchester, 2015). There is a sense from some that over time, the interesting 
work has been “stripped back and centralised” (Author's interview 4, academic, University of 
Manchester, 2015). Some, however, question whether the shared economic narrative and 
responsibility extends beyond the successes and strengths in GM, to the challenges, 
“Manchester City Council is not worried about dealing with the cuts in Stockport, 
Oldham or Rochdale, but it would like to be able to tell a story that draws upon their 
successes” (Author's interview 4, academic, University of Manchester, 2015). 
 
For the districts outside of Manchester City, the political challenge is balancing both the 
benefits of being part of the city-region with having a local identity,  
“I want the benefits of being in GM, contributing to growth in GM, but retain some 
sort of identity” (Author’s interview 29, manager, GM local authority 3, 2016). 
Where some of the tensions emerged with the MIER and the Greater Manchester Strategy 
was in failing to recognise the local aspirations of individual districts by being locked in to a 
fixed view of what the north and south of GM could achieve economically, based on the 
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economic evidence. Particularly given the limited opportunity for political discussions in the 
GM decision-making process that specifically sought to “negate the politics” (Author’s 
interview 44, leader, GM local authority 6, 2016). This tension arose from districts wanting 
to positively contribute and not just benefit from growth and productivity in other parts of 
GM, 
“What we feel is that the whole narrative, doesn’t properly identify a role for 
particularly the north east boroughs and it doesn’t properly identify which measures 
or interventions are needed to make us a more positive contribution to that gap” 
(Author’s interview 28, director, GM local authority 5, 2015). 
 
The local politics and established ways of working are deeply entrenched in Greater 
Manchester to the point where some see the challenge for incoming directly elected mayor is 
to break open what some describe as a Labour cartel for over a decade. The MIER and GMS 
have been important in defining the relationship and independencies between different parts 
of the GM conurbation that has formed the economic evidence base. Unsurprisingly, this is 
sometimes in conflict with local priorities and aspirations and also, becoming increasingly 
important, doesn’t take into account current and planned changes to local government 
finance. A counter-narrative is therefore emerging in a changing context, in response to a 
“limited view”, where changes that solely address economic and efficiency outcomes are 
deemed not enough (Author’s interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016), 
“Our boroughs need to be, not just net equal, but absolutely positive contributing to 
the gap. And whilst I think that everybody accepts that there is need for a highly 
productive economy in the centre of GM and the core, everyone gets that. What we 
feel is that the whole narrative, doesn’t properly identify a role for particularly the 
north east boroughs and it doesn’t properly identify which measures or interventions 
are needed to make us more positive contribution to that gap” (Author’s interview 29, 
director, GM local authority 5, 2015). 
Another example of where tensions are evident is when locations in GM are prioritised for 
development to further city- priorities and this might be in conflict with local aspirations for 
that site to grow and become sustainable in the local context, 
“I wouldn’t call it a prejudice, but it is almost prejudice, or misguided perception, 
slightly unwillingness to agree with us what our ambitions are for that area’ (Author’s 
interview 29, Manager, GM local authority 3, 2016). 
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In summary this section has shown that collaborative working in GM is influenced formally 
through systems and processes to coordinate and coalesce, but also informally through 
established conventions and ways of working. What begins to emerge is that what is often 
presented as an economic case or argument, a technocratic approach and solution, is informed 
by a series of political choices that are benefit some places or actors more than others but 
discussions of whether this is the right approach are not open or encouraged. 
 
6.2.2 North East: Territorial politics, leadership and evidence  
The politics of local growth in the North East during the period of transition and in the 
aftermath of the incoming Coalition government can be examined in the context of historic 
rivalries and new and emergent interests across local actors, all within the re-configured 
framework of governance for economic development and local growth. As with Greater 
Manchester, the changes have unfolded during a period of contraction of public spending 
which has shaped governance outcomes.  
“I still wrestle with this issue, is there a perculiarity to Tyne and Wear, the North East, 
that means that this will forever be the case, or is it about leadership, institutional 
inertia, failure, culture. You can layer up all these things…” (Author’s interview, 
researcher, Newcastle University, 2015). 
As discussed in chapter 4, territorial politics in the North East also existed under the previous 
regional structure and between civic actors representing different economic centres. This 
manifested particularly in determining where investment would be prioritised. While there 
was not wholly unanimous support for everything that One North East (the Regional 
Development Agency) did, in particular some felt it had become a victim of mission creep, it 
provided an institutional mechanism to cut through local politics, albeit with a perceived 
achilles heel of limited accountability itself, as illustrated in this quote, 
“…that is the advantage of having a regional organisation with light touch democratic 
accountability that can take a tougher line and make a decision, and then people 
realise, and oddly enough sometimes people prefer that… they prefer that someone 
else in the end has been able to make a decision rather than the issue just rattles 
around forever” (Author’s interview 11, former chief executive, NE regional 
organisation 1, 2015). 
The Coalition’s decision to abolish regional structures initially united most actors across local 
government and business in the North East against this decision and in support for continuing 
collaboration at this scale. This was despite the decision by Tees Valley to separate from the 
former North East geography and to pursue their own proposals and structures. However, the 
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invitation by central government to form Local Enterprise Partnerships based on functional 
economic areas, and steering away from administrative geographies, resulted in a 
fragmentation of this unity as local authorities scrambled to develop joint and competing 
proposals around individual and shared interests, resulting in smaller scale proposals. In 
response to multiple bids from the North East (Author’s interview 50, former director, NE 
business representative body, 2016) then Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government, Eric Pickles, through the Government Office for the North East, instructed local 
authorities to form a joint North East proposal (ibid.). This political act of fragmentation 
contributed to factors that undermined joint-working and transition to a North East Local 
Enterprise Partnership from the outset. 
 
In trying to understand and explain why disagreements have emerged between the main 
actors in a new framework of government and governance for economic development and 
local growth, interviewees point to a number of different factors. Given issues of 
fragmentation over a number of years, of interest here is the extent to which new governance 
arrangements could negotiate local institutions and politics more or less so, than previous 
arrangements. Despite a political homogeneity across the leadership of local councils - since 
2010, all seven local authorities in the North East have been Labour-led - this hasn’t made the 
process of city-region collaboration within and across the Local Enterprise Partnership and 
Combined Authority any smoother. Some attribute this turmoil to territorial politics rather 
than party politics (Author’s interview 2, former councillor, NE local authority 2, 2015), with 
individual centres in the North East competing with each other for resources and an apparent 
lack of a shared view and commitment to prioritisation of investment beyond strategies and 
economic analyses of the role of different parts of the North East (Author’s interview 46, 
former chief executive, GM level organisation 2, 2015). Local council officers describe 
effective joint-working at the officer and director level, one that is based around an 
understanding of the economic evidence, but that discussions can become more difficult 
between chief executives and leaders where political choices need to be made (Author’s 
interview 10, head of team, NE local authority 2, 2015), which suggests a lack of common 
understanding of the basis for decision-making and prioritisation at a political level. 
 
The process of initially forming and establishing the new LEP exposed the leadership 
challenge in the absence of a regional tier of coordination, despite joint-working at the sub-
regional tier on areas such as transport, skills and economic development. The reality of 
localism and a centrally-prescribed ‘bottom up’ approach to forming new governance 
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arrangements without strong support for collaboration across constituent local authorities and 
sufficient incentives in terms of what powers and resources will be devolved, was seen as a 
challenge for the North East,  
“problem when things are bottom up, which in some sense it is a good thing to design 
own arrangements, but then that is going to bring those tensions to the fore, when 
actually top down arrangements are a good way of dealing with those tensions when 
things are effectively imposed. (Author’s interview 14, leader, NE local authority 1, 
2015). 
Once formed, it was suggested that at least initially, there was a different focus by the civic 
and business leaders on the LEP, where the business leaders focused on innovation and 
higher level skills and the local councils on the Combined Authority more at basic skills and 
social inclusion, which reflected different priorities, 
“… I think they [Combined Authority] could maybe look a bit more at future proofing 
thinking about excelling in future rather than just keeping our heads about water” 
(Author’s interview 1, former officer, NE LEP, 2015).  
The new structures and governance arrangements for economic development and local 
growth in the North East have not helped to mediate the tensions arising from territorial 
politics in decision-making and new tensions have surfaced and provided a challenge to city-
region collaboration. One example of this was funding made available to Core Cities for 
investing in the skills of young people which was then offered by Newcastle as the Core City 
to other local authorities in the North East and was not taken up by some, according to 
sources, because it was made available through the Core City. Further to this, the invitation 
by central government for places to bid to host the Green Investment Bank in 2012 resulted 
in both Newcastle and Sunderland both submitting bids, despite their close proximity and 
also being within the same Local Enterprise Partnership area. This presented a dilemma for 
bidding local authorities in the North East on having a shared view of the “best offer” to 
central government and wanting to present a “united front, with the hope that if it is in the 
North East it doesn’t matter where ” (Author’s interview 9, head of team, NE local authority 
2, 2015). 
 
A new aspect to the politics of local growth between city-region actors since 2010 has been 
the level and tone of public disagreements between local authorities and some of the business 
representatives on the Local Enterprise Partnership. These disagreements and fall-outs 
between council leaders and some LEP business representatives have been a central feature 
of how intra-regional discussions have unfolded particularly in relation to establishing 
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leadership and decision-making responsibilities in the newly formed sub-national governance 
arrangements and in response to negotiating with central government. Leadership has been at 
the heart of these tensions, 
 “This is the debate between the LEP and combined authority. One sees the other as 
being more preeminent so the Combined Authority wants the LEP to be part of the 
Combined Authority, whilst the LEP doesn’t want to be part of traditional council 
apparatus” (Author’s interview 10, associate, Newcastle University, 2015). 
 
Conflicting positions have been adopted between local councils and business representatives 
on a number of different issues, ranging from bigger national issues such as reacting to and 
engaging with the politics of consolidation and austerity and principally on whether to agree 
to a directly-elected mayor, to very specific and local issues such as the salary for the position 
of Chief Executive at the Combined Authority. In the context of discussions of post-
democracy (Crouch, 2004), where technocratic solutions based primarily on economic 
evidence are deemed by central government to be more robust, how decisions on investment 
are made and on what basis, continues to be a very live and contested discussion. In the case 
of Greater Manchester’s Investment Framework, local governance sought to remove 
territorial politics and the place dimension (see 5.1.1). In the North East, the business 
community and politicians on the LEP disagreements were often openly expressed in the 
local newspaper, as discussed by this interviewee, 
“Ultimately it depends whether the outlook of the business community is that it wants 
to work with the public agencies or against them. The open letter from the weekend 
suggests to me that businesses are losing patience with the current structures and that 
actually they want greater autonomy and do their own thing and they are a bit 
concerned about being further constrained by another organisation” (Author’s 
interview 2, former councillor, NE local authority 2, 2015). 
This disagreement only served to further alienate people in the North East from discussions 
on democratic decision-making and impacted negatively on the new structures building 
credibility with central government for the transfer of powers and resources. 
 
In summary, the new structures and governance arrangements in the North East have not to 
date provided a mechanism to resolve the politics of local growth and instead have 
contributed to further fragmentation. In conclusion, this chapter has shown that when 
presented with a version of localism and decentralisation by central government, the response 
by local areas is shaped by their ability to coordinate horizontally across city-region actors as 
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well as vertically with central government. Also by the institutional capacity developed at 
that scale and the ability of local governance to negotiate both party politics and the politics 
of place. The notion of an ‘institutional regime’ (Pike et al., 2015) is a useful framework to 
examine in depth the institutional processes and relationships within the city-region that 
enable or constrain collaboration across boundaries. This finds that territorial and relational 
struggles and tensions remain at the fore and manifest in different ways as part of the 
territorial politics of uneven development. Using Jones and Wood’s (2011) notion of 
imagined and material coherence, an important differentiation in the two case studies is the 
extent to which Greater Manchester has consolidated and invested in city-region coordination 
and capacity (material coherence) while the North East, due to the new scale of collaboration 
from 2010, was starting again to create a shared vision and approach with local partners 
(imagined coherence). Recognising that institutions can have both a positive and negative 
effect on economic performance and growth depending on the quality of institutions (OECD, 
2012), analysis of the two case studies shows that coordination and capacity at scale while 
critical to effective city-regional governance, can also lead to ‘political lock in’ (Hassink, 
2010) of established and preferred ways of working. In the North East city-region governance 
coordination and institutional capacity has suffered from a lack of clarity of leadership 
stemming from a lack of a shared understanding of the role of individual places and 
resistance to implementing the Coalition’s funding cuts – neither the financial incentives nor 
the interdependencies between places were sufficiently understood to engender collaboration. 
In Greater Manchester, coordination and capacity was configured to execute a particular form 
of city-regional governance and political leadership which some argue hasn’t been open to 
adapting to local circumstances as well as a changing context for local government finance. 
The outcomes are further shaped by the politics of local areas which as the cases reveal, can 
be played out explicitly, like in the North East, or more implicitly, in how governance and 
decision-making is designed in GM. 
The next chapter will examine the development of city-region governance in the context of 
multi-level governance and accountability to understand and explain the relationship between 
central and local government over this period how it changed.  
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Chapter 7. What do these changes mean for centre-local relations in the 
sub-national governance of economic development? 
 
This chapter examines how centre-local relations for economic development were 
reconfigured in this latest episode of decentralisation and the implications for accountability, 
scrutiny and transparency. This develops the argument that, in the context of a centrally-
prescribed localism, the Coalition’s episode of decentralisation and devolution has witnessed 
a more assertive centre with a key governance relationship with the local level as regions 
were abolished and new sub-national arrangements were formed. This new sub-national 
framework of government and governance has provided some new opportunities for local 
decision-making but within a constrained context of a reduction in funding and shaped by the 
changing nature of local government finance. This demonstrates the enduring influence of the 
centre on local state actors in the context of decentralisation to subnational tiers of 
government and governance. 
 
The chapter is structured in two parts. First it examines the (re)configuration of centre-local 
relations under the Coalition’s episode of decentralisation and localism (7.1). Second, the 
chapter explores the implications for accountability, scrutiny and transparency of the sub-
national changes (7.2). This chapter explores the research proposition, based on the review of 
literature, that the local state is profoundly conditioned by its relationship with the central 
state. 
 
7.1 Centrally prescribed and orchestrated decentralisation and deal-making  
This section examines centre-local relations in this latest episode of decentralisation and 
devolution and how and why they have been reconfigured. This takes place in the context of 
a global shift towards decentralising powers and responsibilities sub-nationally and 
particularly to cities (Katz and Bradley, 2012; Glaeser, 2012; Faguet, 2013; Ahrend and 
Schumann, 2014). Despite this trend, there is also no single approach to decentralisation, and 
there are significant variations in the interpretation, form and processes adopted by national 
governments (CURDS and LSE., 2011). 
The UK has a highly centralised system of government mainly because of how tax is 
collected and redistributed, and which no political party has sought to fundamentally redress 
(see section 3.2.1). Despite a trend of moving from government to a variety of governance 
mechanism and vehicles in recent years, the recent transfer of more substantial powers and 
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resources in England to sub-national governance arrangements has exposed the limitations of 
voluntary and informal arrangements. This latest reconfiguring of centre-local relations has 
been shaped by the Coalition government’s vision for localism and Big Society (HM 
Government, 2010a) alongside the government’s fiscal consolidation and austerity response 
to the global financial crisis. The condition of a directly-elected mayor and Devolution Deals 
as the mechanism to negotiate and transfer resources from the centre to sub-nation 
differentiate the Coalition’s city-region focus from the previous Labour governments.  
There are a number of themes which help to explain the context and interpret the 
reconfiguration of centre-local government relations in England since 2010 by examining 
who was orchestrating these changes and why, and how these changes to centre-local 
relations were implemented. In the Coalition’s early days, it was Eric Pickles MP, then 
Secretary of State for the Department for Communities and Local Government, who shaped 
relations between central and local government and set the tone of discussions. He launched 
an attack on local authorities based on his views of the profligacy of the sector – which led 
him to agree to the most significant budget reductions of any central government department 
(see section 4.1) - and for acting as a barrier to devolution to communities. The Coalition’s 
vision was to move from Big Government to Big Society by decentralising powers to 
communities (HM Government, 2010). In the aftermath of the 2008-09 recession, the focus 
on economic growth became more pronounced under the Coalition and HM Treasury worked 
bilaterally with groups of local authorities, brokering and influencing discussions with other 
departments, and became instrumental in shaping centre-local relations. While exerting 
power over other departments to get deals announced, HM Treasury were not always so 
successful in getting the content of the deals implemented with individual departments or 
ministers who were resistant to changes. Furthermore, the new way of working being 
implemented by the Coalition – the process of submitting a proposal or bid for central 
approval - reinforced the client status of local government. Despite knowledge of being 
worse off through cuts, local councils maintained the view that it was better to have greater 
responsibility through devolution, as local areas are better placed to determine needs and set 
priorities.  
There were a number of issues discerned from an analysis of changes to centre-local 
relations. First the multiple and overlapping objectives for decentralisation and devolution 
provided an unclear framework for local actors to respond and negotiate. Was 
decentralisation about growth, rebalancing, austerity, shrinking the state, meeting societal 
challenges, was it to provide a safety net for the disadvantaged? (CURDS, 2016). The 
  154 
clearest expression of this contradiction being a commitment set out by the Prime Minister 
and Deputy Prime Minister in 2010 to “rebalance growth across all regions and sectors” (HM 
Government, 2010) yet the funding cuts impacted most severely on the local authorities in 
areas that were underperforming economically in the national context (NAO, 2012). This left 
local councils to balance the politics of funding cuts alongside the prospect of future funding 
to support growth, in more of a chaotic rather than coordinated approach.  
Second, there was a lack of recognition, at least initially, by central government of the 
uneven starting point and variable institutional capacity of different places to respond to 
bidding rounds for competitively allocating resources, for example the Regional Growth 
Fund and Growth Fund Deals. The readiness of local areas to respond was influenced by how 
long the LEP had been in place and the evidence they had available at that scale to underpin 
proposals. The Coalition government began to recognise and respond to this uneven 
institutional capacity later on with a LEP Capacity Fund, BIS Local Teams to provide 
capacity, and central government support to local areas through the Cities and Local Growth 
Unit. The slow response to this suggested either an initial lack of awareness or a belief that 
announcements for funding would provide sufficient incentives to mobilise local actors to 
respond through new arrangements.   
 
Third, along with the local state, the central state also had to adapt to more centralised modes 
of working. This required central government departments to not view the transfer of powers 
and responsibilities sub-nationally as a threat but rather as an opportunity to do, for example, 
“…relevant things in people’s lives that national governments can’t do” (Author’s 
interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016).  
Despite national and local calls for place-based settlements over the longer term (see inter 
alia HOC Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2013; CLG Committee, 2014; 
Core Cities, 2015) progress is piecemeal (Pike et al., 2016b). Further to this, while allowing 
the space and flexibility for some places to do better than others as has happened with deals 
and deal-making, it is unclear what the commitment is by central government to make sure 
that those who fall behind don’t fall too far.  
“Nationally-led economic development policy and implementation should be able to 
demonstrate fair consideration and treatment of all areas” (HM Government, 2010a) 
 
Finally, changes to centre-local relations have also been shaped and moulded by the 
emergence of informal governance and bilateral deals and deal-making between central and 
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local government. This became the preferred method by central government of negotiating 
the transfer of more complex and significant powers and resources for economic 
development and local growth. The Core Cities amendment to the 2011 Localism Act created 
the mechanism for councils to submit plans on how they planned to promote local economic 
growth which if successful they would be invited to negotiate deals with central government 
for greater autonomy of financial and planning matters (Ward, 2017). These bilateral and 
bespoke arrangements paved the way for deal-making and became the Coalition’s – and 
particularly HM Treasury’s - preferred method of negotiating the transfer of powers between 
central and local government. This approach was expanded in the ‘Unlocking Growth in 
Cities’ document (HM Government, 2011) and the first wave of City Deals were agreed 
between the Cities Policy Unit and England’s eight largest core cities outside London, with 
government departments committing up to £2.3 billion to the deals spread over 30 years 
(NAO, 2015). At the time, City Deals were seen to, 
“… signify the direction of travel of central and local government relations and the 
changing nature of economic development activity in England…. This means a move 
away from large nationally funded programmes of regeneration towards funding 
economic growth and regeneration via investment finance tools, such as Tax 
Increment Financing” (CLES, 2011). 
The advantages of City Deals were described as raising ambitions within cities by allowing 
partners to experiment with policy ideas and giving cities more flexibility to respond to local 
priorities and challenges (Centre for Cities, 2013). However, there has been some criticism 
over the impact of the Wave 1 City Deals, particularly for the more ambitious and innovative 
programmes, and over a lack of shared approach to evaluating the impacts of programmes 
(NAO, 2015). Also, a lack of consultation with relevant departments and officials on cities’ 
commitments meant that some of the specific issues around funding were not considered until 
after the deals had been signed (ibid.). The deals were presented by central government as a 
step in a longer-term dialogue between local leaders and central government about devolution 
and growth. After City Deals, all 39 Local Enterprise Partnerships were invited to submit 
proposals for Growth Deals. Following Greater Manchester’s devolution agreement signed in 
November 2014, other cities were invited to follow their lead. 
 
There are a number of implications for deals and deal-making on reconfiguring relations. 
First, the lack of clarity on the overall framework including timetable and criteria for deals 
and deal-making has enabled central government to set the pace and terms on who to strike 
deals with. The secretive process has also enabled central government to flex the terms to fit 
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different political objectives, so that Cornwall was awarded the first non-metropolitan 
devolution deal without being required to sign up to have a directly-elected mayor. Third, 
there was no mechanism established for working out the implications of deals consisting of 
fiscal agreements on the resilience of the overall national system and for those places left 
behind. Added to this an uneven institutional landscape that is being made more uneven by 
the fact that certain city-regions are getting first mover advantage. With so much focus on 
securing the deal itself and the announcement seen as an outward sign of confidence in an 
area, the implementation and individual responsibilities in making it happen was harder to 
pin down, away from the public gaze, 
“Once that’s done [deal making] the role of government is to get behind it and make it 
happen and not to keep questioning it and undermining it as has happened in some of 
the devolution deals that have taken a long time to get going after they have been 
decided” (Author’s interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016). 
This variable support from individual departments and ministers reflected a challenge as to 
the extent devolution to cities is seen as a priority across Whitehall. Greg Clark, Minister for 
Cities at the time, was a proponent of deals, as was then Chancellor George Osborne. Deal-
making is not new, previous governments have had bilateral discussions with local teams but 
more than often as part of schemes or programmes available to all places. The process of the 
deals themselves and how they were progressed by both central and local government teams 
is therefore significant. In summary, despite a commitment to decentralisation and localism 
the centre still maintains a close role in local decisions on government and economic 
development activities. 
 
7.1.1. Greater Manchester: Shaping the approach to deals and deal-making  
This section critically examines how centre-local relations were constituted and brokered in 
GM during this period, examining both formal and informal interaction to understand more 
about the importance and influence of this relationship, and whether it differs to the 
experience of other city-regions. Building credibility and convincing government has been a 
central theme. Receiving less attention, has been how changes to sub-national and economic 
and political outcomes have been negotiated informally and behind the scenes, how 
relationships have been nurtured across GM councils and civic actors and with central 
government and how this has been managed across the ten councils to achieve a coherent 
voice with central government. 
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The relationship between Greater Manchester local authorities and central government 
officials and ministers has been developed and nurtured over a number of years and spanning 
different political allegiances. Building on city region deals and developments made under 
the previous Labour government, from 2010, the dismantling of administrative regions 
consolidated Greater Manchester’s decision-making powers formally at this city-region scale 
(see section 4.1). These relationships have been instrumental to GM achieving its ambitions 
for decentralisation under the Coalition government. It has also been influential in shaping 
the Coalition government’s overall approach to negotiating decentralisation and devolution 
with other cities based on Greater Manchester trailblazer status (see section 5.2).  
First, there have been several accounts written of how GM governance has achieved 
successful negotiation of powers and responsibilities from central to GM level (see inter alia 
Emmerich, 2017; Holden and Harding, 2015; OECD, 2015). A common thread running 
through these is that they describe a largely uncontested and unchallenged version of events 
(apart from reference to the 2009 congestion charge referendum); stable institutions and 
leadership, strong and credible governance, and an evidence based approach to economic 
development. The accounts of GM’s success in collaboration and in securing investment is 
often told from the perspective of those places in GM that have benefited most economically 
from this model of growth, mainly the larger urban centres (Author’s interview 3, director, 
GM local authority 4, 2015). 
 
Second, is a concern amongst some local councils in the districts surrounding Manchester 
City that rather than decentralise to the lowest level possible, the approach in GM to date has 
been to devolve to the city-region level, consolidating powers at the GM level, at the expense 
of localism – referred to by some as “metro-centralisation” (Author’s interview 13, officer, 
GM local authority 2, 2015) and argued as follows, 
“…in my view you cannot argue for differential devolution in England and then say 
one size fits all in GM… How is devolution about localism and not just about 
centralising at GM – if we are just going to recreate a county council then we have 
failed” (Author’s interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016). 
These tension and concerns have emerged despite the all work that has gone on in GM in 
terms of governance reviews, distributed leadership and cross-boundary working, all which is 
deemed essential to the collaborative approach and a “true place-based plan” in the Greater 
Manchester Strategy (Author’s interview 24, lead, GM level organisation 1, 2015).  
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Third, the decision to opt for a directly-elected metro mayor as a condition of the devolution 
agreement fuelled these concerns. The concern by districts was that there would be limited 
scope and flexibility to do things differently within GM, particularly in response to the local 
government cuts and funding outlook, and reduced capacity (see chapter 5.1.1). The GM 
level was not only positioned as the dominant scale by GM governance, it also become the 
preferred scale by central government with some departments insisting on dealing with GM 
exclusively, rather than with smaller alliances of local districts, for example those facing 
similar economic challenges and who wanted to tackle issues at a sub city-regional level 
(Author’s interview 29, manager, GM local authority 3, 2015). This was helped along by the 
analytical contribution of New Economy which built credibility with HM Treasury by 
developing the narrative around addressing both growth and reform in order to address the 
£6bn gap in the public finances in GM. 
 
Fourth, as the remit of New Economy has grown, some local council officials mentioned they 
were concerned that in their centrally orchestrating analytical role, they were setting 
assumptions despite being further away from delivery and there were not always the 
opportunities or forums to address areas where there was deemed insufficient evidence at a 
district level (Author’s interview 29, policy officer, GM local authority 3, 2015). The reach 
of the different activities carried out by New Economy was also raising questions by some as 
to whether there was a conflict of interest in their different roles and capacities, 
“You might be aware that there has been a bit of thinking about what New Economy’s 
role should be, because they are acting as evaluators, researchers, they do also 
programme management, also programme commissioners, and it doesn’t quite 
work…. because the reality being local authorities inevitably know what is going on 
the ground” (ibid.) 
 
Despite their progress, GM local leaders, like other city-regions, have had to contend with 
central government moving from a history of centralised policy driven government 
intervention to more enabling, creating, place-shaping type approaches and to let go, and 
adapt to a localised way of thinking. In relation to deal-making, the emergent form of deal-
making and negotiation between local and central government under the Coalition and 
subsequent Conservative government has become synonymous with Greater Manchester. Not 
only have Greater Manchester local authority leaders negotiated the most significant 
devolution deal - in terms of both value at £6bn and significant responsibilities that include 
provisions to integrate health and social care, in addition to agreeing further iterations of 
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deals – they have also shaped the overall devolution process and terms, by which other places 
follow and are assessed by. This trailblazing position has led to Greater Manchester 
governance architects/officials also having an informal advisory role in devolution 
discussions between central government and other city-regions, including the North East 
(Author’s interview 42, former chief executive, GM body, 2016). The first mover advantage 
in devolution discussions has been particularly important given that the central pot of 
investment available for all places is undefined by central government and given the ongoing 
commitment to reducing the deficit, it is unlikely to be limitless.  
 
The culture of deal-making in Greater Manchester has spanned a longer period than the 
recent episode with the Coalition government and is reflective of longstanding bilateral 
relationships across political divides (see section 5.2.1). Under the Coalition’s episode of 
decentralisation, Greater Manchester has both on its own and with the other Core Cities 
sought to redress the imbalance of power between national and local government. The GM 
case can be examined in terms of the case for devolution, the process followed and 
implementing the deals. In this latest episode of decentralisation, GM presented a compelling 
economic case to HM Treasury in order to secure deals. This consisted of an “unstoppable 
argument” based on the £6bn funding gap between tax receipts and what GM spends 
(Author’s interview 42, former chief executive, GM body) along with the intention to make a 
positive net fiscal contribution to the HM Treasury. Further to this, the ability of local leaders 
to communicate big ideas and scale for projects and investment has been important for 
negotiations led by HM Treasury and focused on economic growth and built credibility in 
delivering large scale projects,  
“Manchester and GM pitches up [in central government] and it’s got the schemes and 
you know what the priorities are and they are big scheme. And they know if Eammon 
or Howard stands up and says these are our schemes and if you invest in them we will 
deliver and we have a track record that we do deliver. And that track record is not one 
just known by UK investors, it’s now known by Abu Dhabi, China, Singapore, US 
investors” (Author’s interview 42, former chief executive, GM level organisation 2, 
2016). 
The process for how deals have been developed and extent to which local stakeholders have 
been consulted has received increasing attention by civic actors and citizens, particularly on 
the decision by the GM Combined Authority to have a directly elected mayor. The article by 
Simon Jenkins (Jenkins, 2015) describing the secretive nature of deal-making was, according 
to some local authority officers, an accurate depiction. The announcement of the first 
  160 
devolution deal for GM on 23 November 2014 came as a surprise to other Core Cities, who 
also happened to be meeting on that day, without Manchester. Even within GM, the 
announcement of the health and social care integration deal in 2015 only became known to 
senior level officers in Manchester as it was being confirmed. However, as with other places, 
the implementation of devolution deals has been more difficult to across different 
government departments, despite GM being the devolution trailblazer and with personal 
advocacy from the Chancellor. This is partly explained by the limited detail on how 
devolution deals would be implemented. This meant that they were “constructively 
ambiguous” to get them agreed by local leaders and government departments but this also led 
to delays once they were agreed,  
“…if they are not sufficiently clear they are destructive when you come to implement 
them because you have that debate about what does it mean” (Author’s interview 44, 
leader, GM local authority 6, 2016). 
The ambiguity in the deals required ongoing dialogue with government departments and led 
to some trying to go back on conditions. The advantage of devolution to cities being led by 
HM Treasury was that you needed Treasury backed proposals but then you had to bring the 
rest of government with you. GM had the political advantage by having a Conservative led 
council and therefore had the political leverage to call upon if required. More often than not, 
in the event of delay or retraction by government departments, Sir Howard Bernstein would 
call Chancellor George Osborne direct. 
“… we have a range of tools at our disposal which include really strong links with 
civil servants, some great chief executives across GM, political influence if we need 
it, all based on this common purpose of what we are trying to achieve” (Author’s 
interview 44, leader, GM local authority 6, 2016). 
 
The challenge for central government is to move from a history of centralised policy-driven 
government intervention to more enabling and place-shaping type approaches. To hold 
government to account to implement the terms of agreed devolution deals, Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority – along with other cities through the Core Cities network – 
asked central government for a place-based settlement for GM in the 2015 Comprehensive 
Spending Review to include multi-year budgets and alignment across all relevant 
departments, rather than, 
“..just a war between departments about who gets what” (Author’s interview 47, chief 
executive, GM local authority 2, 2016). 
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In summary, centre-local relations in GM have been developed and nurtured over a long time 
with personal relationships with key individuals providing important connections. Though, 
beyond securing deals and announcements, it appears that GM faces the same barriers as 
other local authorities in trying to implement activity across government, which highlights 
the challenge to adapt as well. Those outside of local government in GM see the secretive and 
informal relationships as problematic and opaque, particularly given that for a number of 
stakeholders that is the approach of leaders in GM as well. 
 
7.1.2 North East: Moving from individual to collective negotiation 
This section examines how centre-local relations have unfolded in the North East over this 
period. Local councils and business leaders in the North East have, together with Greater 
Manchester and the other largest cities and city regions in England, long campaigned for 
greater decentralisation of powers and resources for economic development and local growth. 
In contrast to Greater Manchester, local councils were largely supportive of the regional tier 
as a way of coordinating and prioritising economic development activity (see chapter 4.1.1). 
The main governance arrangement for these discussions following the demise of the Regional 
Development Agency and before the LEP and Combined Authority was the LA7 - the seven 
local authority leaders that formed the Leaders’ Board and precursor to the Combined 
Authority. Also, the Core Cities network through Newcastle City Council and Key Cities 
network through Sunderland City Council.  
 
The localist or bottom-up approach to determining new structures and powers at a 
subnational level created additional challenges for local leaders in the North East following 
the dismantling of previous regional structures and the fragmentation of local partners in 
establishing the North East Local Enterprise Partnership (see chapter 4.2.1). It also brought 
tensions around leadership and decision-making between local and business leaders to the 
fore where the evidence for investment priorities was “geographically light … and the seven 
individual plans were not joined up” (Author’s interview 32, director, NE local authority 6, 
2015) where for some,  
“… top down arrangements are a good way of dealing with those tensions, when 
things are effectively imposed” (Author’s interview 14, leader, NE local authority 1, 
2015) 
 
There are a number of themes which help to explain how multi-level governance has 
unfolded in the North East since 2010 and shaped centre-local relations. Central-local 
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relations in the North East over the Coalition government period were highly politically-
driven and framed by the significant cuts to funding overall in the North East and what was 
seen by some as a political decision to fragment the region (see chapter 6.2.2). At the same 
time this was countered by individual local council relationships with Ministers and 
departments which enabled the agreement of the Newcastle Gateshead City Deal in 2012 and 
the Sunderland City Deal in 2014, in addition to pilot programmes. The North East seven 
authorities commissioned a governance review in 2013 and decided to formalise and 
constitute their partnership as a Combined Authority in order to take on additional powers 
and responsibilities for areas including transport and economic development. Despite this 
decision, there was deep mistrust among politicians and underlying suspicion of the medium 
and long term objectives of central government for decentralisation and whether it would lead 
to a reorganisation and consolidation of local councils.  
 
Partnership working was already held back by a fear of losing sovereignty by individual 
councils before the LEP and Combined Authority were established (see OECD, 2006). 
Devolution of joint funding pots and shared responsibilities combined with the phasing out of 
local government funding grant by 2020 and new forms of local government finance – i.e. 
business rates and council tax - tested the commitment to joint working under the new 
structures. The NE’s relationship with central government for decentralisation discussions 
improved over time. The brokering role of senior officers with experience of working in 
central government – such as Pat Ritchie and Andrew Lewis, Chief Executive and Assistant 
Chief Executive of Newcastle City Council, respectively – was seen as critical to building 
trust and credibility with Ministers and civil servants in devolution negotiations (Author’s 
interview 42, former director, GM organisation 2, 2015). This was important given the public 
disagreements and fallouts between some local politicians and business leaders on the 
NELEP. Also critical to negotiating the transfer of powers and resources was developing the 
narrative and economic case for devolution with central government.  
“When we started off it [statement of intent] didn’t have enough of the NE strengths 
in, just give us this money. The argument is in some respect, we realise that we are a 
problem. We cost a lot of money to central coffers, and we want to be out of that 
position, this is our way out, we will trade our way out, give us these 
responsibilities…it is still more important to be in charge of your own destiny, even if 
that means fewer resources…” (Author’s interview 32, director, NE local authority 6, 
2015). 
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The limited scope to shape decentralisation outcomes was raised by interviews who described 
the steps taken to date as part of a journey towards greater control of the tax base as there is 
“no representation without taxation” (ibid.).  
 
The issue of metro mayors was a particularly contentious one in the NE with diverging views 
between local authorities and business leaders. The politics of having a mayor in the NE were 
seen as significant partly because some in local government suspected it may lead onto 
further local government restructuring in five years’ time, and begin a process of taking 
powers away from local authorities to transfer to the mayor (Author’s interview 19, director, 
local authority 3, 2015). In the context of the changing nature of local government finance, 
the economic development challenge for some local authorities when faced with trying to 
deliver essential services and transform the city economically, was that they were more 
reliant on other funding streams at the city-region scale particularly if they were not going to 
generate significant returns through council and business rates. While the GM model of 
governance and devolution has acted as the trailblazer and paved the way for other city-
regions, it also creates challenges for other places when the roadmap for devolution is based 
on how GM is configured geographically and institutionally, 
“The implications of following a Manchester model for the North East was that you 
could not use the Association of North East Councils as a statutory body to devolve 
powers in the same way as the constituted Association of Greater Manchester 
Councils (AGMA), as it was an association of local authorities… the NE was actually 
working very nicely along those standard regional lines and all that went with it and I 
think we have struggled to cope as an outcome of that” (Author’s interview 32, 
director, North East local authority 6, 2015). 
 
In summary, this chapter has shown how the process and nature of centre-local relations in 
the context of decentralisation and localism to sub-national tiers and particularly cities, has 
changed in two prominent ways. First, the onus has been placed by central government on 
local areas to present a case (primarily economic) for the transfer of powers and resources 
based on criteria established and assessed by central government. Second, the process for 
doing this has been characterised by bilateral and secretive discussions which have enabled 
central government to retain control of the overall process and has increased competition 
between localities. The implications of this for individual places depends on the strength of 
existing and personal relationships and institutional capacity in places rather than creating a 
level playing field for all. Individual experiences of both GM and the NE both demonstrate 
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the limited knowledge, understanding and capacity within government to respond to and 
administer changes.  
 
7.2 Centre-local relations: Limited accountability, scrutiny and transparency 
The shifting landscape of sub national government and governance for economic 
development between 2010-2015 resulted in powers and resources both (re)centralised as 
well as decentralised to new local structures. This process of reconfiguring governance, 
powers and resources at the sub national level alongside the emergence of informal 
governance and deal-making created new challenges and a struggle for ensuring democratic 
accountability, scrutiny and transparency in decision-making. This unfolding and emerging 
picture led to credible, independent sources voicing concerns at both a local and national 
level on the transition (see inter alia: NAO, 2016; CLG Select Committee (2016); Committee 
of Public Accounts (2016); This section examines how these issues of accountability, 
scrutiny and transparency have emerged and been negotiated by central and local government 
teams and the implication for centre-local relations. 
A lack of democratic accountability was one of the main criticisms levelled at Regional 
Development Agencies by the Conservative government in the lead up to the 2010 General 
Election and formed part of the rationale for their abolition. As a quango, RDAs were 
vulnerable to criticism because of their unelected status and for the growing number of 
responsibilities and resources for economic development. despite having a constituted board 
with broad representation from trade unions, higher and further education, business and local 
government, to oversee decisions. Localism was presented by the Coalition government as 
the solution to this by decentralising powers to the local level, to neighbourhoods and local 
authorities.  
 
There are a number of issues to emerge from this to explore why this might be the case. First, 
the pace and design of the Coalition government’s decentralisation process for economic 
development has provided limited scope for reflection and debate and reinforced a centrally-
prescribed version of localism (see chapter 5). The Coalition government oversaw a process 
and timescale that left local teams both scrambling around to form new governance 
arrangements and respond to new funding calls while local authorities were also interpreting 
and implementing the reduced financial landscape. Across government, despite HM Treasury 
leading discussions and consulting with other departments, local teams in both the North East 
and Greater Manchester had experience of some departments unfulfilling or delaying 
implementation following the announcements.  
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However, as concluded by independent sources (e.g. Pike et al., 2016a; NAO, 2014), the hive 
of activity and announcements that unfolded particularly in the first few years of the 
Coalition’s administration, did not provide an overall framework and direction for 
decentralisation and devolution changes thereby providing limited scope for planning, 
monitoring and learning for individual places. Funding announcements were drip-fed and 
local teams were unable to discern how much funding was available overall and whether 
there would be further rounds. The implication of this is has been a centrally determined 
process which has not actively encouraged or created spaces for scrutiny and debate. The 
focus by the Coalition government has been on securing an announcement with limited time 
to reflect and to question as decisions are passed quickly with the detail to be developed later 
on. This has resulted in an accountability and scrutiny process for decisions and 
announcements that considers due diligence but does not create the space for wider and more 
inclusive discussion, particularly on the significant and variable implications of changes for 
local authorities, particularly as the risk is mainly transferred to local areas. 
For local authorities who already operate a scrutiny function as part of their democratic 
services, scrutiny of Combined Authorities become an extension of their local government 
scrutiny function but at the larger scale for the new responsibilities held. For the business 
representatives on the Local Enterprise Partnerships, public sector scrutiny was less familiar 
to them and required them to adapt to public sector practices placing individuals under 
greater scrutiny and exposure over collective decisions and personal interests. For local 
councils, the approach by central government did not reflect an appreciation for how local 
democracy works and the systems in place at the local government level for considering and 
implementing changes. A centrally-prescribed localism that expects local implementation of 
centrally-determined cuts with far-reaching implications by central government does not take 
into account that – in contrast to the parliamentary system of how central government is 
configured - local government is part of a local democracy and therefore not able to 
implement significant decisions in an executive fashion.   
As well as strengthening democratic decision-making, why this was important for local areas 
is because there were often several related changes taking place at once – reconfiguring 
powers and governance at the same time as implementing austerity with funding cuts to local 
government, and changing the nature of local government finance – which required 
developing an understanding of the totality of changes and scrutinising the implications for 
different places, often within short timeframe to respond. An example of this is the transfer of 
responsibility of funding cuts from national to the local level by HM Treasury stipulating that 
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proposals needed to have “fiscal neutrality”, so delivering services with less money and 
covering the costs of increased demands on services would be the task of local areas. As the 
then chancellor George Osborne set out: 
“These new powers must come with new responsibilities, as well as phasing out the 
main grant from Whitehall, to ensure the reforms are fiscally neutral.” (HM Treasury 
and The Rt Hon George Osborne, 2015, October 5).  
The centrally-determined approach to decentralisation process was seen as a technocratic and 
narrow process of reconfiguring powers and resources rather than mobilising local people. 
The pressure for greater democratic, local accountability has mostly come from citizens and 
civic actors and MPs who haven’t had a clear role in the deal-making process. 
“…if there is a deal to be struck they will strike it and they [local and central 
government] worry about the democratic process and consequences later” (Author’s 
interview 31, chief executive, think tank 2, 2015). 
An example of the lack of oversight by central government of the democratic accountability 
of new sub national governance arrangements is evident by concerns being raised by the 
National Audit Office (2016) on issues of transparency and LEP accountability as the LEPs 
took on greater responsibilities over economic priorities and investment including 
responsibility for the Local Growth Fund (Ward, 2016). The subsequent decision to make 
Combined Authorities the accountable bodies for LEPs as an afterthought, where they were 
in place, demonstrated the lack of planning and awareness of transferring accountability, as 
illustrated by  
“Broadly speaking at the moment, we are talking about a fairly technocratic process 
of devolution that doesn’t worry about the democratic side of things” (Author’s 
interview 11, leader, NE local authority 1, 2015). 
The devolved accountability system for capital provided authorities with substantial 
autonomy to develop investment strategies in line with local priorities and circumstances. 
However, this also meant that there was less understanding in central government of capital 
issues, trends and challenges across the local authority sector.  
Third, the main mechanism for ensuring there would be democratic accountability from new 
sub national arrangements would be through a democratically elected metro mayor.  The 
mostly negative outcome and low turnout in the 2012 city mayor referendum left a vacuum in 
the Coalition government’s plans for accountability.  
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The analysis of the two case studies in previous chapters and sections has shown that the 
absence of this function/critique has enabled Greater Manchester to move further and faster 
towards decentralisation while for the North East, this lack of clarity has slowed progress 
down, at least that is what it has been publicly attributed has also shown the lack of civic 
infrastructure at a sub national and local scale to provide this function.  
 
7.2.1 Greater Manchester: The politics of technocracy 
With its trailblazer status in devolution based on securing the first and subsequent devolution 
deals (see chapter 6.1.1), Greater Manchester local council leaders were the first to adapt and 
evolve accountability and scrutiny arrangements in line with new and shared responsibilities 
across public agencies, thereby also setting a precedence for other places. The advantage for 
GM as discussed in earlier chapters, was being able to configure new governance 
arrangements building on existing relationships through the GM Combined Authority and 
AGMA. However, as highlighted in the previous section the unfolding nature of 
decentralisation and devolution has also brought complexity to GM governance and 
communicating accountable and transparent decision-making to the public. 
 
With the stated ambition to ‘close the gap… and bring GM back to GM’ (Author’s interview 
46, leader, GM local authority 1, 2016) there has been significant effort invested in making 
the case to central government on the economic case and strong governance in place for 
transferring powers and resources to the GM level. GM has moved further and faster than 
anywhere else - agreeing four iterations of devolution deals, and the most significant powers 
with health and social care integration. While some senior officers in GM see benefits in a 
fast paced approach others working on devolution delivery see real challenges in 
implementing the vision within the timescales and question the reason for setting such a tight 
timeframe, with examples of pressured inclusion,  
“I genuinely think there is a positive about pace and momentum but it also means you 
don’t get the time to think it through. …Sign now or the whole deal falls over and you 
will be the one that costs GM the deal – that narrative has played out several times” 
(Author’s interview 47, chief executivem GM local authority 2, 2016). 
Part of the challenge in moving to a more inclusive and democratic process for devolution in 
GM has been a difference of opinion among local council leaders and chief executives as to 
what a democratic process consists of and the role of the public in the devolution process. Is 
it to secure a devolution deal on behalf of the people of Greater Manchester and engage them 
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instead on the detail of how it will be implemented, or should it be more inclusive giving GM 
residents the opportunity to vote on the content of the deal itself, particularly in the context of 
austerity and cuts to public services.  
“In calling for a referendum, “[it was] hard to fathom how something which is 
supposed to empower the people shouldn't involve them. People should be involved 
in a discussion about what devolution should look like, rather than being told 'This is 
what you're having, whether you like it or not” (BBC, 2015, quote by Stephen Hall, 
president of the Association of Greater Manchester Trade Unions Councils, and from 
the WUW campaign). 
Agreeing devolution deals with central government is not difficult, however holding them to 
account for implementing the deals has been more challenging. For a deal to be agreed it had 
to be backed by HM Treasury, but this also required bringing the rest of government along, 
“…so BIS, DWP, DFE in particular are difficult, DWP is horrific – I suppose getting 
the deal is not the hard bit, it is implementing it. Because in order to get the deal, 
George [Osborne] rocks up [and says] you’re going to do this. Then the ongoing 
dialogue is more difficult. But we are making progress” (Author’s interview 44, 
leader, GM local authority 6, 2016). 
 
With further iterations of devolution deals there has been increased public interest and 
discussion among civic organisations and citizens of GM of the powers and resources being 
negotiated, on who the decision-makers are, and on the implications of proposals. Most 
significantly, public attention has focused upon the decision taken by the ten local council 
leaders to have a directly elected Mayor for the city-region in exchange for the transfer of 
powers. The devolution agreement signed by the Chancellor and leaders of Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority on 3 November 2014 was for a directly elected city wide 
mayor with powers over transport, housing, planning and policing (HM Government, 
‘Manchester to get directly elected Mayor’, 3 November 2014). Among the further powers 
that were proposed included an invitation to develop a business plan for the integration of 
health and social care across Greater Manchester, based on control of existing health and 
social care budgets (ibid.).  
 
The decision by local council leaders to agree to a directly elected mayor in exchange for 
powers was picked up by civic actors in Greater Manchester and resulted in petition for a 
referendum to discuss the detail of the deal. This was particularly given the 2012 city mayor 
referendum in Manchester (along with the other nine largest cities in England) which saw the 
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electorate in Manchester voting against the proposal 53.2% to 46.8%, based on 24% turnout 
(BBC, 2012 ‘Nine cities reject elected mayors’). Some local actors and citizens criticised this 
unilateral decision by local leaders and argued that it should have had public consultation and 
scrutiny and be put to a “Greater Manchester wide referendum, before it or further devolution 
is implemented” adding,  
“Ordinary people must surely have the basic democratic right to be consulted, 
scrutinise, and have a say in ANY changes, welcome or otherwise, to the way they are 
governed, including on any regional 'devolution' proposal affecting them. This would 
include whether they actually want it or not, and if they do, such things as what region 
they might be part of, and what any "devolved" decision making powers and financial 
settlement might go with it” (Hall, ‘The People of Greater Manchester must have 
right to a say and vote on Devo Manc’).  
Local leaders who defended the decision suggested that devolution was in the interests of the 
people of Greater Manchester who would now be able to comment on the detail which would 
be of more relevance and interest to them, such as plans for school and bus routes rather than 
governance structures, 
“If you ask people about devolution – might have heard of it, might not. If you say do 
you want decisions to be made locally or made in Westminster, they want decisions to 
be made locally. I think the job of local politicians is to take those things that people 
say and turn them into the practicalities of it” (Author’s interview 46, leader, GM 
local authority 1, 2016).  
As the decision to have a directly-elected mayor was borne out of necessity to secure a deal, 
the proposed mayoral model by local leaders was a constrained model with the primary 
purpose to embed this position within existing decision-making structures to maintain the 
status quo, 
“…maintaining a one tier model is absolutely vital. It gives us a full-time pair of 
hands at GM level, we need that for all the things we are trying to do. But not in a 
way that is separated off from the 10 councils that are the other members of the CA” 
(Author’s interview 46, leader, GM local authority 1, 2016). 
 
Some local council senior officers and policy officers expressed a different view on the 
prospect of a mayor, than the approach that was put forward by the GM Combined Authority. 
Some districts, particularly those with greater underlying economic challenges, saw the 
mayoral role as an opportunity to disrupt the dominant political voices and agglomeration 
economics view in decision-making for GM. The alternative view expressed by some local 
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council representatives - confidentially in the author’s interviews - was that a mayor may, 
over time, offer an opportunity to break with the established ways of working and political 
leadership that have dominated in GM by those places with greater economic performance. 
Officers suggested that a metro mayor could offer an opportunity to do something different in 
GM but that this would probably only be realised in the second or third mayoral term 
(Author’s interview 28, director, GM local authority 5, 2015; Author’s interview 29, 
manager, GM local authority 3, 2015). The Interim Mayor, Tony Lloyd, who was previously 
the Police and Crime Commissioner, was voted in in June 2015 and operated in this 
embedded model. The devolution of responsibility for certain powers and resources at the 
GM level, particularly for health and social care, will present new challenges on who should 
be taking decisions, for example over a hospital, and who is accountable? (Author’s interview 
6, academic, London university, 2015). 
 
Of growing interest by local councils, voluntary and community organisations and citizens of 
Greater Manchester is understanding what the risks of devolution could be and how growth 
will be realised for different places across GM, particularly with the changes to local 
government finance. Some local council officials expressed concern over the lack of debate 
around the “real unintended consequences” from devolution on different groups of the 
population in GM as further responsibilities over a wider number of policy areas, such as 
health and social care integration and adult skills from 2019 are devolved to the GMCA and 
Elected Mayor (Author’s interview 47, chief executive, GM local authority 2, 2016). 
According to some local council officials, there is a real cocktail of challenge and opportunity 
at stake with potential school and hospital closures. This reflects a tension between different 
views that it is better to Centre of Excellence dotted around GM while districts have evidence 
showing that the ability and propensity of local people to travel, for example to work, is 
limited. 
 “I think the trajectory of Greater Manchester will be one of disillusioned on the North 
trench, more of the same in the centre and the south and tensions building up between 
the advantaged and the disadvantaged regions of Greater Manchester” (Author’s 
interview 49, academic, University of Manchester, 2016). 
 
7.2.2 North East: The politics of accountability  
In contrast to Greater Manchester, the North East Combined Authority comprising the seven 
local councils has not to date (as of September 2017) agreed a devolution deal with central 
government despite various attempts (see chapter 6.2.1). Arguments over democratic 
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accountability and trust have dominated devolution negotiations in the North East between 
local councils and business leaders and with central government, and internal disagreements 
and infighting have contributed to proposals being abandoned on more than one occasion.  
Recent political history in the North East suggests these issues are challenging and contested 
at this intermediate scale, which has seen a number of spatial imaginaries emerge over time. 
Following the resounding no vote in the 2004 Elected Regional Assembly, political 
accountability has been the “elephant in the room” (Author’s interview 14, leader, NE local 
authority 1, 2015), with little consensus on who should provide that leadership and where it 
can come from. 
 
What is interesting about issues of accountability, scrutiny and transparency under this recent 
episode of decentralisation and devolution is how they became tensions between local 
council and business leaders in the North East, as well as a point of contention in negotiations 
with central government. Learning from previous regional structures, the prioritisation of 
democratic accountability in joint decision-making depends on what else is happening in the 
economy, 
“You’ll get periods where democratic accountability is uppermost and crucially important 
and if it’s not democratically accountable through either MPs or local Councillors then 
it’s not worth doing. To almost a reaction to that saying we really need to choose some 
priorities here we need to get on with some action, unemployment is now 24%, in parts of 
the area and this is all taking too long and we need a development corporation with its 
own board who can cut through all this bureaucracy” (Author’s interview 11, former 
chief executive, NE level organisation 1, 2015). 
In terms of business stakeholders, they were less interested in discussions on structures, 
“Sounds a bit brutal, but if you talk to our members they say we don’t really care, we 
want to get something done and we want to have someone who we know who to 
speak to who can explain the impacts on business are. They want that level of 
accountability or consultation with the business community but they are not really 
concerned about what the structure is behind that” (Author’s interview 12, director, 
NE business representative organisation, 2015). 
 
The issues for the North East can be summarised as follows. First, the shift in scale from 
twelve local councils in the administrative geography of the North East to seven resulted in 
established scrutiny arrangements in the North East also being dismantled along with 
regional structures. The Regional Select Committee – a parliamentary committee of MPs 
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chaired by then Regional Minister for the North East, Nick Brown MP, had been established 
and was deemed to be effective, more so than other places (Author’s interview 14, leader, NE 
local authority 1, 2015). Below the regional level, there were Area Partnerships which 
included a range of stakeholders e.g. health, police and fire on decision-making boards, 
bringing together a range of public agencies to debate and scrutinise placed-based decisions. 
Instead of learning from and building on existing partnership formats the shift to a new North 
East administrative geography also resulted in rebuilding new sub national and local 
arrangements for scrutiny. 
“A lot of it is about that, if people have the ability to ask difficult questions it gives 
confidence to a wider group of people” (Author’s interview 32, director, NE local 
authority 6, 2015). 
Second, it can be argued that, the politics and, at times, hostile exchanges between civic 
leaders and some business leaders on the Local Enterprise Partnership over the content and 
process of devolution deals was a distraction from ensuring effective scrutiny and critical 
inquiry of the content, detail and implications of proposals. This was exacerbated by the tone 
of reporting in the local press. Scrutiny of the devolution proposals which led to a loss of 
momentum in the process or the abandoning of proposals was heavily criticised and viewed 
by certain business leaders as a deliberate intention to derail negotiations and reluctance to 
work with the Conservative Party, despite an uncertain context for the many contingent 
factors that deals were based on. As a result, local newspaper reporting was predominantly 
focused on the infighting between local actors rather than scrutinising proposals on critical 
issues to the North East such as cuts to resource equalisation as grant funding is phased out  
“There will be a net cut in social care funding next year. Where was this issue raised 
and debated? None of it was obvious…” (Author’s interview 43, former director, NE 
local authority 2, 2016). 
 
Third, the lack of clarity on the interrelationship between a LEP with growing responsibilities 
and the Combined Authority introduced later on, followed by the subsequent decision to 
make the LEPs accountable to Combined Authorities added to tensions in an already fraught 
relationship between local authorities and business leaders (see chapter 6.2.2),  
“So they [NE Combined Authority] say to the LEP, we’d like to make sure that you 
are doing things properly. Well what’s that got to do with you? We are the 
accountable body… so lots of tension in the past, but I do think that we are moving on 
in that” (Author’s interview 19, director, NE local authority 3, 2015). 
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The lack of trust between local councils and business leaders on matters of political 
leadership and collaboration along with limited consensus on the evidence on place priorities 
underpinning investment decisions (see chapter 5), presents challenges for any prospective 
mayor,  
“…how on earth can you get a mayor who legitimately has the interests of the whole 
region [urban and rural]? It’s a huge place” (Author’s interview 19, director, NE local 
authority 3, 2015).  
Furthermore, while local councils were familiar with establishing structures for public 
accountability the private sector are less so, so at first LEP structures did not follow this and 
meetings were often held in private, decisions were made outside of meetings and the level of 
scrutiny, accountability and transparency of decision-making wasn’t as high. The decision to 
make the LEP accountable to the NECA exacerbated an already difficult relationship. 
 
Fourth, the defining issue in North East devolution discussions has been the issue of whether 
to adopt a metro mayor as a condition of new powers and responsibilities. It became a 
divisive issue between local authorities as well as with business members on the NE LEP, 
and between local councils as well as time moved on. 
“I don’t think this is right that decision should come down to individual council 
leaders, and this looks like what happened in Manchester, I don’t think this is right, 
for individual council leaders to make a decision that is as far reaching as that on 
political structure…. For me there needs to be a mid-point somewhere or at least we 
involve the public and the advantage of that is that you can then explain things that 
are happening, why we are going in the direction we are, what things we are talking 
about, what functions, what powers.” (Author’s interview 14, leader, NE local 
authority 1, 2015).  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown how under the Coalition’s episode of decentralisation, 
the centre-local relationship became more pronounced following the dismantling of regions, 
the reductions to local government funding and rise of informal governance. The 
decentralisation process has also revealed variable support across government departments 
and ministers for devolving powers and local decision-making, with the challenge and 
associated risk of not implementing proposals passed on to local areas to work through. Deals 
and deal-making are characteristic of this episode of decentralisation which has led to uneven 
and decentralisation and devolution. It has also shaped informal governance. Another 
characteristic feature of this episode of decentralisation is that accountability and scrutiny of 
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changes to powers have struggled to keep pace with the unfolding of changes at times. At a 
national level this has manifested as retrospective assessments and independent assessments 
of impact after implementation, particularly of reductions to local government spend rather 
than upfront impact assessments. At a sub national level, the focus has been on a technocratic 
approach to accountability that addresses compliance and due diligence more so than civic 
engagement in democratic decision-making. This varies across places with the North East 
taking further steps to consult with the public on proposals while in GM it has been more 
closed. 
 
The main findings from this chapter are as follows. First, neither the local nor central state 
can be viewed as a single-minded entity and instead reflecting a myriad of different 
relationships and competing interests, which can enable or constrain progress. Second, the 
proliferation of bilateral deals and deal making between central and local government as the 
mechanism for transitioning powers and responsibilities became characteristic of this episode 
of decentralisation. While this represented a more significant downwards transfer of powers 
than under the previous Labour government, it needs to be viewed in the context of less 
funding overall and a lack of transparency overall in terms of how deals are negotiated. 
Third, accountability and scrutiny arrangements for new powers and responsibilities have 
struggled to keep pace with the shifting and uneven landscape of decentralisation and have 
focused on due diligence rather than creating opportunities for critical inquiry. 
 
In summary, despite steps towards greater localism in decision-making for city-regions, 
centrally prescribed localism and informal governance has continued to constrain the agency 
of local areas and has maintained a dependency on central government for decisions and 
accountability. 
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Chapter 8. The changing role and structure of the local state in economic 
development: conclusions and reflections 
 
This chapter synthesises the findings from this research, presents the theoretical and 
conceptual contributions the thesis is making, and offers reflections and limitations of the 
study to inform future research. 
 
The overall aim of the research was to examine the changing role and structure of the local 
state in new frameworks of government and governance for economic development and how 
this has unfolded differently across scales, places and actors. The main argument of the 
research – and its contemporary theoretical and policy relevance – is that local government 
remains a pivotal actor in the sub-national governance of economic development. In the 
context of what appears to be constant restructure and upheaval of the local state; local 
government, as suggested (Barnett, 2013), maintains a degree of permanence despite constant 
talk of its demise. This research demonstrates how local government has become more 
important in the context of decentralisation and austerity, but in new and changed forms.  
 
Attention to the different manifestations and configurations of the local state have grown with 
the burgeoning interest in city-regions and metropolitan forms of governance (e.g. Glaeser, 
2012; Nelles, 2012; OECD, 2012; Katz and Bradley, 2013; Ward, 2017), organised around 
functional economic areas and more relational understandings of space. This academic and 
policy literature also reflects diverging perspectives on sources and approaches to economic 
development and growth and the role and contribution of local institutions and forms of 
governance. The research was interested to explore territorial and relational perspectives of 
the local state to develop a better understanding of multi-level and multi-actor forms of 
government and governance for economic development.  
 
This study sought to make distinctive conceptual and theoretical contributions to both 
academic and policy understanding in a number of ways. First, to develop new insight on why 
institutions matter and how they influence the governance of economic development 
(Rafiqui, 2009; Farole, 2011; Pike et al., 2015) through a comparative study of how local 
states have adapted to new frameworks of government and government. Second, to provide a 
“richer account” (Rodrik 2003: 12) and more detailed understanding of local government in 
the local state in order to understand its unique role as a political institution and the political 
factors that “shape incentives for economic action” (Tomaney 2015: 6). Third, to draw on 
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empirical research to understand how new frameworks of government and governance have 
unfolded differently for city-regions in England to understand and explain the variation in 
governance and decentralisation outcomes (Gertler, 2010). Fourth, through a relational 
comparative approach to the analysis of cities (Ward, 2010), reveal the uneven ways in which 
the broader processes (e.g. of state rescaling) are mediated in particular city and city-regional 
contexts, drawing out the similarities and differences. Also, to provide a critical and in-depth 
analysis of the Greater Manchester model of governance that has shaped the Coalition 
government’s approach to decentralisation and devolution to cities - building on critical 
accounts including Ward et al. (2015) and Haughton et al. (2016), and of to sit alongside the 
many normative accounts of its success (cf. Emmerich et al., 2013; Holden and Harding, 
2015; OECD, 2015). The analysis of Greater Manchester together with a less successful 
example from the North East. Finally, to provide lessons on collaboration across the local 
state and relationship with the centre for future local governance experiments. 
 
 
8.1 Addressing the research questions: a summary of findings 
 
A number of research propositions were developed from the literature in order to inform the 
research questions and guide the study (see Section 2.5 ‘Research framework and questions’). 
The research propositions were important themes and arguments that were drawn from the 
review of the literature on local institutions, the local state and economic development and 
provided a conceptual framework to explore the role of local government in the local state. 
 
The review showed there were gaps in the literature in the following areas. First, despite a 
greater recognition of the role and contribution of local institutions to economic development 
and growth – and particularly to addressing uneven development - precisely why and how this 
happens is less understood (Martin, 2000; Rafiqui, 2009; Pike at al., 2015). Second, that there 
are important insights to be made on the role of political institutions in this development 
process (Helpman, 2004; Tomaney, 2013) because of how their qualities and capacities shape 
the activity of other actors and economic outcomes. Third, the local state is increasingly 
drawing in and upon a range of different civic actors and interests engaged in urban 
governance (Ward et al., 2015; Wills, 2016) but that local government is a unique and 
distinctive actor among local actors (Kateb, 1981; Musson, 2010; Lobao and Adua, 2011; 
Sullivan, 2011). The remainder of this section addresses the research questions and 
summarises the findings of the study.  
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8.1.1 Question 1: What is the local state’s role in the sub-national governance of 
economic development and how is it shaped by new and dominant approaches to local 
and regional development? 
The first research question sought to understand and explain the local state’s changing role in 
the governance of economic development in relation to new and dominant approaches to 
local and regional development and how these exogenous forces were negotiated and 
implemented locally. The aim was to explore the autonomy and agency of the local state and 
the extent that it is shaped by approaches to growth and territorial competition. 
The analysis identified the renewed international academic and policy interest in cities as 
vehicles of growth as well as the diverging perspective on sources of growth and the role of 
institutions in enabling and facilitating growth (Pike and Tomaney, 2009). This showed that 
theories of Urban Economics and agglomeration economies (e.g. World Bank, 2009; Glaeser, 
2012), that concentrate growth activity in urban cores and focus policy interventions on 
supply-side measures to connect people to this growth, dominated cities thinking by national 
governments. This was in contrast to more place-based approaches to growth that focused on 
measures to unlock and harness growth in all regions (OECD, 2012). The analysis showed 
that these were not only exogenous forces and trends shaping and imposing these approaches 
to growth and development on localities, but that the narrative and discourse was also being 
developed by the cities themselves to make a stronger case for greater autonomy in a national 
context, given its traction with central governments. These findings chimed with the 
aforementioned works of Brenner and Wachsmuth (2012) and Newman (2014) who discuss 
the more successful places as those who build alliances and linkages across space in such a 
way as to mitigate if not challenge hegemonic dynamics of neoliberalism and inter-local 
competition. This challenge was exercised through the Core Cities network, providing a 
counter balance to growth and investment in London and the South East, which both 
Manchester and Newcastle were part of and highlighting the power of interurban networks 
(Leitner, 2004). 
The empirical research of the English context showed how a renewed policy focus on cities 
and city-regions as the preferred sub-national scale of governance for economic development 
based on external economies of agglomeration had been enacted and mobilised by local and 
central government actors and, in turn, this has shaped an unfolding geography of 
institutional variation in England. Manifestations of this included the Northern Powerhouse 
  178 
initiative seeking to connect cities and labour markets in the North and the decision by some 
city-regions to opt for a directly-elected metro mayor governance at this scale. Under the 
Coalition government, the local state for economic development consisted of business-led 
Local Enterprise Partnerships across the whole country and for some city-regions, Combined 
Authorities reflecting groupings of local authorities with statutory responsibilities.  
The analysis of the two case studies provided detailed understanding of how this process and 
transition to new arrangements had unfolded unevenly in city-regions with different 
economic geographies and structure and with varied experience and history of collaborating 
at the city-region scale. The analysis revealed a number of findings. First, rather than a 
fundamental shift in rescaling powers to cities and the local level, the changes represented a 
continuation of the transfer of powers to cities seen under the Labour administration, with 
increased bilateral deal-making, and an acceleration of concentrating growth around 
particular urban cores. While both case studies were previously City Regional Development 
Pilots, Greater Manchester had also invested in building up evidence on how the GM 
economy functioned as an agglomeration economy through the Manchester Independent 
Economic Review, based on the economy of the ten districts who also had a long history of 
working together. The spatial policy focus on agglomeration economies as the preferred 
model of development and associated governance at this scale enabled those city-regions 
already configured in this way, like GM, to capitalise on this and create a saleable proposition 
to government for the devolution of greater powers. For the NE with multiple and competing 
economic centres and a more diverse mix of urban and rural areas in the newly formed city-
region, it was more challenging to prioritise the location of economic activity and develop 
city-region governance accordingly. This was revealed by the tensions between local 
authorities as well as with some business representatives in the NE Local Enterprise 
Partnership.  
Second, the focus on functional economic areas as the preferred scale to organise economic 
development and growth activity created some confusion and conflict between the centre and 
local levels in the centrally-determined process to define and approve new geographies. This 
resulted in uneven transitions for city-regions to establish Local Enterprise Partnerships based 
on their history of collaborating at this level. A more critical take on the approach to growth 
in the two case studies showed how this was being challenged. In GM, despite individual 
districts recognising the wider economic benefits of investing in the urban core of GM, there 
was mounting evidence to question and challenge the assumptions on how those benefits 
would be realised outside of the growth centres. In the NE, there was deep suspicion from 
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some local authorities within the Combined Authority that investing in a city-region approach 
and model would result in additional benefits to Newcastle at the expense of other localities. 
In contrast to GM, the economic linkages and interdependencies were less understood and 
accepted in the North East.  
Third, the interviews in GM uncovered concerns about the economic strategy and approach 
to growth being pursued and the extent to which expected benefits were being realised 
outside of the core areas of investment. The challenging financial outlook and impact on a 
wider range of services for local authorities in outlying districts was leading some to question 
the assumptions underpinning this model. With the focus on creating a technocratic process 
for determining activity and investment in GM, the political objectives behind economic 
arguments were less clear. In summary, the analysis showed the importance of examining 
political and economic arguments together to understand and explain how changes to the 
local state have unfolded. 
 
8.1.2 Question 2: ‘What characterises and explains the government’s programme of 
changes to the sub-national governance of economic development?’ 
The second research question examined how the global trend of political and administrative 
decentralisation to cities and city-regions was interpreted and implemented by the Coalition 
government and how it informed new frameworks of government and governance for 
economic development. This was to understand and explain how the process of 
decentralisation unfolded differently across scales, places and actors.  
The analysis showed that the Coalition government had configured and implemented their 
approach by orchestrating a crisis narrative to take forward a programme of deficit reduction 
and restructuring of the local state, at the same time as reasserting the role and 
responsibilities of local government in the governance of economic development. This 
formed part of their localist vision following the dismantling of regions and would be realised 
through new institutional forms and based on grouping of local authorities and businesses and 
the shift from local government grant funding to growth-incentivised funding mechanisms. 
There were a number of findings to emerge from this analysis. First, the type and nature of 
decentralisation and devolution that shaped new frameworks of government and governance 
for economic development was the outcome of political choices and central imposition of 
changes with complicit local actors. The political choices that framed changes to sub-national 
governance included an ideological shift away from regions as a focus for economic 
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development policy, a decision to reduce the deficit through spending cuts rather than tax 
rises, and that these cuts would be front-loaded, rather than gradual thereby creating an 
austerity state (Blyth, 2011; Schäfer and Streeck 2013) and reinforcing neoliberal tendencies 
of helping the strongest first (Peck, 2012). These decisions were deeply political. As 
demonstrated in independent analyses (e.g. NAO, 2012), cuts to local government fell 
disproportionately on metropolitan areas which were mostly Labour-led, and in parallel the 
Coalition immediately removed legacy funding for urban regeneration targeted at the most 
deprived areas, described by one interviewee as “Labour money for Labour areas” (Author’s 
interview 43, former director, NE local authority 2, 2016). At one point, the Coalition 
government made additional funding available to local authorities based on a formula that 
benefitted the lesser-hit Conservative local authorities. This accords with Pike and 
Tomaney’s (2009) finding that particular states may give a different weight to specific forms 
of decentralisation and design them in ways which encourage or inhibit the capacities of 
institutional actors, making “profoundly political choices” about the future character of the 
state (McCarthy et al. 2012:127). This question was concerned with making explicit the way 
political institutions interpret exogenous developments in terms of political dilemmas, and 
that lead to governance reforms (Bevir, 2004) 
Second, there were a number of contradictions in the Coalition’s localist approach 
reminiscent of what Brenner and Theodore (2002) referred to as “a revival of the local” as 
intergovernmental relations were reconfigured in the context of localism. Examples from the 
research showed that Coalition ministers directly intervened in the decision of local areas to 
form functional economic areas, in the aftermath of abolishing regions they recentralised a 
number of functions, and the centre maintained a role approving local projects despite 
devolved funding such as the Regional Growth Fund. Third, the reassertion of local 
government in economic development took place in the context of local government as a 
sector absorbing a significant proportion of overall departmental savings. Therefore, the 
enhanced responsibilities in economic development as a non-statutory function of local 
government took place at the same time as the capacity and capability of local authorities to 
deliver their statutory functions was being tested, illustrating how austerity has reduced the 
agency and autonomy of local government (Meegan et al., 2014). 
Analysis of the two case studies showed that while they were both disproportionately affected 
by the funding cuts, Greater Manchester responded opportunistically to these changes and 
consolidated collaboration at the GM scale. Conversely, the North East initially had a 
tendency to retrench and focused more on self-preservation than collaboration at the new 
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scale because of the national politics of cuts and a resistance among politicians to work with 
the Conservative government. Also because of the lack of clarity and consensus on leadership 
and who was taking decisions in the newly formed Local Enterprise Partnership. Greater 
Manchester local authorities used the crisis narrative and economic focus of the Coalition 
government to create a fiscal imperative to do things differently in order to reduce the deficit 
to the public finances in GM, by reforming public services and reducing expenditure 
alongside the focus on economic growth to boost local tax revenues. Presenting the case in 
the Coalition’s terms and language helped GM to build up credibility with ministers. Local 
authorities in the NE were more political in their response to the changes, highlighting how 
the reduced resources undermined efforts to grow the economy. This created tensions 
between local authority leaders and the business representatives on the NE LEP who 
acknowledged the challenge of reduced resources but at the same time were also trying to set 
out an ambition and vision of growth for the North East. Critical to developing a finer-grain 
understanding and explaining the different governance outcomes for the two case studies was 
adopting an institutional perspective that considers complex political dynamics (Nicholls, 
2005; Koch, 2013) and looking beyond “the economic determinism of state rescaling” to 
examine the political struggles, actors and interests (Le Galès, 2006). This helped to uncover 
and explain the spatial, scalar and temporal implications of rescaling (Donald et al., 2014; 
Meegan et al., 2014). 
In summary, these findings highlight the conflicting perspectives held by the Coalition on 
role and purpose of local government and how it should be resourced in new frameworks of 
government and governance for economic development. This was particularly the case given 
the variable capacity, resources and mandate of some local state actors, for example the 
LEPs, to take on and be accountable for powers and resources.  
 
8.1.3 Question 3: ‘How and why have changes to powers and resources unfolded 
differently across and between scales, actors and places?’ 
The third research question sought to examine and explain how local institutions and city-
region collaboration are constructed over time and how these processes are reconfigured and 
negotiated in new frameworks of government and governance for economic development. 
Lowndes (2009) had previously described there being no necessary association between the 
emergence of local governance and any increase in local autonomy. This was how it unfolded 
in the English context, with the establishment of new governance structures for economic 
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development not necessarily leading to increased political or financial autonomy, and this 
decision being at the discretion of central government in what was an opaque and unclear 
process. 
The research showed that coordination and alignment were important to configuring and 
implementing new frameworks of government and governance for economic development 
across city-region scales and by the actors involved reinforcing findings by inter alia Hooghe 
and Marks (2003); Büchs (2009); Nelles (2012); OECD (2012); Ahrend (2014). However, 
effective coordination and alignment were not sufficient to counter the politics of local 
growth within the new local authority groupings where the individual benefits of being part 
of a larger geography were less understood and thereby affected the level of support for and 
investment in new scales.  
Addressing this research question led to a number of findings. Applying North’s distinction 
(North, 2005) of institutions (rules of the game) and organisations (players of the game) to 
examine the interaction between the two, showed that the scope of interaction between 
institutions and organisations in GM was narrow and based around a small number of elite 
local actors with a fixed interpretation of economic development and growth objectives. This 
reflected path dependency of existing collaborations and ways of working in GM and 
contributed to ‘political lock-in’ (Hassink, 2007) of a particular approach that was resistant to 
adaptation and different interpretations of the approach to growth. Conversely, in the NE, the 
scope of interaction between institutions and organisations was less organised between a 
contested set of formal institutions with limited history and success of building informal 
institutions – relationships, informal networks – at this scale, and a disparate group of local 
economic actors with diverse and competing interests and no leadership or consensus to 
progress. The notion of ‘institutional regimes’ (Pike et al., 2015) of the two cases provided a 
useful conceptual framework to examine how economic behaviours and outcomes are 
shaped. 
For GM the analysis showed that their former structures and informal practices were more 
akin to these new institutions and were therefore more recognised and owned by local actors 
requiring less of an institutional shift. The informal institutions – the norms, relationships and 
informal networks – were therefore still relevant and could be built upon which was essential 
for trust between actors as well (Fukuyama, 2000). For the North East, local actors saw the 
formal institutions as something that was imposed (LEP) and developed elsewhere 
(Combined Authority model). Without a commitment to translate “imagined coherence”, for 
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example understanding the new economic geography in the North East Independent 
Economic Review, into “material coherence”, for example GM embedding the plan in 
districts and mirroring GM structures locally, there was limited interaction in the NE between 
formal and informal institutions to make the new scale meaningful (Jones and Woods 2013: 
39). This episode under the Coalition government saw an accelerated de-territorialisation of 
geographically bounded scales and re-territorialisation around functional economic areas 
(Koch, 2013). 
In practice, informal institutions can also be negative reinforcement of formal institutions. 
Both case studies illustrate “political lock-in (Hassink, 2007) with resistance from dominant 
actors to new ways of working and alternative approaches to growth (GM) and preserving 
existing traditional structures and sovereignty to slow down or prevent governance 
restructuring (NE).  
In summary, the analysis showed that in practice, institutional and governance coordination 
and capacity are (continuously) attempted by the actors involved through power, politics and 
funding mechanisms and incentives. Local historical and political legacies play a crucial role 
in shaping these processes and this research shows that the nature of conflicts can also be 
explained by historical geographical factors.  
 
8.1.4 Question 4: ‘What do these changes mean for centre-local relations in the sub-
national governance of economic development?’ 
This final research question critically reflected on how centre-local relationships have been 
reconfigured in this latest episode of decentralisation and localism and on the implications for 
sub-national governance and the local state. 
The analysis showed that, in the context of what can be interpreted as a ‘centrally-prescribed 
localism’, the Coalition’s episode of decentralisation and devolution has witnessed a more 
assertive centre with a key governance relationship with the local level as regions were 
abolished and new sub-national relationships were formed. This reflects a readjustment 
between different levels of government rather than a scaling back or weakening of, 
particularly, the nation state’s powers (Shaw and MacKinnon 2011: 28; Jessop, 2002; 
Goodwin et al., 2005; Jessop, 2000). 
This new sub-national framework of government and governance has provided some new 
opportunities for local decision-making but within a constrained context of a reduction in 
  184 
funding and the changing nature of local government finance. The UK’s centralised system 
for local government finance limits and constrains the scope for real localism and significant 
decentralisation as it results in powers without resources and reinforces the subordinate status 
of local government. The notion of ‘filling in’ governance with new organisational forms 
(Shaw and MacKinnon, 2011) – alongside the more familiar idea of ‘hollowing out’ – can 
reflect both the central state’s continued involvement in local decisions as well as relations 
between scales and practicing informal governance, known as “relational filling in” (ibid; see 
also Clifford and Morphet, 2014). This episode of decentralisation witnessed both ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ steering (Martin and Guarneros-Meza 2013: 585) of city-region governance by central 
government in both explicit (e.g. City Deal awards) and implicit (e.g. funding formulas and 
criteria for additional funding) ways. Despite responsibilities handed over with reduced or no 
resources thereby transferring the risk of delivering services to local authorities and the 
Combined Authorities, most of those interviewed maintained the view that it was better to 
have greater responsibility through devolution, as local areas were better placed to determine 
needs and set priorities. Some incremental and modest reforms have been put in place e.g. 
Business Rates Retention scheme, and precepts on Council Tax for Infrastructure investment 
and social care.  
This question uncovered a number of issues. First, neither the local nor central state can be 
viewed as a single-minded entity and resulting in a myriad of different relationships and 
competing interests between ministers, central departments and local actors (Pike and 
Tomaney, 2009). The strength of these individual and personal relationships and connections 
can enable or constrain progress and opportunities, but for local areas with limited 
connections and political capital it is much more difficult to navigate and influence the 
process. Greater Manchester’s personal connections in government helped the city-region to 
build credibility and facilitated dialogue particularly with the Chancellor and HM Treasury. 
But they were not always as successful in influencing other departments particularly when it 
came to implementation. Second, bilateral deals and deal-making between central and local 
government and city-region teams to negotiate new powers and responsibilities are 
particularly characteristic of this episode of decentralisation. While this has resulted in a 
more significant transfer of powers and responsibilities to cities and city-region than under 
the previous Labour administration, there is less funding overall as well as declining capacity 
in local government. The lack of transparency in the Coalition’s approach to decentralisation 
and devolution has reinforced informal governance practices through secretive negotiations. 
Third, accountability and scrutiny arrangements for new powers and responsibilities have 
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struggled to keep pace with the shifting and uneven landscape of decentralisation. This has 
led to a scrutiny focus on due diligence but less opportunity for wider discussion with civic 
actors on choices and implications, which may change with metro-mayors. In summary, 
despite steps towards greater localism in decision-making for city-regions, centrally-
prescribed localism and informal governance has continued to constrain the agency of local 
areas and maintained a dependency on central government for decisions and accountability.  
 
In conclusion, the findings from the research questions show that despite a restructuring of 
responsibilities from the local to the sub-national and central state, and a rescaling of 
austerity to the local state; local government remains a pivotal actor in economic 
development but in new and changed institutional forms, which is discussed further below. 
 
 
8.2 The local state and economic development: conceptual and theoretical 
contributions 
 
The findings discussed in the section above point to number of theoretical and conceptual 
contributions the thesis can make based on the research. These contributions draw on the 
underpinning literature in this research (8.2.1 and 8.2.2) as well as those relating to the UK 
context (8.2.3 and 8.2.4). 
 
8.2.1 Local government remains a pivotal actor in the local state in the governance of 
economic development but in new and changed forms 
 
This first contribution argues that despite a renewed rescaling of economic development 
responsibilities from the local and regional level to city-region or metropolitan scales 
(OECD, 2012; Katz and Bradley, 2013; Ahrend et al., 2014), and an increasing number of 
local state actors involved in the governance of economic development (Nelles, 2012); local 
government remains a pivotal actor in new frameworks of government and government for 
economic development and changed forms of local government finance.  
 
This claim builds on the work of Koch (2013) who observes a shift in metropolitan 
governance, from governance to government, as the importance of formal rules to interact, 
make decisions and offer reliability, become clear. But the claim does not share Koch’s view 
that the return to government is a conscious move by the state to extend the ‘shadow of 
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hierarchy’ in governance mechanism. Instead, the empirical research showed in this case that 
the establishment of business-led LEPs by central government was seen as a step to scale 
back central government’s control, along with proposals for a mayor. The research supports 
the argument for a qualitative perspective of the state that considers multiplicity of state 
structures and practices (MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010) in the context of uneven development 
(Pike and Tomaney, 2009), rather than fixating on the scale or extent of intervention. The 
review of the literature showed that analyses of urban governance can overlook the role and 
contribution of local government as an economic actor in local state configurations. 
 
The analysis supports this contribution in a number of ways. First, the empirical research 
confirmed the importance of democratic accountability and transparency for governance 
mechanisms particularly as powers, responsibilities and funding for economic development 
became multiple and complex across scales and actors. Specifically, local government is a 
key institution in representative democracy through which many channels of accountability 
flow. In networked accountability, this is less clear (Aars and Fimreite, 2005). Second, 
analysis of the two case studies shows how local authorities in city-region governance 
arrangements can both enable partnership and effective governance (Greater Manchester) as 
well as disrupt and disable collaborative working (North East). Despite achieving effective 
outcomes in terms of strengthening credibility and responsibilities of the main governance 
mechanisms for economic development, the Greater Manchester case shows the power of 
local authorities to dominate multi-actor and multi-level governance leading to ‘political 
lock-in’ (Hassink, 2007) based on a particular set of ideas and approaches. The North East 
case study shows how a lack of understanding and appreciation of the respective roles, 
objectives and responsibilities of state and non-state actors and an agreed approach to 
governing can result in conflict. Third, and more practically, in both cases the governance 
partnerships relied on the capacity of local authorities and their funding to coordinate activity 
and collaboration, undertake analysis, to bring other partners around the table and to manage 
the relationship with the centre. The continuing declining capacity of the state however 
means that this is not necessarily sustainable, as discussed by Meegan et al. (2014). The 
analysis showed that state rescaling is occurring horizontally at the city-regional scale and 
vertically in city-region deals with the national level. 
Examining the unique features of local government as discussed in Section 2.2.1 and 
exploring these in the research interviews provided further insight, also on the qualities and 
capacities of political institutions in economic development (Tomaney, 2013). The unique 
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features of local government were seen as both opportunities and challenges. First it 
highlighted how the public missions of justice and equality were being overlooked and 
eroded by the central state in favour of pursuing economic growth. A challenge for local 
government is managing the dual objectives of democratic representation and administration 
in implementing local and central objectives. Second, that in ‘governing the mix’ (Sullivan, 
2011) local government is able to control who is involved and how, rather than moving 
towards and enabling, facilitating role of local actors. Third, as with earlier conceptualisation 
of urban governance and regime theory (Stone, 1987; Harding, 1994; Ward, 1996), the role 
of power and individuals in urban coalitions is also relevant in the analysis of groupings of 
local authorities in the local state. The criticisms of accountability and unrepresentativeness 
of LEPs from with city-regions as well as independent sources, reinforced the position of 
elected and accountable actors in local government to take decisions on spending and powers. 
Finally, the way local government is funded longer term will have implications for these 
unique roles. 
 
8.2.2 Local government and centre-local relations remain critical to multi-actor and 
multi-level governance arrangements  
This thesis contribution states that multi-level and multi-actor conceptualisations of the local 
state are critical to explain local government’s role in contemporary sub-national governance 
and in relation to other actors operating across and between different scales. This is in order 
to examine how and why the autonomy and agency of the local state to pursue economic 
development powers and resources is contingent upon the roles of local and central 
government and their interrelations. Even in a centralised state like the UK, the practice of 
informal governance and the greater involvement of a range of local actors in city-region 
governance and with democratic demands to connect with citizens, requires a more pluralistic 
approach to the analysis of the local state.   
This contributes to the growing literature on intermunicipal cooperation (cf. Nelles, 2012; 
Ahrend and Schumann, 2014) by recommending that examining frameworks of both 
government and governance simultaneously recognises the role that local government plays 
within a broader multi-level and multi-actor context. This case for analysing multi-level and 
multi-actor frameworks is further reinforced by examining the relational geography of cities 
and how they are implicated in each other’s development (Ward, 2010), as demonstrated by 
the influence of the GM model of governance and economic decentralisation on other cities. 
Also by examining central government in these frameworks it is possible to understand the 
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role of the centre in shaping the outcomes of different cities through vertical autonomy that 
facilitates and constrains political action (Pierre, 2014) and through spatial selectivity, such 
as the preferred GM model of governance and devolution.  
There are two findings, in particular, this research makes which supports this claim. First, in 
conceptualising the local state for economic development governance – that is those actors 
represented on decision-making structures - the role and responsibilities of the central state 
are often largely undefined and unaccounted for, despite being critical to the agency and 
autonomy of the local state. This research has found that by not making transparent the 
contingencies of the local state on the central state this can undermine local agency and 
autonomy as well preventing the centre being held to account for implementing commitments 
to resources and implementation. Further to this, without a clear framework for central 
involvement it is difficult to understand the impact of individual changes on the whole 
system and achieving parity of outcomes across different city-regions, responding to 
arguments on what constitutes fairness. Second, the trend is for more integrated approaches 
to economic development across different policy areas and geographies (see 8.2.4) and more 
open and ‘bottom up’ approaches to collaboration and governance giving a greater number of 
local actors a stake in determining priorities and investment. This places increased demands 
on multi-actor governance approaches to represent and negotiate a more diverse range of 
interests, determine how this will be coordinated and by whom, and link back to democratic 
representation. In summary, the research has shown how a lack of clarity and uncertainty on 
the terms of decentralisation and associated funding streams can act a barrier to local areas. 
Making these conditions and underpinning assumptions more open and explicit would enable 
local areas to better assess the opportunities and potential risks.  
 
 
8.2.3 A centrally-prescribed version of localism has constrained the agency of the local 
state to deliver governance and development outcomes 
Third, the commitment to decentralisation and localism was not shared or implemented 
across all central government departments. This contribution refers to the need to closely 
scrutinise claims about decentralisation and the powers and resources involved as elements of 
both centralisation and decentralisation are typically evident, especially in highly centralised 
systems like the UK and England. This is to understand and explain the uneven outcomes of 
localities through this process.  
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The analysis of the literature showed that localism is narrowly defined and comes in different 
forms and with variegations – including different objectives and how it is implemented – 
which is not sufficiently examined. There is a long and varied history of localism in England 
which has seen powers and resources shift between scales and particularly to cities. Despite 
incremental shifts and various sub-national experiments and imaginaries (see Section 3.2.1), 
the post-war trend overall has been creeping centralisation (Travers and Esposito, 2003; Jerry 
White, 2005: Pike et al. 2012; Wills, 2016). The Coalition’s decision to rebalance powers 
away from central government to local areas was a central pillar of their decentralisation 
approach, yet their approach to localism was centrally-prescribed and contradictory. In 
practice, the design and implementation of changes to powers and resources under 
decentralisation – as well as lack of – has shaped how this process has unfolded differently 
for places and resulted in uneven governance outcomes. 
 
The analysis showed that local states were not only shaped by the type and nature of 
decentralisation and localism on offer, but also how these changes were implemented. The 
overriding objective shaping decentralisation and localism changes was reducing the deficit 
and austerity. In particular, a process and form of politics which resulted in deep and rapid 
reductions to local government funding, and the rescaling the financial crisis to the urban 
scale in relation to cuts to local government funding. This builds on Peck (2012) and Meegan 
et al.’s (2014) analysis of austerity urbanism and urban politics and chimes with Will’s 
(2016) top-down notion of localism, where central government devolves power, authority and 
responsibility to lower-level institutions. 
 
First, local areas were to define and determine the scale of the new Local Enterprise 
Partnerships based on functional economic areas yet the empirical research showed that 
Coalition ministers intervened in determining the scale of the new LEP in the North East. 
Second, the Coalition argued to rebalance away from ‘big government’ to ‘big society’ as 
part of their critique and cutbacks of local government without having an understanding of 
the variable landscape and capacity of civic actors and communities across the country 
(Section 5.1). Third, in addition to offering a centrally-prescribed version of localism, by 
reducing funding to local authorities and changing the nature of local government finance 
going forward, this has placed further restrictions and constraints on local areas. In the North 
East, the insistence on a metro-mayor as part of devolution deals has prevented local leaders 
in progressing a deal to unlock powers and resources. In contrast, being the trailblazer and 
example of the preferred model of devolution has enabled GM to secure an initial plus three 
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subsequent Devolution Deals. However, it has also prevented district-led intra-GM coalitions 
from negotiating direct with government who insisted on working with the GM scale. In a 
centralised economy such as the UK where there is no sub-national constitutional framework 
or settlement; the ability of the local government to influence and resist the changes 
implemented by the national government is minimal. Without a clear framework or indication 
of what the overall settlement would look like it was challenging for places to participate and 
for outcomes to be evaluated. 
 
 
8.2.4 Economic development has become further integrated with social policy through 
austerity and funding cuts 
This emerging contribution finds that a more explicit link between economic and social 
policy has emerged under decentralisation to city-regions and encourages conceptualisation 
of connecting and overlapping of formerly separate economic and social spheres of state 
activity. The analysis of the literature showed a broadening field of economic development 
policy in the context of urban governance and the empirical work showed that there was 
greater awareness and experimentation of integration at the local rather than national level.  
 
This dimension of the process has had surprisingly little attention in the literature but it has 
emerged as a distinctive feature of the UK context under decentralisation and devolution. In 
this case, integration has primarily occurred as a product of the centralised nature of central 
government funding and focus on economic growth objectives. The transition to a 
Schumpeterian Workfare State (Section 2.3) which has focused on the promotion of 
innovation and competitiveness, has witnessed social policy now more geared and linked to 
economic policy and its focus upon economic competitiveness and growth. The analysis 
demonstrates how this has manifest sub-nationally, at the city-region level. 
 
Changes to local government finance under this latest episode of decentralisation now require 
local authorities to generate growth locally to pay for their statutory social services. Given the 
uneven growth prospects and varying levels of demand on services, this raises profound 
questions of redistribution and fairness that need further attention.  
 
The empirical analysis has shown that the greater integration of economic development and 
social policy occurred in two ways. First, this integration was developed through the primacy 
of economic objectives. GM was central to developing this new narrative around addressing 
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growth and public service reform in tandem in order to tackle the deficit in public finances 
and become a ‘surplus city’ making a positive contribution to the national exchequer. GM’s 
analysis showed that despite savings through funding cuts the overall public sector cost had 
not reduced. Second, this integration has been shaped through the shifting nature of local 
government finance. The reduction in grant funding along with a move toward growth-
incentivised funding combined with increased pressure on funding statutory social services 
created a dependency for local authorities to fulfil their statutory duties through economic 
growth. This was part of central government’s fiscal localisation and devolution plan. 
There are a number of implications to highlight from this greater integration between 
economic and social objectives. The integration of economic and social policy through a 
growth and reform approach to decentralisation in England has made local government’s role 
in the local state more important, as a local institution with both economic and social 
responsibilities and levers. The shift to growth funding as the main source of revenue for 
local authorities along with local government represented on LEPs and comprising Combined 
Authorities has confirmed local government’s role and responsibilities as an economic actor. 
The case for investment in social objectives is increasingly made in economic terms rather 
than as a welfare state provision. Under the public service reform agenda, social objectives 
are argued on basis of economic returns and efficiency rather than automatic provision of 
welfare. Social reform becomes driven by efficiency and cost savings. 
 
8.3 Reflections and limitations 
This thesis has examined the changing role and structure of the local state in new frameworks 
of government and governance for economic development. The research began in October 
2011, 16 months into the Coalition government’s administration and examined a five-year 
period from the General Election in 2010. This was a dynamic period which saw the 
unfolding and reconfiguring of policies for the governance and finance of economic 
development at different scales. Policies for economic development and the shift the from 
regions to sub-national arrangements were announced at the same time as extensive 
reductions to local government budgets and while questions on the overall impact of these 
changes were raised it was very difficult to assess and understand the cumulative effect of the 
changes and how they might impact differently on places within an unfolding context. Over 
the course of the administration more substantive and independent inquiries were established 
to examine these changes but despite concerns raise, including on the future viability of local 
government, there was limited disruption to the government’s intended course of action, to 
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reduce the deficit. This research adds to this body of critique by providing a detailed and 
critical account of changes to the governance of economic development, not just on the 
decisions and policies but also on the process and way these were implemented, from the 
local perspective. Following all of this through to assessment and evaluation of its outputs, 
outcomes and impacts has not been possible in the timescale for the study. 
 
Reflecting on the research, there are a number of aspects of the study which worked well. 
First, the good relationship with the core case study and collaborative partner, Newcastle City 
Council, was helpful to refine the research aims, objectives and questions and to iteratively 
reflect on what was emerging from the interviews as part of the ‘extended methods’ (Barnes 
et al., 2007) approach, and to keep the research policy-relevant. Second, the comparative 
approach was critical to reflecting on the experience and approach of both case studies in 
addition to how the overall process was configured by central government. Third, detailed 
insights captured through the in-depth interviews validated the research design and approach 
taken, through a relational comparative approach (Ward, 2010). This was particularly the 
case in Greater Manchester which is most likely due to the city-region being further ahead in 
the decentralisation and devolution process (they have secured initial and further devolution 
deals whereas the North East is yet to secure one), also having a longer history of 
collaboration at this scale to reflect on whereas the North East was in the – at times, 
politically sensitive - process of forming and embedding new arrangements. Third, the timing 
of the research, while challenging to maintain both a watching brief of unfolding events and 
strategic overview of the direction of changes, proved to be critical to understanding and 
challenging both cases. 
 
There were also a number of challenging aspects to delivering the research. The broadening 
definition of economic development under decentralisation and devolution and integration 
with social objectives and other growth area policies for urban governance such as planning, 
made it difficult to set parametres around the economic development focus of the study 
which could have adopted a broader definition to ‘local growth’ policies. More practically, 
maintaining momentum in the research over a period of maternity leave and part-time study 
was challenging but this was also an opportunity for the ‘extended case methods’ approach to 
the research of continuous reflection on theory and methods with the Collaborative Partner. 
While this study focused on the role and contribution of local government it would be useful 
to explore the role of other public bodies increasingly engaged in the local state for economic 
development and growth. Also to explore the role and responsibilities of local government to 
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enable and facilitate the increased participation of civics actors in more participatory forms of 
local governance. Additional case studies within the English context could have provided 
further insight on the variation in approach and outcomes as well as reflection on the two 
case studies. But these would not have achieved the same level and depth of insight as to 
what achieved here. It may have been challenging to achieve the same level and depth of 
insight across a greater number of case studies in addition to the time and cost implications of 
this. Furthermore, while international case studies could have provided insight on different 
approaches and interpretations of an economic development and growth agenda, the highly 
centralised English context would be a challenge for comparative research.  
 
In terms of reflecting on the methods used, the research propositions and analytical 
framework were useful to bridge the important themes of the literature with the empirical 
research. These themes were broad and distinct which helped when organising the analysis in 
addition to acting as prompts in the interviews. The case studies were illuminations of what 
the themes meant to interviews based on what they thought was important, with some cross-
case comparison, rather than a structured and exact comparison. This also reflected the case 
study extreme/deviant strategy and the different stages the case studies were at.  
 
  
8.3.1 Future research agenda 
Even since this research was completed, events have moved on and in a sense, a number of 
the tensions which I identified through the research has become more manifest since the 
research was completed. Following the initial signing of the North East devolution proposal 
by constituent authorities in 2015, this was finally rejected by 4 local authorities to 3 in 2016 
leading to the proposed disbandment of the North East Combined Authority. In Greater 
Manchester, the Greater Manchester Spatial Framework has exposed tensions on the location 
of investments and housing and the changed governance arrangements with the newly 
directly-elected mayor is starting to disrupt established ways of working and decision-making 
between political leaders in GM. 
 
For future research, there are some areas that could be developed. First, drawing on Jane 
Wills’ (2016) work to examine more ‘bottom up’ and participatory forms of governance and 
why the local state is bad at adapting to this. Second, examining the financial collapse and 
demise of local government under fiscal stress and austerity to understand whether local 
governments can fail and what the implications would be. Third, by pursuing international 
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comparative studies to understand how decentralisation, austerity and the changing role of 
local government in the local state has unfolded in different political economies and 
variegations of capitalism. Fourth, to explore economic development as a function of local 
government if localisation continues and local authorities becoming financially independent. 
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